fix some CVE and update spec

This commit is contained in:
openeuler-basic 2019-12-25 18:38:04 +08:00
parent 11db1f8d64
commit f3e7b3de9b
11 changed files with 589 additions and 3 deletions

101
CVE-2018-20852.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,101 @@
diff -uNrp a/Lib/cookielib.py b/Lib/cookielib.py
--- a/Lib/cookielib.py 2019-12-21 16:06:12.476000000 +0800
+++ b/Lib/cookielib.py 2019-12-21 16:09:31.556000000 +0800
@@ -1139,6 +1139,12 @@ class DefaultCookiePolicy(CookiePolicy):
req_host, erhn = eff_request_host(request)
domain = cookie.domain
+ if domain and not domain.startswith("."):
+ dotdomain = "." + domain
+ else:
+ dotdomain = domain
+
+
# strict check of non-domain cookies: Mozilla does this, MSIE5 doesn't
if (cookie.version == 0 and
(self.strict_ns_domain & self.DomainStrictNonDomain) and
@@ -1151,7 +1157,7 @@ class DefaultCookiePolicy(CookiePolicy):
_debug(" effective request-host name %s does not domain-match "
"RFC 2965 cookie domain %s", erhn, domain)
return False
- if cookie.version == 0 and not ("."+erhn).endswith(domain):
+ if cookie.version == 0 and not ("."+erhn).endswith(dotdomain):
_debug(" request-host %s does not match Netscape cookie domain "
"%s", req_host, domain)
return False
@@ -1165,7 +1171,11 @@ class DefaultCookiePolicy(CookiePolicy):
req_host = "."+req_host
if not erhn.startswith("."):
erhn = "."+erhn
- if not (req_host.endswith(domain) or erhn.endswith(domain)):
+ if domain and not domain.startswith("."):
+ dotdomain = "." + domain
+ else:
+ dotdomain = domain
+ if not (req_host.endswith(dotdomain) or erhn.endswith(dotdomain)):
#_debug(" request domain %s does not match cookie domain %s",
# req_host, domain)
return False
diff -uNrp a/Lib/test/test_cookielib.py b/Lib/test/test_cookielib.py
--- a/Lib/test/test_cookielib.py 2019-12-21 16:06:12.640000000 +0800
+++ b/Lib/test/test_cookielib.py 2019-12-21 16:11:53.888000000 +0800
@@ -368,6 +368,7 @@ class CookieTests(TestCase):
("http://foo.bar.com/", ".foo.bar.com", True),
("http://foo.bar.com/", "foo.bar.com", True),
("http://foo.bar.com/", ".bar.com", True),
+ ("http://foo.bar.com/", "bar.com", True),
("http://foo.bar.com/", "com", True),
("http://foo.com/", "rhubarb.foo.com", False),
("http://foo.com/", ".foo.com", True),
@@ -378,6 +379,8 @@ class CookieTests(TestCase):
("http://foo/", "foo", True),
("http://foo/", "foo.local", True),
("http://foo/", ".local", True),
+ ("http://barfoo.com", ".foo.com", False),
+ ("http://barfoo.com", "foo.com", False),
]:
request = urllib2.Request(url)
r = pol.domain_return_ok(domain, request)
@@ -938,6 +941,34 @@ class CookieTests(TestCase):
c.add_cookie_header(req)
self.assertFalse(req.has_header("Cookie"))
+ c.clear()
+
+ pol.set_blocked_domains([])
+ req = Request("http://acme.com/")
+ res = FakeResponse(headers, "http://acme.com/")
+ cookies = c.make_cookies(res, req)
+ c.extract_cookies(res, req)
+ self.assertEqual(len(c), 1)
+
+ req = Request("http://acme.com/")
+ c.add_cookie_header(req)
+ self.assertTrue(req.has_header("Cookie"))
+
+ req = Request("http://badacme.com/")
+ c.add_cookie_header(req)
+ self.assertFalse(pol.return_ok(cookies[0], req))
+ self.assertFalse(req.has_header("Cookie"))
+
+ p = pol.set_blocked_domains(["acme.com"])
+ req = Request("http://acme.com/")
+ c.add_cookie_header(req)
+ self.assertFalse(req.has_header("Cookie"))
+
+ req = Request("http://badacme.com/")
+ c.add_cookie_header(req)
+ self.assertFalse(req.has_header("Cookie"))
+
+
def test_secure(self):
from cookielib import CookieJar, DefaultCookiePolicy
diff -uNrp a/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2019-05-20-00-35-12.bpo-35121.RRi-HU.rst b/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2019-05-20-00-35-12.bpo-35121.RRi-HU.rst
--- a/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2019-05-20-00-35-12.bpo-35121.RRi-HU.rst 1970-01-01 08:00:00.000000000 +0800
+++ b/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2019-05-20-00-35-12.bpo-35121.RRi-HU.rst 2019-12-21 16:12:17.416000000 +0800
@@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
+Don't send cookies of domain A without Domain attribute to domain B when
+domain A is a suffix match of domain B while using a cookiejar with
+:class:`cookielib.DefaultCookiePolicy` policy. Patch by Karthikeyan
+Singaravelan.

