backport-CVE-2024-22195.patch

@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ index 9741567..3230539 100644
      """Convert a value to lowercase."""
      return soft_unicode(s).lower()
  
-+_space_re = re.compile(r"\s", re.U)
++_space_re = re.compile(r"\s", flags=re.ASCII)
  
  @evalcontextfilter
  def do_xmlattr(_eval_ctx, d, autospace=True):
@@ -51,9 +51,9 @@ index 9741567..3230539 100644
 +            continue
 +
 +        if _space_re.search(key) is not None:
-+            raise ValueError("Spaces are not allowed in attributes: {}".format(key))
++            raise ValueError(f"Spaces are not allowed in attributes: '{key}'")
 +
-+        items.append('{}="{}"'.format(escape(key), escape(value)))
++        items.append(f'{escape(key)}="{escape(value)}"')
 +
 +    rv = " ".join(items)
      if autospace and rv:

backport-CVE-2024-34064.patch

@@ -1,109 +0,0 @@
-From 0668239dc6b44ef38e7a6c9f91f312fd4ca581cb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: David Lord <davidism@gmail.com>
-Date: Thu, 2 May 2024 09:14:00 -0700
-Subject: [PATCH] disallow invalid characters in keys to xmlattr filter
-
-Reference:https://github.com/pallets/jinja/commit/0668239dc6b44ef38e7a6c9f91f312fd4ca581cb
-Conflict:NA
-
----
- Jinja2-2.11.2/CHANGES.rst           |  6 ++++++
- Jinja2-2.11.2/src/jinja2/filters.py | 23 ++++++++++++++++++-----
- Jinja2-2.11.2/tests/test_filters.py | 11 ++++++-----
- 3 files changed, 30 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/Jinja2-2.11.2/CHANGES.rst b/Jinja2-2.11.2/CHANGES.rst
-index 6dfe912..2c7614b 100644
---- a/Jinja2-2.11.2/CHANGES.rst
-+++ b/Jinja2-2.11.2/CHANGES.rst
-@@ -1,5 +1,11 @@
- .. currentmodule:: jinja2
- 
-+-   The ``xmlattr`` filter does not allow keys with ``/`` solidus, ``>``
-+    greater-than sign, or ``=`` equals sign, in addition to disallowing spaces.
-+    Regardless of any validation done by Jinja, user input should never be used
-+    as keys to this filter, or must be separately validated first.
-+    GHSA-h75v-3vvj-5mfj
-+
- Version 2.11.3
- --------------
- 
-diff --git a/Jinja2-2.11.2/src/jinja2/filters.py b/Jinja2-2.11.2/src/jinja2/filters.py
-index eed8d8b..92592dc 100644
---- a/Jinja2-2.11.2/src/jinja2/filters.py
-+++ b/Jinja2-2.11.2/src/jinja2/filters.py
-@@ -204,15 +204,24 @@ def do_lower(s):
-     """Convert a value to lowercase."""
-     return soft_unicode(s).lower()
- 
--_space_re = re.compile(r"\s", re.U)
-+
-+# Check for characters that would move the parser state from key to value.
-+# https://html.spec.whatwg.org/#attribute-name-state
-+_attr_key_re = re.compile(r"[\s/>=]", flags=re.U)
- 
- @evalcontextfilter
- def do_xmlattr(_eval_ctx, d, autospace=True):
-     """Create an SGML/XML attribute string based on the items in a dict.
-     All values that are neither `none` nor `undefined` are automatically
-     escaped:
--    If any key contains a space, this fails with a ``ValueError``. Values that
--    are neither ``none`` nor ``undefined`` are automatically escaped.
-+    **Values** that are neither ``none`` nor ``undefined`` are automatically
-+    escaped, safely allowing untrusted user input.
-+
-+    User input should not be used as **keys** to this filter. If any key
-+    contains a space, ``/`` solidus, ``>`` greater-than sign, or ``=`` equals
-+    sign, this fails with a ``ValueError``. Regardless of this, user input
-+    should never be used as keys to this filter, or must be separately validated
-+    first.
-     .. sourcecode:: html+jinja
- 
-         <ul{{ {'class': 'my_list', 'missing': none,
-@@ -231,6 +240,10 @@ def do_xmlattr(_eval_ctx, d, autospace=True):
-     As you can see it automatically prepends a space in front of the item
-     if the filter returned something unless the second parameter is false.
- 
-+    .. versionchanged:: 3.1.4
-+        Keys with ``/`` solidus, ``>`` greater-than sign, or ``=`` equals sign
-+        are not allowed.
-+
-     .. versionchanged:: 3.1.3
-         Keys with spaces are not allowed.
-     """
-@@ -240,8 +253,8 @@ def do_xmlattr(_eval_ctx, d, autospace=True):
-         if value is None or isinstance(value, Undefined):
-             continue
- 
--        if _space_re.search(key) is not None:
--            raise ValueError("Spaces are not allowed in attributes: {}".format(key))
-+        if _attr_key_re.search(key) is not None:
-+            raise ValueError("Invalid character in attribute name: {!r}".format(key))
- 
-         items.append('{}="{}"'.format(escape(key), escape(value)))
- 
-diff --git a/Jinja2-2.11.2/tests/test_filters.py b/Jinja2-2.11.2/tests/test_filters.py
-index 6e697f3..c34dd9d 100644
---- a/Jinja2-2.11.2/tests/test_filters.py
-+++ b/Jinja2-2.11.2/tests/test_filters.py
-@@ -440,11 +440,12 @@ class TestFilter(object):
-         assert 'bar="23"' in out
-         assert 'blub:blub="&lt;?&gt;"' in out
- 
--    def test_xmlattr_key_with_spaces(self, env):
--        with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="Spaces are not allowed"):
--            env.from_string(
--                "{{ {'src=1 onerror=alert(1)': 'my_class'}|xmlattr }}"
--            ).render()
-+    @pytest.mark.parametrize("sep", ("\t", "\n", "\f", " ", "/", ">", "="))
-+    def test_xmlattr_key_invalid(self, env, sep):
-+        with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="Invalid character"):
-+            env.from_string("{{ {key: 'my_class'}|xmlattr }}").render(
-+                key="class{}onclick=alert(1)".format(sep)
-+            )
- 
-     def test_sort1(self, env):
-         tmpl = env.from_string("{{ [2, 3, 1]|sort }}|{{ [2, 3, 1]|sort(true) }}")
--- 
-2.33.0
-

