!87 fix CVE-2024-56201

From: @jack0240 
Reviewed-by: @dillon_chen 
Signed-off-by: @dillon_chen

backport-CVE-2024-22195.patch

@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ index 9741567..3230539 100644
      """Convert a value to lowercase."""
      return soft_unicode(s).lower()
  
-+_space_re = re.compile(r"\s", flags=re.ASCII)
++_space_re = re.compile(r"\s", re.U)
  
  @evalcontextfilter
  def do_xmlattr(_eval_ctx, d, autospace=True):
@@ -51,9 +51,9 @@ index 9741567..3230539 100644
 +            continue
 +
 +        if _space_re.search(key) is not None:
-+            raise ValueError(f"Spaces are not allowed in attributes: '{key}'")
++            raise ValueError("Spaces are not allowed in attributes: {}".format(key))
 +
-+        items.append(f'{escape(key)}="{escape(value)}"')
++        items.append('{}="{}"'.format(escape(key), escape(value)))
 +
 +    rv = " ".join(items)
      if autospace and rv:

backport-CVE-2024-34064.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,109 @@
+From 0668239dc6b44ef38e7a6c9f91f312fd4ca581cb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: David Lord <davidism@gmail.com>
+Date: Thu, 2 May 2024 09:14:00 -0700
+Subject: [PATCH] disallow invalid characters in keys to xmlattr filter
+
+Reference:https://github.com/pallets/jinja/commit/0668239dc6b44ef38e7a6c9f91f312fd4ca581cb
+Conflict:NA
+
+---
+ Jinja2-2.11.2/CHANGES.rst           |  6 ++++++
+ Jinja2-2.11.2/src/jinja2/filters.py | 23 ++++++++++++++++++-----
+ Jinja2-2.11.2/tests/test_filters.py | 11 ++++++-----
+ 3 files changed, 30 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/Jinja2-2.11.2/CHANGES.rst b/Jinja2-2.11.2/CHANGES.rst
+index 6dfe912..2c7614b 100644
+--- a/Jinja2-2.11.2/CHANGES.rst
++++ b/Jinja2-2.11.2/CHANGES.rst
+@@ -1,5 +1,11 @@
+ .. currentmodule:: jinja2
+ 
++-   The ``xmlattr`` filter does not allow keys with ``/`` solidus, ``>``
++    greater-than sign, or ``=`` equals sign, in addition to disallowing spaces.
++    Regardless of any validation done by Jinja, user input should never be used
++    as keys to this filter, or must be separately validated first.
++    GHSA-h75v-3vvj-5mfj
++
+ Version 2.11.3
+ --------------
+ 
+diff --git a/Jinja2-2.11.2/src/jinja2/filters.py b/Jinja2-2.11.2/src/jinja2/filters.py
+index eed8d8b..92592dc 100644
+--- a/Jinja2-2.11.2/src/jinja2/filters.py
++++ b/Jinja2-2.11.2/src/jinja2/filters.py
+@@ -204,15 +204,24 @@ def do_lower(s):
+     """Convert a value to lowercase."""
+     return soft_unicode(s).lower()
+ 
+-_space_re = re.compile(r"\s", re.U)
++
++# Check for characters that would move the parser state from key to value.
++# https://html.spec.whatwg.org/#attribute-name-state
++_attr_key_re = re.compile(r"[\s/>=]", flags=re.U)
+ 
+ @evalcontextfilter
+ def do_xmlattr(_eval_ctx, d, autospace=True):
+     """Create an SGML/XML attribute string based on the items in a dict.
+     All values that are neither `none` nor `undefined` are automatically
+     escaped:
+-    If any key contains a space, this fails with a ``ValueError``. Values that
+-    are neither ``none`` nor ``undefined`` are automatically escaped.
++    **Values** that are neither ``none`` nor ``undefined`` are automatically
++    escaped, safely allowing untrusted user input.
++
++    User input should not be used as **keys** to this filter. If any key
++    contains a space, ``/`` solidus, ``>`` greater-than sign, or ``=`` equals
++    sign, this fails with a ``ValueError``. Regardless of this, user input
++    should never be used as keys to this filter, or must be separately validated
++    first.
+     .. sourcecode:: html+jinja
+ 
+         <ul{{ {'class': 'my_list', 'missing': none,
+@@ -231,6 +240,10 @@ def do_xmlattr(_eval_ctx, d, autospace=True):
+     As you can see it automatically prepends a space in front of the item
+     if the filter returned something unless the second parameter is false.
+ 
++    .. versionchanged:: 3.1.4
++        Keys with ``/`` solidus, ``>`` greater-than sign, or ``=`` equals sign
++        are not allowed.
++
+     .. versionchanged:: 3.1.3
+         Keys with spaces are not allowed.
+     """
+@@ -240,8 +253,8 @@ def do_xmlattr(_eval_ctx, d, autospace=True):
+         if value is None or isinstance(value, Undefined):
+             continue
+ 
+-        if _space_re.search(key) is not None:
+-            raise ValueError("Spaces are not allowed in attributes: {}".format(key))
++        if _attr_key_re.search(key) is not None:
++            raise ValueError("Invalid character in attribute name: {!r}".format(key))
+ 
+         items.append('{}="{}"'.format(escape(key), escape(value)))
+ 
+diff --git a/Jinja2-2.11.2/tests/test_filters.py b/Jinja2-2.11.2/tests/test_filters.py
+index 6e697f3..c34dd9d 100644
+--- a/Jinja2-2.11.2/tests/test_filters.py
++++ b/Jinja2-2.11.2/tests/test_filters.py
+@@ -440,11 +440,12 @@ class TestFilter(object):
+         assert 'bar="23"' in out
+         assert 'blub:blub="&lt;?&gt;"' in out
+ 
+-    def test_xmlattr_key_with_spaces(self, env):
+-        with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="Spaces are not allowed"):
+-            env.from_string(
+-                "{{ {'src=1 onerror=alert(1)': 'my_class'}|xmlattr }}"
+-            ).render()
++    @pytest.mark.parametrize("sep", ("\t", "\n", "\f", " ", "/", ">", "="))
++    def test_xmlattr_key_invalid(self, env, sep):
++        with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="Invalid character"):
++            env.from_string("{{ {key: 'my_class'}|xmlattr }}").render(
++                key="class{}onclick=alert(1)".format(sep)
++            )
+ 
+     def test_sort1(self, env):
+         tmpl = env.from_string("{{ [2, 3, 1]|sort }}|{{ [2, 3, 1]|sort(true) }}")
+-- 
+2.33.0
+