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@ -0,0 +1,45 @@
diff -uNrp a/Lib/test/test_urlparse.py b/Lib/test/test_urlparse.py
--- a/Lib/test/test_urlparse.py 2019-12-21 15:41:32.172000000 +0800
+++ b/Lib/test/test_urlparse.py 2019-12-21 15:44:28.316000000 +0800
@@ -641,6 +641,12 @@ class UrlParseTestCase(unittest.TestCase
self.assertIn(u'\u2100', denorm_chars)
self.assertIn(u'\uFF03', denorm_chars)
+ # bpo-36742: Verify port separators are ignored when they
+ # existed prior to decomposition
+ urlparse.urlsplit(u'http://\u30d5\u309a:80')
+ with self.assertRaises(ValueError):
+ urlparse.urlsplit(u'http://\u30d5\u309a\ufe1380')
+
for scheme in [u"http", u"https", u"ftp"]:
for c in denorm_chars:
url = u"{}://netloc{}false.netloc/path".format(scheme, c)
diff -uNrp a/Lib/urlparse.py b/Lib/urlparse.py
--- a/Lib/urlparse.py 2019-12-21 15:41:32.080000000 +0800
+++ b/Lib/urlparse.py 2019-12-21 15:46:11.480000000 +0800
@@ -171,13 +171,17 @@ def _checknetloc(netloc):
# looking for characters like \u2100 that expand to 'a/c'
# IDNA uses NFKC equivalence, so normalize for this check
import unicodedata
- netloc2 = unicodedata.normalize('NFKC', netloc)
- if netloc == netloc2:
+ n = netloc.rpartition('@')[2] # ignore anything to the left of '@'
+ n = n.replace(':', '') # ignore characters already included
+ n = n.replace('#', '') # but not the surrounding text
+ n = n.replace('?', '')
+ netloc2 = unicodedata.normalize('NFKC', n)
+ if n == netloc2:
return
_, _, netloc = netloc.rpartition('@') # anything to the left of '@' is okay
for c in '/?#@:':
if c in netloc2:
- raise ValueError("netloc '" + netloc2 + "' contains invalid " +
+ raise ValueError("netloc '" + netloc + "' contains invalid " +
"characters under NFKC normalization")
def urlsplit(url, scheme='', allow_fragments=True):
diff -uNrp a/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2019-04-29-15-34-59.bpo-36742.QCUY0i.rst b/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2019-04-29-15-34-59.bpo-36742.QCUY0i.rst
--- a/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2019-04-29-15-34-59.bpo-36742.QCUY0i.rst 1970-01-01 08:00:00.000000000 +0800
+++ b/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2019-04-29-15-34-59.bpo-36742.QCUY0i.rst 2019-12-21 15:53:31.188000000 +0800
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+Fixes mishandling of pre-normalization characters in urlsplit().