backport-CVE-2024-56201.patch

@@ -1,81 +0,0 @@
-From 56a724644b1ad9cb03745c10cca732715cdc79e9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Sigurd Spieckermann <sigurd.spieckermann@gmail.com>
-Date: Fri, 26 May 2023 14:32:36 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH] fix f-string syntax error in code generation
-
-Reference:https://github.com/pallets/jinja/commit/56a724644b1ad9cb03745c10cca732715cdc79e9
-
----
- Jinja2-2.11.2/CHANGES.rst            |  3 +++
- Jinja2-2.11.2/src/jinja2/compiler.py |  7 ++++++-
- Jinja2-2.11.2/tests/test_compile.py  | 20 ++++++++++++++++++++
- 3 files changed, 29 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
- create mode 100644 Jinja2-2.11.2/tests/test_compile.py
-
-diff --git a/Jinja2-2.11.2/CHANGES.rst b/Jinja2-2.11.2/CHANGES.rst
-index 2c7614b..6ef2d3d 100644
---- a/Jinja2-2.11.2/CHANGES.rst
-+++ b/Jinja2-2.11.2/CHANGES.rst
-@@ -1,5 +1,8 @@
- .. currentmodule:: jinja2
- 
-+-   Escape template name before formatting it into error messages, to avoid
-+    issues with names that contain f-string syntax.
-+    :issue:`1792`, :ghsa:`gmj6-6f8f-6699`
- -   The ``xmlattr`` filter does not allow keys with ``/`` solidus, ``>``
-     greater-than sign, or ``=`` equals sign, in addition to disallowing spaces.
-     Regardless of any validation done by Jinja, user input should never be used
-diff --git a/Jinja2-2.11.2/src/jinja2/compiler.py b/Jinja2-2.11.2/src/jinja2/compiler.py
-index 63297b4..3d6e3d7 100644
---- a/Jinja2-2.11.2/src/jinja2/compiler.py
-+++ b/Jinja2-2.11.2/src/jinja2/compiler.py
-@@ -1034,6 +1034,11 @@ class CodeGenerator(NodeVisitor):
-             )
-             self.writeline("if %s is missing:" % frame.symbols.ref(alias))
-             self.indent()
-+            # The position will contain the template name, and will be formatted
-+            # into a string that will be compiled into an f-string. Curly braces
-+            # in the name must be replaced with escapes so that they will not be
-+            # executed as part of the f-string.
-+            position = self.position(node).replace("{", "{{").replace("}", "}}")
-             self.writeline(
-                 "%s = undefined(%r %% "
-                 "included_template.__name__, "
-@@ -1042,7 +1047,7 @@ class CodeGenerator(NodeVisitor):
-                     frame.symbols.ref(alias),
-                     "the template %%r (imported on %s) does "
-                     "not export the requested name %s"
--                    % (self.position(node), repr(name)),
-+                    % (position, repr(name)),
-                     name,
-                 )
-             )
-diff --git a/Jinja2-2.11.2/tests/test_compile.py b/Jinja2-2.11.2/tests/test_compile.py
-new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..12ce0e7
---- /dev/null
-+++ b/Jinja2-2.11.2/tests/test_compile.py
-@@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
-+import pytest
-+
-+from jinja2 import UndefinedError
-+from jinja2.environment import Environment
-+from jinja2.loaders import DictLoader
-+
-+def test_undefined_import_curly_name():
-+    env = Environment(
-+        loader=DictLoader(
-+            {
-+                "{bad}": "{% from 'macro' import m %}{{ m() }}",
-+                "macro": "",
-+            }
-+        )
-+    )
-+
-+    # Must not raise `NameError: 'bad' is not defined`, as that would indicate
-+    # that `{bad}` is being interpreted as an f-string. It must be escaped.
-+    with pytest.raises(UndefinedError):
-+        env.get_template("{bad}").render()
--- 
-2.33.0
-