backport-CVE-2024-56201.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,81 @@
+From 56a724644b1ad9cb03745c10cca732715cdc79e9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Sigurd Spieckermann <sigurd.spieckermann@gmail.com>
+Date: Fri, 26 May 2023 14:32:36 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] fix f-string syntax error in code generation
+
+Reference:https://github.com/pallets/jinja/commit/56a724644b1ad9cb03745c10cca732715cdc79e9
+
+---
+ Jinja2-2.11.2/CHANGES.rst            |  3 +++
+ Jinja2-2.11.2/src/jinja2/compiler.py |  7 ++++++-
+ Jinja2-2.11.2/tests/test_compile.py  | 20 ++++++++++++++++++++
+ 3 files changed, 29 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+ create mode 100644 Jinja2-2.11.2/tests/test_compile.py
+
+diff --git a/Jinja2-2.11.2/CHANGES.rst b/Jinja2-2.11.2/CHANGES.rst
+index 2c7614b..6ef2d3d 100644
+--- a/Jinja2-2.11.2/CHANGES.rst
++++ b/Jinja2-2.11.2/CHANGES.rst
+@@ -1,5 +1,8 @@
+ .. currentmodule:: jinja2
+ 
++-   Escape template name before formatting it into error messages, to avoid
++    issues with names that contain f-string syntax.
++    :issue:`1792`, :ghsa:`gmj6-6f8f-6699`
+ -   The ``xmlattr`` filter does not allow keys with ``/`` solidus, ``>``
+     greater-than sign, or ``=`` equals sign, in addition to disallowing spaces.
+     Regardless of any validation done by Jinja, user input should never be used
+diff --git a/Jinja2-2.11.2/src/jinja2/compiler.py b/Jinja2-2.11.2/src/jinja2/compiler.py
+index 63297b4..3d6e3d7 100644
+--- a/Jinja2-2.11.2/src/jinja2/compiler.py
++++ b/Jinja2-2.11.2/src/jinja2/compiler.py
+@@ -1034,6 +1034,11 @@ class CodeGenerator(NodeVisitor):
+             )
+             self.writeline("if %s is missing:" % frame.symbols.ref(alias))
+             self.indent()
++            # The position will contain the template name, and will be formatted
++            # into a string that will be compiled into an f-string. Curly braces
++            # in the name must be replaced with escapes so that they will not be
++            # executed as part of the f-string.
++            position = self.position(node).replace("{", "{{").replace("}", "}}")
+             self.writeline(
+                 "%s = undefined(%r %% "
+                 "included_template.__name__, "
+@@ -1042,7 +1047,7 @@ class CodeGenerator(NodeVisitor):
+                     frame.symbols.ref(alias),
+                     "the template %%r (imported on %s) does "
+                     "not export the requested name %s"
+-                    % (self.position(node), repr(name)),
++                    % (position, repr(name)),
+                     name,
+                 )
+             )
+diff --git a/Jinja2-2.11.2/tests/test_compile.py b/Jinja2-2.11.2/tests/test_compile.py
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..12ce0e7
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/Jinja2-2.11.2/tests/test_compile.py
+@@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
++import pytest
++
++from jinja2 import UndefinedError
++from jinja2.environment import Environment
++from jinja2.loaders import DictLoader
++
++def test_undefined_import_curly_name():
++    env = Environment(
++        loader=DictLoader(
++            {
++                "{bad}": "{% from 'macro' import m %}{{ m() }}",
++                "macro": "",
++            }
++        )
++    )
++
++    # Must not raise `NameError: 'bad' is not defined`, as that would indicate
++    # that `{bad}` is being interpreted as an f-string. It must be escaped.
++    with pytest.raises(UndefinedError):
++        env.get_template("{bad}").render()
+-- 
+2.33.0
+