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@ -0,0 +1,50 @@
diff -uNrp a/Lib/test/test_urlparse.py b/Lib/test/test_urlparse.py
--- a/Lib/test/test_urlparse.py 2019-12-21 15:54:46.576000000 +0800
+++ b/Lib/test/test_urlparse.py 2019-12-21 15:56:22.440000000 +0800
@@ -648,11 +648,13 @@ class UrlParseTestCase(unittest.TestCase
urlparse.urlsplit(u'http://\u30d5\u309a\ufe1380')
for scheme in [u"http", u"https", u"ftp"]:
- for c in denorm_chars:
- url = u"{}://netloc{}false.netloc/path".format(scheme, c)
- print "Checking %r" % url
- with self.assertRaises(ValueError):
- urlparse.urlsplit(url)
+ for netloc in [u"netloc{}false.netloc", u"n{}user@netloc"]:
+ for c in denorm_chars:
+ url = u"{}://{}/path".format(scheme, netloc.format(c))
+ if test_support.verbose:
+ print "Checking %r" % url
+ with self.assertRaises(ValueError):
+ urlparse.urlsplit(url)
def test_main():
test_support.run_unittest(UrlParseTestCase)
diff -uNrp a/Lib/urlparse.py b/Lib/urlparse.py
--- a/Lib/urlparse.py 2019-12-21 15:54:46.344000000 +0800
+++ b/Lib/urlparse.py 2019-12-21 15:57:41.260000000 +0800
@@ -171,18 +171,18 @@ def _checknetloc(netloc):
# looking for characters like \u2100 that expand to 'a/c'
# IDNA uses NFKC equivalence, so normalize for this check
import unicodedata
- n = netloc.rpartition('@')[2] # ignore anything to the left of '@'
- n = n.replace(':', '') # ignore characters already included
- n = n.replace('#', '') # but not the surrounding text
- n = n.replace('?', '')
+ n = netloc.replace(u'@', u'') # ignore characters already included
+ n = n.replace(u':', u'') # but not the surrounding text
+ n = n.replace(u'#', u'')
+ n = n.replace(u'?', u'')
netloc2 = unicodedata.normalize('NFKC', n)
if n == netloc2:
return
_, _, netloc = netloc.rpartition('@') # anything to the left of '@' is okay
for c in '/?#@:':
if c in netloc2:
- raise ValueError("netloc '" + netloc + "' contains invalid " +
- "characters under NFKC normalization")
+ raise ValueError(u"netloc '" + netloc + u"' contains invalid " +
+ u"characters under NFKC normalization")
def urlsplit(url, scheme='', allow_fragments=True):
"""Parse a URL into 5 components:

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@ -0,0 +1,41 @@
diff -uNrp a/Lib/test/test_urlparse.py b/Lib/test/test_urlparse.py
--- a/Lib/test/test_urlparse.py 2019-12-21 15:58:00.556000000 +0800
+++ b/Lib/test/test_urlparse.py 2019-12-21 15:59:11.456000000 +0800
@@ -656,6 +656,15 @@ class UrlParseTestCase(unittest.TestCase
with self.assertRaises(ValueError):
urlparse.urlsplit(url)
+ # check error message: invalid netloc must be formated with repr()
+ # to get an ASCII error message
+ with self.assertRaises(ValueError) as cm:
+ urlparse.urlsplit(u'http://example.com\uFF03@bing.com')
+ self.assertEqual(str(cm.exception),
+ "netloc u'example.com\\uff03@bing.com' contains invalid characters "
+ "under NFKC normalization")
+ self.assertIsInstance(cm.exception.args[0], str)
+
def test_main():
test_support.run_unittest(UrlParseTestCase)
diff -uNrp a/Lib/urlparse.py b/Lib/urlparse.py
--- a/Lib/urlparse.py 2019-12-21 15:58:00.480000000 +0800
+++ b/Lib/urlparse.py 2019-12-21 15:59:55.128000000 +0800
@@ -181,8 +181,9 @@ def _checknetloc(netloc):
_, _, netloc = netloc.rpartition('@') # anything to the left of '@' is okay
for c in '/?#@:':
if c in netloc2:
- raise ValueError(u"netloc '" + netloc + u"' contains invalid " +
- u"characters under NFKC normalization")
+ raise ValueError("netloc %r contains invalid characters "
+ "under NFKC normalization"
+ % netloc)
def urlsplit(url, scheme='', allow_fragments=True):
"""Parse a URL into 5 components:
diff -uNrp a/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Library/2019-06-10-12-02-45.bpo-36742.UEdHXJ.rst b/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Library/2019-06-10-12-02-45.bpo-36742.UEdHXJ.rst
--- a/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Library/2019-06-10-12-02-45.bpo-36742.UEdHXJ.rst 1970-01-01 08:00:00.000000000 +0800
+++ b/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Library/2019-06-10-12-02-45.bpo-36742.UEdHXJ.rst 2019-12-21 16:00:40.480000000 +0800
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+:func:`urlparse.urlsplit` error message for invalid ``netloc`` according to
+NFKC normalization is now a :class:`str` string, rather than a
+:class:`unicode` string, to prevent error when displaying the error.