backport-CVE-2024-56326-2.patch

@@ -1,73 +0,0 @@
-From 98b40f8dd96cf4f2997e7dc935d2fe7b9efd24ab Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: changtao <changtao@kylinos.cn>
-Date: Sun, 15 Dec 2024 07:14:04 +0800
-Subject: [PATCH] fix CVE-2024-56326
-
----
- Jinja2-2.11.2/src/jinja2/sandbox.py | 21 ++++++++++-----------
- 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/Jinja2-2.11.2/src/jinja2/sandbox.py b/Jinja2-2.11.2/src/jinja2/sandbox.py
-index 3f78075..4ddd50a 100644
---- a/Jinja2-2.11.2/src/jinja2/sandbox.py
-+++ b/Jinja2-2.11.2/src/jinja2/sandbox.py
-@@ -423,25 +423,24 @@ class SandboxedEnvironment(Environment):
-             exc=SecurityError,
-         )
- 
--    def wrap_str_format(self, value: t.Any) -> t.Optional[t.Callable[..., str]]:
-+    def wrap_str_format(self, value):
-         """If the given value is a ``str.format`` or ``str.format_map`` method,
--        return a new function than handles sandboxing. This is done at access
-+        return a new function that handles sandboxing. This is done at access
-         rather than in :meth:`call`, so that calls made without ``call`` are
-         also sandboxed.
-         """
--        if not isinstance(
--            value, (types.MethodType, types.BuiltinMethodType)
--        ) or value.__name__ not in ("format", "format_map"):
-+        if not isinstance(value, (types.MethodType, types.BuiltinMethodType)) or value.__name__ not in ("format", "format_map"):
-             return None
- 
--        f_self: t.Any = value.__self__
-+        f_self = value.__self__
- 
-         if not isinstance(f_self, str):
-             return None
- 
--        str_type: t.Type[str] = type(f_self)
-+        str_type = type(f_self)
-         is_format_map = value.__name__ == "format_map"
--        formatter: SandboxedFormatter
-+        formatter = None
-+
-         if isinstance(f_self, Markup):
-             formatter = SandboxedEscapeFormatter(self, escape=f_self.escape)
-         else:
-@@ -449,20 +448,20 @@ class SandboxedEnvironment(Environment):
- 
-         vformat = formatter.vformat
- 
--        def wrapper(*args: t.Any, **kwargs: t.Any) -> str:
-+        def wrapper(*args, **kwargs):
-             if is_format_map:
-                 if kwargs:
-                     raise TypeError("format_map() takes no keyword arguments")
- 
-                 if len(args) != 1:
-                     raise TypeError(
--                        f"format_map() takes exactly one argument ({len(args)} given)"
-+                        "format_map() takes exactly one argument ({0} given)".format(len(args))
-                     )
- 
-                 kwargs = args[0]
-                 args = ()
--            return str_type(vformat(f_self, args, kwargs))
- 
-+            return str_type(vformat(f_self, args, kwargs))
- 
-         return update_wrapper(wrapper, value)
- 
--- 
-2.43.0
-