backport-CVE-2024-56326-2.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,73 @@
+From 98b40f8dd96cf4f2997e7dc935d2fe7b9efd24ab Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: changtao <changtao@kylinos.cn>
+Date: Sun, 15 Dec 2024 07:14:04 +0800
+Subject: [PATCH] fix CVE-2024-56326
+
+---
+ Jinja2-2.11.2/src/jinja2/sandbox.py | 21 ++++++++++-----------
+ 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/Jinja2-2.11.2/src/jinja2/sandbox.py b/Jinja2-2.11.2/src/jinja2/sandbox.py
+index 3f78075..4ddd50a 100644
+--- a/Jinja2-2.11.2/src/jinja2/sandbox.py
++++ b/Jinja2-2.11.2/src/jinja2/sandbox.py
+@@ -423,25 +423,24 @@ class SandboxedEnvironment(Environment):
+             exc=SecurityError,
+         )
+ 
+-    def wrap_str_format(self, value: t.Any) -> t.Optional[t.Callable[..., str]]:
++    def wrap_str_format(self, value):
+         """If the given value is a ``str.format`` or ``str.format_map`` method,
+-        return a new function than handles sandboxing. This is done at access
++        return a new function that handles sandboxing. This is done at access
+         rather than in :meth:`call`, so that calls made without ``call`` are
+         also sandboxed.
+         """
+-        if not isinstance(
+-            value, (types.MethodType, types.BuiltinMethodType)
+-        ) or value.__name__ not in ("format", "format_map"):
++        if not isinstance(value, (types.MethodType, types.BuiltinMethodType)) or value.__name__ not in ("format", "format_map"):
+             return None
+ 
+-        f_self: t.Any = value.__self__
++        f_self = value.__self__
+ 
+         if not isinstance(f_self, str):
+             return None
+ 
+-        str_type: t.Type[str] = type(f_self)
++        str_type = type(f_self)
+         is_format_map = value.__name__ == "format_map"
+-        formatter: SandboxedFormatter
++        formatter = None
++
+         if isinstance(f_self, Markup):
+             formatter = SandboxedEscapeFormatter(self, escape=f_self.escape)
+         else:
+@@ -449,20 +448,20 @@ class SandboxedEnvironment(Environment):
+ 
+         vformat = formatter.vformat
+ 
+-        def wrapper(*args: t.Any, **kwargs: t.Any) -> str:
++        def wrapper(*args, **kwargs):
+             if is_format_map:
+                 if kwargs:
+                     raise TypeError("format_map() takes no keyword arguments")
+ 
+                 if len(args) != 1:
+                     raise TypeError(
+-                        f"format_map() takes exactly one argument ({len(args)} given)"
++                        "format_map() takes exactly one argument ({0} given)".format(len(args))
+                     )
+ 
+                 kwargs = args[0]
+                 args = ()
+-            return str_type(vformat(f_self, args, kwargs))
+ 
++            return str_type(vformat(f_self, args, kwargs))
+ 
+         return update_wrapper(wrapper, value)
+ 
+-- 
+2.43.0
+