57
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@ -0,0 +1,57 @@
diff -uNrp a/Lib/email/_parseaddr.py b/Lib/email/_parseaddr.py
--- a/Lib/email/_parseaddr.py 2019-12-21 16:01:21.340000000 +0800
+++ b/Lib/email/_parseaddr.py 2019-12-21 16:03:22.108000000 +0800
@@ -336,7 +336,12 @@ class AddrlistClass:
aslist.append('@')
self.pos += 1
self.gotonext()
- return EMPTYSTRING.join(aslist) + self.getdomain()
+ domain = self.getdomain()
+ if not domain:
+ # Invalid domain, return an empty address instead of returning a
+ # local part to denote failed parsing.
+ return EMPTYSTRING
+ return EMPTYSTRING.join(aslist) + domain
def getdomain(self):
"""Get the complete domain name from an address."""
@@ -351,6 +356,10 @@ class AddrlistClass:
elif self.field[self.pos] == '.':
self.pos += 1
sdlist.append('.')
+ elif self.field[self.pos] == '@':
+ # bpo-34155: Don't parse domains with two `@` like
+ # `a@malicious.org@important.com`.
+ return EMPTYSTRING
elif self.field[self.pos] in self.atomends:
break
else:
diff -uNrp a/Lib/email/test/test_email.py b/Lib/email/test/test_email.py
--- a/Lib/email/test/test_email.py 2019-12-21 16:01:21.344000000 +0800
+++ b/Lib/email/test/test_email.py 2019-12-21 16:04:40.564000000 +0800
@@ -2306,6 +2306,20 @@ class TestMiscellaneous(TestEmailBase):
self.assertEqual(Utils.parseaddr('<>'), ('', ''))
self.assertEqual(Utils.formataddr(Utils.parseaddr('<>')), '')
+ def test_parseaddr_multiple_domains(self):
+ self.assertEqual(
+ Utils.parseaddr('a@b@c'),
+ ('', '')
+ )
+ self.assertEqual(
+ Utils.parseaddr('a@b.c@c'),
+ ('', '')
+ )
+ self.assertEqual(
+ Utils.parseaddr('a@172.17.0.1@c'),
+ ('', '')
+ )
+
def test_noquote_dump(self):
self.assertEqual(
Utils.formataddr(('A Silly Person', 'person@dom.ain')),
diff -uNrp a/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2019-05-04-13-33-37.bpo-34155.MJll68.rst b/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2019-05-04-13-33-37.bpo-34155.MJll68.rst
--- a/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2019-05-04-13-33-37.bpo-34155.MJll68.rst 1970-01-01 08:00:00.000000000 +0800
+++ b/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2019-05-04-13-33-37.bpo-34155.MJll68.rst 2019-12-21 16:05:05.292000000 +0800
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+Fix parsing of invalid email addresses with more than one ``@`` (e.g. a@b@c.com.) to not return the part before 2nd ``@`` as valid email address. Patch by maxking & jpic.