backport-CVE-2024-56326-3.patch

@@ -1,31 +0,0 @@
-From b23759fa6498f200f7557d40264515d8cf41cb1d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: changtao <changtao@kylinos.cn>
-Date: Sun, 15 Dec 2024 11:59:30 +0800
-Subject: [PATCH] fix CVE-2024-56326
-
----
- Jinja2-2.11.2/tests/test_security.py | 4 ++--
- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/Jinja2-2.11.2/tests/test_security.py b/Jinja2-2.11.2/tests/test_security.py
-index 2e2af69..0d3e60c 100644
---- a/Jinja2-2.11.2/tests/test_security.py
-+++ b/Jinja2-2.11.2/tests/test_security.py
-@@ -179,12 +179,12 @@ class TestStringFormat(object):
- 
-     def test_safe_format_safety(self):
-         env = SandboxedEnvironment()
--        t = env.from_string('{{ ("a{0.__class__}b{1}"|safe).format(42, "<foo>") }}')
-+        t = env.from_string('{{ ("a{0}b{1}"|safe).format("", "<foo>") }}')
-         assert t.render() == "ab&lt;foo&gt;"
- 
-     def test_safe_format_all_okay(self):
-         env = SandboxedEnvironment()
--        t = env.from_string('{{ ("a{0.foo}b{1}"|safe).format({"foo": 42}, "<foo>") }}')
-+        t = env.from_string('{{ ("a{0[foo]}b{1}"|safe).format({"foo": 42}, "<foo>") }}')
-         assert t.render() == "a42b&lt;foo&gt;"
- 
- 
--- 
-2.43.0
-