74
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@ -0,0 +1,74 @@
diff -uNrp a/Lib/DocXMLRPCServer.py b/Lib/DocXMLRPCServer.py
--- a/Lib/DocXMLRPCServer.py 2019-12-21 16:13:25.240000000 +0800
+++ b/Lib/DocXMLRPCServer.py 2019-12-21 16:15:24.076000000 +0800
@@ -20,6 +20,15 @@ from SimpleXMLRPCServer import (SimpleXM
CGIXMLRPCRequestHandler,
resolve_dotted_attribute)
+def _html_escape_quote(s):
+ s = s.replace("&", "&amp;") # Must be done first!
+ s = s.replace("<", "&lt;")
+ s = s.replace(">", "&gt;")
+ s = s.replace('"', "&quot;")
+ s = s.replace('\'', "&#x27;")
+ return s
+
+
class ServerHTMLDoc(pydoc.HTMLDoc):
"""Class used to generate pydoc HTML document for a server"""
@@ -210,7 +219,9 @@ class XMLRPCDocGenerator:
methods
)
- return documenter.page(self.server_title, documentation)
+ title = _html_escape_quote(self.server_title)
+ return documenter.page(title, documentation)
+
class DocXMLRPCRequestHandler(SimpleXMLRPCRequestHandler):
"""XML-RPC and documentation request handler class.
diff -uNrp a/Lib/test/test_docxmlrpc.py b/Lib/test/test_docxmlrpc.py
--- a/Lib/test/test_docxmlrpc.py 2019-12-21 16:13:25.340000000 +0800
+++ b/Lib/test/test_docxmlrpc.py 2019-12-21 16:16:49.828000000 +0800
@@ -1,5 +1,6 @@
from DocXMLRPCServer import DocXMLRPCServer
import httplib
+import re
import sys
from test import test_support
threading = test_support.import_module('threading')
@@ -176,6 +177,26 @@ class DocXMLRPCHTTPGETServer(unittest.Te
self.assertIn("""Try&nbsp;self.<strong>add</strong>,&nbsp;too.""",
response.read())
+ def test_server_title_escape(self):
+ """Test that the server title and documentation
+ are escaped for HTML.
+ """
+ self.serv.set_server_title('test_title<script>')
+ self.serv.set_server_documentation('test_documentation<script>')
+ self.assertEqual('test_title<script>', self.serv.server_title)
+ self.assertEqual('test_documentation<script>',
+ self.serv.server_documentation)
+
+ generated = self.serv.generate_html_documentation()
+ title = re.search(r'<title>(.+?)</title>', generated).group()
+ documentation = re.search(r'<p><tt>(.+?)</tt></p>', generated).group()
+ self.assertEqual('<title>Python: test_title&lt;script&gt;</title>',
+ title)
+ self.assertEqual('<p><tt>test_documentation&lt;script&gt;</tt></p>',
+ documentation)
+
+
+
def test_main():
test_support.run_unittest(DocXMLRPCHTTPGETServer)
diff -uNrp a/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2019-09-25-13-21-09.bpo-38243.1pfz24.rst b/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2019-09-25-13-21-09.bpo-38243.1pfz24.rst
--- a/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2019-09-25-13-21-09.bpo-38243.1pfz24.rst 1970-01-01 08:00:00.000000000 +0800
+++ b/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2019-09-25-13-21-09.bpo-38243.1pfz24.rst 2019-12-21 16:17:13.368000000 +0800
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+Escape the server title of :class:`DocXMLRPCServer.DocXMLRPCServer`
+when rendering the document page as HTML.
+(Contributed by Dong-hee Na in :issue:`38243`.)

13
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@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
diff -uNrp a/Doc/library/glob.rst b/Doc/library/glob.rst
--- a/Doc/library/glob.rst 2019-12-21 16:18:26.908000000 +0800
+++ b/Doc/library/glob.rst 2019-12-21 16:19:36.668000000 +0800
@@ -31,7 +31,8 @@ For example, ``'[?]'`` matches the chara
a string containing a path specification. *pathname* can be either absolute
(like :file:`/usr/src/Python-1.5/Makefile`) or relative (like
:file:`../../Tools/\*/\*.gif`), and can contain shell-style wildcards. Broken
- symlinks are included in the results (as in the shell).
+ symlinks are included in the results (as in the shell). Whether or not the
+ results are sorted depends on the file system.
.. function:: iglob(pathname)

View File

@ -0,0 +1,128 @@
diff -uNrp a/Doc/library/urlparse.rst b/Doc/library/urlparse.rst
--- a/Doc/library/urlparse.rst 2019-12-21 15:21:09.836000000 +0800
+++ b/Doc/library/urlparse.rst 2019-12-21 15:34:37.812000000 +0800
@@ -119,12 +119,22 @@ The :mod:`urlparse` module defines the f
See section :ref:`urlparse-result-object` for more information on the result
object.
+ Characters in the :attr:`netloc` attribute that decompose under NFKC
+ normalization (as used by the IDNA encoding) into any of ``/``, ``?``,
+ ``#``, ``@``, or ``:`` will raise a :exc:`ValueError`. If the URL is
+ decomposed before parsing, or is not a Unicode string, no error will be
+ raised
+
.. versionchanged:: 2.5
Added attributes to return value.
.. versionchanged:: 2.7
Added IPv6 URL parsing capabilities.
+ .. versionchanged:: 2.7.17
+ Characters that affect netloc parsing under NFKC normalization will
+ now raise :exc:`ValueError`.
+
.. function:: parse_qs(qs[, keep_blank_values[, strict_parsing[, max_num_fields]]])
@@ -232,11 +242,21 @@ The :mod:`urlparse` module defines the f
See section :ref:`urlparse-result-object` for more information on the result
object.
+ Characters in the :attr:`netloc` attribute that decompose under NFKC
+ normalization (as used by the IDNA encoding) into any of ``/``, ``?``,
+ ``#``, ``@``, or ``:`` will raise a :exc:`ValueError`. If the URL is
+ decomposed before parsing, or is not a Unicode string, no error will be
+ raised.
+
.. versionadded:: 2.2
.. versionchanged:: 2.5
Added attributes to return value.
+ .. versionchanged:: 2.7.17
+ Characters that affect netloc parsing under NFKC normalization will
+ now raise :exc:`ValueError`.
+
.. function:: urlunsplit(parts)
diff -uNrp a/Lib/test/test_urlparse.py b/Lib/test/test_urlparse.py
--- a/Lib/test/test_urlparse.py 2019-12-21 15:21:09.456000000 +0800
+++ b/Lib/test/test_urlparse.py 2019-12-21 15:37:03.840000000 +0800
@@ -1,4 +1,6 @@
from test import test_support
+import sys
+import unicodedata
import unittest
import urlparse
@@ -623,6 +625,28 @@ class UrlParseTestCase(unittest.TestCase
self.assertEqual(urlparse.urlparse("https:"),('https','','','','',''))
self.assertEqual(urlparse.urlparse("http://www.python.org:80"),
('http','www.python.org:80','','','',''))
+
+ def test_urlsplit_normalization(self):
+ # Certain characters should never occur in the netloc,
+ # including under normalization.
+ # Ensure that ALL of them are detected and cause an error
+ illegal_chars = u'/:#?@'
+ hex_chars = {'{:04X}'.format(ord(c)) for c in illegal_chars}
+ denorm_chars = [
+ c for c in map(unichr, range(128, sys.maxunicode))
+ if (hex_chars & set(unicodedata.decomposition(c).split()))
+ and c not in illegal_chars
+ ]
+ # Sanity check that we found at least one such character
+ self.assertIn(u'\u2100', denorm_chars)
+ self.assertIn(u'\uFF03', denorm_chars)
+
+ for scheme in [u"http", u"https", u"ftp"]:
+ for c in denorm_chars:
+ url = u"{}://netloc{}false.netloc/path".format(scheme, c)
+ print "Checking %r" % url
+ with self.assertRaises(ValueError):
+ urlparse.urlsplit(url)
def test_main():
test_support.run_unittest(UrlParseTestCase)
diff -uNrp a/Lib/urlparse.py b/Lib/urlparse.py
--- a/Lib/urlparse.py 2019-12-21 15:21:09.304000000 +0800
+++ b/Lib/urlparse.py 2019-12-21 15:39:24.324000000 +0800
@@ -165,6 +165,21 @@ def _splitnetloc(url, start=0):
delim = min(delim, wdelim) # use earliest delim position
return url[start:delim], url[delim:] # return (domain, rest)
+def _checknetloc(netloc):
+ if not netloc or not isinstance(netloc, unicode):
+ return
+ # looking for characters like \u2100 that expand to 'a/c'
+ # IDNA uses NFKC equivalence, so normalize for this check
+ import unicodedata
+ netloc2 = unicodedata.normalize('NFKC', netloc)
+ if netloc == netloc2:
+ return
+ _, _, netloc = netloc.rpartition('@') # anything to the left of '@' is okay
+ for c in '/?#@:':
+ if c in netloc2:
+ raise ValueError("netloc '" + netloc2 + "' contains invalid " +
+ "characters under NFKC normalization")
+
def urlsplit(url, scheme='', allow_fragments=True):
"""Parse a URL into 5 components:
<scheme>://<netloc>/<path>?<query>#<fragment>
@@ -193,6 +208,7 @@ def urlsplit(url, scheme='', allow_fragm
url, fragment = url.split('#', 1)
if '?' in url:
url, query = url.split('?', 1)
+ _checknetloc(netloc)
v = SplitResult(scheme, netloc, url, query, fragment)
_parse_cache[key] = v
return v
@@ -216,6 +232,7 @@ def urlsplit(url, scheme='', allow_fragm
url, fragment = url.split('#', 1)
if '?' in url:
url, query = url.split('?', 1)
+ _checknetloc(netloc)
v = SplitResult(scheme, netloc, url, query, fragment)
_parse_cache[key] = v
return v