backport-CVE-2024-56326.patch

@@ -1,157 +0,0 @@
-From 91a972f5808973cd441f4dc06873b2f8378f30c7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Lydxn <hlyndon20@gmail.com>
-Date: Mon, 23 Sep 2024 15:09:10 -0700
-Subject: [PATCH] sandbox indirect calls to str.format
----
- Jinja2-2.11.2/src/jinja2/sandbox.py  | 72 +++++++++++++++++-----------
- Jinja2-2.11.2/tests/test_security.py | 17 +++++++
- 2 files changed, 60 insertions(+), 29 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/Jinja2-2.11.2/src/jinja2/sandbox.py b/Jinja2-2.11.2/src/jinja2/sandbox.py
-index cfd7993..3f78075 100644
---- a/Jinja2-2.11.2/src/jinja2/sandbox.py
-+++ b/Jinja2-2.11.2/src/jinja2/sandbox.py
-@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@ import operator
- import types
- import warnings
- from collections import deque
-+from functools import update_wrapper
- from string import Formatter
- 
- from markupsafe import EscapeFormatter
-@@ -153,16 +154,6 @@ class _MagicFormatMapping(abc.Mapping):
-         return len(self._kwargs)
- 
- 
--def inspect_format_method(callable):
--    if not isinstance(
--        callable, (types.MethodType, types.BuiltinMethodType)
--    ) or callable.__name__ not in ("format", "format_map"):
--        return None
--    obj = callable.__self__
--    if isinstance(obj, string_types):
--        return obj
--
--
- def safe_range(*args):
-     """A range that can't generate ranges with a length of more than
-     MAX_RANGE items.
-@@ -394,6 +385,9 @@ class SandboxedEnvironment(Environment):
-                     except AttributeError:
-                         pass
-                     else:
-+                        fmt = self.wrap_str_format(value)
-+                        if fmt is not None:
-+                            return fmt
-                         if self.is_safe_attribute(obj, argument, value):
-                             return value
-                         return self.unsafe_undefined(obj, argument)
-@@ -411,6 +405,9 @@ class SandboxedEnvironment(Environment):
-             except (TypeError, LookupError):
-                 pass
-         else:
-+            fmt = self.wrap_str_format(value)
-+            if fmt is not None:
-+                return fmt
-             if self.is_safe_attribute(obj, attribute, value):
-                 return value
-             return self.unsafe_undefined(obj, attribute)
-@@ -426,34 +423,51 @@ class SandboxedEnvironment(Environment):
-             exc=SecurityError,
-         )
- 
--    def format_string(self, s, args, kwargs, format_func=None):
--        """If a format call is detected, then this is routed through this
--        method so that our safety sandbox can be used for it.
-+    def wrap_str_format(self, value: t.Any) -> t.Optional[t.Callable[..., str]]:
-+        """If the given value is a ``str.format`` or ``str.format_map`` method,
-+        return a new function than handles sandboxing. This is done at access
-+        rather than in :meth:`call`, so that calls made without ``call`` are
-+        also sandboxed.
-         """
--        if isinstance(s, Markup):
--            formatter = SandboxedEscapeFormatter(self, s.escape)
-+        if not isinstance(
-+            value, (types.MethodType, types.BuiltinMethodType)
-+        ) or value.__name__ not in ("format", "format_map"):
-+            return None
-+
-+        f_self: t.Any = value.__self__
-+
-+        if not isinstance(f_self, str):
-+            return None
-+
-+        str_type: t.Type[str] = type(f_self)
-+        is_format_map = value.__name__ == "format_map"
-+        formatter: SandboxedFormatter
-+        if isinstance(f_self, Markup):
-+            formatter = SandboxedEscapeFormatter(self, escape=f_self.escape)
-         else:
-             formatter = SandboxedFormatter(self)
- 
--        if format_func is not None and format_func.__name__ == "format_map":
--            if len(args) != 1 or kwargs:
--                raise TypeError(
--                    "format_map() takes exactly one argument %d given"
--                    % (len(args) + (kwargs is not None))
--                )
-+        vformat = formatter.vformat
-+
-+        def wrapper(*args: t.Any, **kwargs: t.Any) -> str:
-+            if is_format_map:
-+                if kwargs:
-+                    raise TypeError("format_map() takes no keyword arguments")
-+
-+                if len(args) != 1:
-+                    raise TypeError(
-+                        f"format_map() takes exactly one argument ({len(args)} given)"
-+                    )
-+
-+                kwargs = args[0]
-+                args = ()
-+            return str_type(vformat(f_self, args, kwargs))
- 
--            kwargs = args[0]
--            args = None
- 
--        kwargs = _MagicFormatMapping(args, kwargs)
--        rv = formatter.vformat(s, args, kwargs)
--        return type(s)(rv)
-+        return update_wrapper(wrapper, value)
- 
-     def call(__self, __context, __obj, *args, **kwargs):  # noqa: B902
-         """Call an object from sandboxed code."""
--        fmt = inspect_format_method(__obj)
--        if fmt is not None:
--            return __self.format_string(fmt, args, kwargs, __obj)
- 
-         # the double prefixes are to avoid double keyword argument
-         # errors when proxying the call.
-diff --git a/Jinja2-2.11.2/tests/test_security.py b/Jinja2-2.11.2/tests/test_security.py
-index 7e8974c..2e2af69 100644
---- a/Jinja2-2.11.2/tests/test_security.py
-+++ b/Jinja2-2.11.2/tests/test_security.py
-@@ -208,3 +208,20 @@ class TestStringFormatMap(object):
-             '{{ ("a{x.foo}b{y}"|safe).format_map({"x":{"foo": 42}, "y":"<foo>"}) }}'
-         )
-         assert t.render() == "a42b&lt;foo&gt;"
-+
-+    def test_indirect_call(self):
-+        def run(value, arg):
-+            return value.run(arg)
-+
-+        env = SandboxedEnvironment()
-+        env.filters["run"] = run
-+        t = env.from_string(
-+            """{% set
-+                ns = namespace(run="{0.__call__.__builtins__[__import__]}".format)
-+            %}
-+            {{ ns | run(not_here) }}
-+            """
-+        )
-+
-+        with pytest.raises(SecurityError):
-+            t.render()
--- 
-2.43.0
-

python-jinja2.spec

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 
 Name:           python-jinja2
 Version:        2.11.2
-Release:        9
+Release:        4
 Summary:        A full-featured template engine for Python
 License:        BSD
 URL:            http://jinja.pocoo.org/
@@ -10,13 +10,8 @@ Source0:        https://files.pythonhosted.org/packages/source/J/Jinja2/Jinja2-%
 