View File

@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
diff -uNrp a/Lib/platform.py b/Lib/platform.py
--- a/Lib/platform.py 2019-12-21 15:00:32.420000000 +0800
+++ b/Lib/platform.py 2019-12-21 15:07:14.292000000 +0800
@@ -353,6 +353,8 @@ def linux_distribution(distname='', vers
return distname,version,id
etc.sort()
for file in etc:
+ if os.path.islink('/etc/'+file):
+ continue
m = _release_filename.match(file)
if m is not None:
_distname,dummy = m.groups()

View File

@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
diff -uNrp a/Lib/test/test_codecs.py b/Lib/test/test_codecs.py
--- a/Lib/test/test_codecs.py 2019-12-21 15:08:05.068000000 +0800
+++ b/Lib/test/test_codecs.py 2019-12-21 15:17:35.536000000 +0800
@@ -1427,7 +1427,7 @@ class CodecsModuleTest(unittest.TestCase
def test_lookup_issue1813(self):
# Issue #1813: under Turkish locales, lookup of some codecs failed
# because 'I' is lowercased as a dotless "i"
- oldlocale = locale.getlocale(locale.LC_CTYPE)
+ oldlocale = locale.setlocale(locale.LC_CTYPE)
self.addCleanup(locale.setlocale, locale.LC_CTYPE, oldlocale)
try:
locale.setlocale(locale.LC_CTYPE, 'tr_TR')
diff -uNrp a/Lib/test/test_locale.py b/Lib/test/test_locale.py
--- a/Lib/test/test_locale.py 2019-12-21 15:08:05.060000000 +0800
+++ b/Lib/test/test_locale.py 2019-12-21 15:19:01.140000000 +0800
@@ -469,7 +469,7 @@ class TestMiscellaneous(unittest.TestCas
def test_getsetlocale_issue1813(self):
# Issue #1813: setting and getting the locale under a Turkish locale
- oldlocale = locale.getlocale()
+ oldlocale = locale.setlocale(locale.LC_CTYPE)
self.addCleanup(locale.setlocale, locale.LC_CTYPE, oldlocale)
for loc in ('tr_TR', 'tr_TR.UTF-8', 'tr_TR.ISO8859-9'):
try:
@@ -494,7 +494,7 @@ class TestMiscellaneous(unittest.TestCas
self.assertEqual(locale.normalize(u'en_US'), 'en_US.ISO8859-1')
def test_setlocale_unicode(self):
- oldlocale = locale.getlocale()
+ oldlocale = locale.setlocale(locale.LC_CTYPE)
self.addCleanup(locale.setlocale, locale.LC_CTYPE, oldlocale)
user_locale = locale.setlocale(locale.LC_CTYPE, '')

View File

@ -15,7 +15,7 @@
%undefine _debuginfo_subpackages
Name: python2
Version: 2.7.16
Release: 6
Release: 8
Summary: Python is an interpreted, interactive object-oriented programming language suitable
License: Python
URL: https://www.python.org/
@ -88,6 +88,16 @@ Patch6044: python2-CVE-2019-9948-1.patch
Patch6045: python2-CVE-2019-9948-2.patch
Patch6047: CVE-2019-9740.patch
Patch9000: python2-add-generic-os-supportr.patch
Patch6048: bugfix-linux_distribution-skip-link-file.patch
Patch6049: bugfix-test_locale-and-test_codecs.patch
Patch6050: CVE-2019-9636-bpo-36216-Add-check-for-characters.patch
Patch6051: CVE-2019-10160-1.patch
Patch6052: CVE-2019-10160-2.patch
Patch6053: CVE-2019-10160-3.patch
Patch6054: CVE-2019-16056.patch
Patch6055: CVE-2018-20852.patch
Patch6056: CVE-2019-16935.patch
Patch6057: CVE-2019-17514.patch
BuildRequires: libdb-devel libffi-devel valgrind-devel ncurses-devel expat-devel readline-devel
BuildRequires: openssl-devel libtirpc-devel tcl-devel tk-devel glibc-devel libnsl2-devel
@ -164,6 +174,7 @@ Obsoletes: %{name}-test < %{version}-%{release}
Obsoletes: %{name}-test%{?_isa} < %{version}-%{release}
Provides: %{name}-test = %{version}-%{release}
Provides: %{name}-test%{?_isa} = %{version}-%{release}
Requires: openEuler-rpm-config
%description devel
This package contains libraries and header files used to build applications
@ -286,7 +297,7 @@ BuildPython optimized \
python%{pybasever} \
true \
%ifarch %{ix86} x86_64
"--enable-optimizations"
"--disable-optimizations" \
%else
""
%endif
@ -375,6 +386,7 @@ for Dir in python%{pybasever} python%{pybasever}-debug ; do
#endif
EOF
done
ln -s ../../libpython%{pybasever}.so %{buildroot}%{pylibdir}/config/libpython%{pybasever}.so
#with systemtap
mkdir -p %{buildroot}%{tapsetdir}
@ -455,7 +467,6 @@ sed -e "s|LIBRARY_PATH|%{_libdir}/%{py_INSTSONAME_debug}|" %{SOURCE1} \
%{pylibdir}/test/script_helper.py*
%{pylibdir}/test/test_support.py*
%files tkinter
%defattr(-,root,root)
%{pylibdir}/lib-tk
@ -469,6 +480,8 @@ sed -e "s|LIBRARY_PATH|%{_libdir}/%{py_INSTSONAME_debug}|" %{SOURCE1} \
%{_libdir}/pkgconfig/python*.pc
%{_libdir}/libpython%{pybasever}.so
%{_bindir}/python*-config
%{pylibdir}/distutils/command/wininst-*.exe
%doc Misc/README.valgrind Misc/valgrind-python.supp Misc/gdbinit
#Tests
%{pylibdir}/bsddb/test
@ -479,6 +492,16 @@ sed -e "s|LIBRARY_PATH|%{_libdir}/%{py_INSTSONAME_debug}|" %{SOURCE1} \
%{pylibdir}/lib2to3/tests
%{pylibdir}/sqlite3/test
%{pylibdir}/test/*
%exclude %{pylibdir}/test/allsans.pem
%exclude %{pylibdir}/test/badcert.pem
%exclude %{pylibdir}/test/badkey.pem
%exclude %{pylibdir}/test/keycert2.pem
%exclude %{pylibdir}/test/keycert3.pem
%exclude %{pylibdir}/test/keycert4.pem
%exclude %{pylibdir}/test/keycert.pem
%exclude %{pylibdir}/test/ssl_key.pem
%exclude %{pylibdir}/test/ssl_key.passwd.pem
%exclude %{pylibdir}/test/keycert.passwd.pem
%exclude %{pylibdir}/test/__init__.py*
%exclude %{pylibdir}/test/support/
%exclude %{pylibdir}/test/script_helper.py*
@ -616,6 +639,15 @@ sed -e "s|LIBRARY_PATH|%{_libdir}/%{py_INSTSONAME_debug}|" %{SOURCE1} \
%{dynload_dir}/_testcapimodule_d.so
%changelog
* Wed Dec 25 2019 openEuler Buildteam <buildteam@openeuler.org> - 2.7.16-8
- exclude private key; provide some file in python2-devel
* Sat Dec 21 2019 openEuler Buildteam <buildteam@openeuler.org> - 2.7.16-7
- Type:bugfix
- Id:NA
- SUG:NA
- DESC:fix CVE
* Thu Nov 28 2019 openEuler Buildteam <buildteam@openeuler.org> - 2.7.16-6
- add _pyconfig32_h _pyconfig64_h global var