 Patch6000:      backport-CVE-2020-28493.patch
 Patch6001:      backport-CVE-2024-22195.patch
-Patch6002:      backport-CVE-2024-34064.patch
 
 Patch9000:      huawei-replace-instances-of-the-older-style-tmpdir-fixture.patch
-Patch9001:      backport-CVE-2024-56326.patch
-Patch9002:      backport-CVE-2024-56326-2.patch
-Patch9003:      backport-CVE-2024-56326-3.patch
-Patch9004:      backport-CVE-2024-56201.patch
 
 BuildArch:      noarch
 
@@ -26,19 +21,6 @@ templating system but extends it with an expressive language that gives template
 a more powerful set of tools. On top of that it adds sandboxed execution and optional
 automatic escaping for applications where security is important.
 
-%if %{with python2}
-%package -n python2-jinja2
-Summary:        General purpose template engine for python2
-
-BuildRequires:  python2-markupsafe python2-babel
-BuildRequires:  python2-pytest python2-devel python2-setuptools
-Requires:       python2-babel python2-markupsafe python2-setuptools
-%{?python_provide:%python_provide python2-jinja2}
-
-%description -n python2-jinja2
-This package is the python2 version of python-jinja2.
-%endif
-
 %package -n python3-jinja2
 Summary:        General purpose template engine for python3
 
@@ -61,49 +43,22 @@ sed -i 's|\r$||g' Jinja2-%{version}/LICENSE.rst
 cp -a Jinja2-%{version} python3
 
 %build
-%if %{with python2}
-pushd Jinja2-%{version}
-%py2_build
-popd
-%endif
 
 pushd python3
 %py3_build
 popd
 
 %install
-%if %{with python2}
-pushd Jinja2-%{version}
-%py2_install
-
-#valid on python above 3.6, if not removed, installation will fail
-rm %{buildroot}%{python2_sitelib}/jinja2/asyncsupport.py
-rm %{buildroot}%{python2_sitelib}/jinja2/asyncfilters.py
-
-popd
-%endif
 
 pushd python3
 %py3_install
 popd
 
 %check
-%if %{with python2}
-pushd Jinja2-%{version}
-PYTHONPATH=$(pwd)/src %{__python2} -m pytest tests
-popd
-%endif
 pushd python3
 PYTHONPATH=$(pwd)/src %{__python3} -m pytest tests
 popd
 
-%if %{with python2}
-%files -n python2-jinja2
-%license Jinja2-%{version}/LICENSE.rst
-%{python2_sitelib}/jinja2
-%{python2_sitelib}/Jinja2*-info
-%endif
-
 %files -n python3-jinja2
 %license Jinja2-%{version}/LICENSE.rst
 %{python3_sitelib}/jinja2
@@ -114,36 +69,6 @@ popd
 %doc Jinja2-%{version}/ext Jinja2-%{version}/examples
 
 %changelog
-* Thu Dec 26 2024 weihaohao <weihaohao2@huawei.com> - 2.11.2-9
- Type:CVE
- CVE:CVE-2024-56201
- SUG:NA
- DESC:fix CVE-2024-56201
-
-* Wed Dec 25 2024 changtao <changtao@kylinos.cn> - 2.11.2-8
-  Type:CVE
-  CVE:CVE-2024-56326
-  SUG:NA
-  DESC:fix CVE-2024-56326
-
-* Fri May 10 2024 weihaohao <weihaohao2@huawei.com> - 2.11.2-7
-  Type:CVE
-  CVE:CVE-2024-34064
-  SUG:NA
-  DESC:fix CVE-2024-34064
-
-* Fri Jan 26 2024 zhuofeng <zhuofeng2@huawei.com> - 2.11.2-6
-  Type:bugfix
-  CVE:NA
-  SUG:NA
-  DESC:make the test check and adapt python2 grammer
-
-* Thu Jan 25 2024 zhuofeng <zhuofeng2@huawei.com> - 2.11.2-5
-  Type:bugfix
-  CVE:NA
-  SUG:NA
-  DESC:add python2 and adpat python2
-
 * Mon Jan 22 2024 weihaohao <weihaohao2@huawei.com> - 2.11.2-4
   Type:CVE
   CVE:CVE-2024-22195