backport-CVE-2024-56326-3.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,31 @@
+From b23759fa6498f200f7557d40264515d8cf41cb1d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: changtao <changtao@kylinos.cn>
+Date: Sun, 15 Dec 2024 11:59:30 +0800
+Subject: [PATCH] fix CVE-2024-56326
+
+---
+ Jinja2-2.11.2/tests/test_security.py | 4 ++--
+ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/Jinja2-2.11.2/tests/test_security.py b/Jinja2-2.11.2/tests/test_security.py
+index 2e2af69..0d3e60c 100644
+--- a/Jinja2-2.11.2/tests/test_security.py
++++ b/Jinja2-2.11.2/tests/test_security.py
+@@ -179,12 +179,12 @@ class TestStringFormat(object):
+ 
+     def test_safe_format_safety(self):
+         env = SandboxedEnvironment()
+-        t = env.from_string('{{ ("a{0.__class__}b{1}"|safe).format(42, "<foo>") }}')
++        t = env.from_string('{{ ("a{0}b{1}"|safe).format("", "<foo>") }}')
+         assert t.render() == "ab&lt;foo&gt;"
+ 
+     def test_safe_format_all_okay(self):
+         env = SandboxedEnvironment()
+-        t = env.from_string('{{ ("a{0.foo}b{1}"|safe).format({"foo": 42}, "<foo>") }}')
++        t = env.from_string('{{ ("a{0[foo]}b{1}"|safe).format({"foo": 42}, "<foo>") }}')
+         assert t.render() == "a42b&lt;foo&gt;"
+ 
+ 
+-- 
+2.43.0
+

backport-CVE-2024-56326.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,157 @@
+From 91a972f5808973cd441f4dc06873b2f8378f30c7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Lydxn <hlyndon20@gmail.com>
+Date: Mon, 23 Sep 2024 15:09:10 -0700
+Subject: [PATCH] sandbox indirect calls to str.format
+---
+ Jinja2-2.11.2/src/jinja2/sandbox.py  | 72 +++++++++++++++++-----------
+ Jinja2-2.11.2/tests/test_security.py | 17 +++++++
+ 2 files changed, 60 insertions(+), 29 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/Jinja2-2.11.2/src/jinja2/sandbox.py b/Jinja2-2.11.2/src/jinja2/sandbox.py
+index cfd7993..3f78075 100644
+--- a/Jinja2-2.11.2/src/jinja2/sandbox.py
++++ b/Jinja2-2.11.2/src/jinja2/sandbox.py
+@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@ import operator
+ import types
+ import warnings
+ from collections import deque
++from functools import update_wrapper
+ from string import Formatter
+ 
+ from markupsafe import EscapeFormatter
+@@ -153,16 +154,6 @@ class _MagicFormatMapping(abc.Mapping):
+         return len(self._kwargs)
+ 
+ 
+-def inspect_format_method(callable):
+-    if not isinstance(
+-        callable, (types.MethodType, types.BuiltinMethodType)
+-    ) or callable.__name__ not in ("format", "format_map"):
+-        return None
+-    obj = callable.__self__
+-    if isinstance(obj, string_types):
+-        return obj
+-
+-
+ def safe_range(*args):
+     """A range that can't generate ranges with a length of more than
+     MAX_RANGE items.
+@@ -394,6 +385,9 @@ class SandboxedEnvironment(Environment):
+                     except AttributeError:
+                         pass
+                     else:
++                        fmt = self.wrap_str_format(value)
++                        if fmt is not None:
++                            return fmt
+                         if self.is_safe_attribute(obj, argument, value):
+                             return value
+                         return self.unsafe_undefined(obj, argument)
+@@ -411,6 +405,9 @@ class SandboxedEnvironment(Environment):
+             except (TypeError, LookupError):
+                 pass
+         else:
++            fmt = self.wrap_str_format(value)
++            if fmt is not None:
++                return fmt
+             if self.is_safe_attribute(obj, attribute, value):
+                 return value
+             return self.unsafe_undefined(obj, attribute)
+@@ -426,34 +423,51 @@ class SandboxedEnvironment(Environment):
+             exc=SecurityError,
+         )
+ 
+-    def format_string(self, s, args, kwargs, format_func=None):
+-        """If a format call is detected, then this is routed through this
+-        method so that our safety sandbox can be used for it.
++    def wrap_str_format(self, value: t.Any) -> t.Optional[t.Callable[..., str]]:
++        """If the given value is a ``str.format`` or ``str.format_map`` method,
++        return a new function than handles sandboxing. This is done at access
++        rather than in :meth:`call`, so that calls made without ``call`` are
++        also sandboxed.
+         """
+-        if isinstance(s, Markup):
+-            formatter = SandboxedEscapeFormatter(self, s.escape)
++        if not isinstance(
++            value, (types.MethodType, types.BuiltinMethodType)
++        ) or value.__name__ not in ("format", "format_map"):
++            return None
++
++        f_self: t.Any = value.__self__
++
++        if not isinstance(f_self, str):
++            return None
++
++        str_type: t.Type[str] = type(f_self)
++        is_format_map = value.__name__ == "format_map"
++        formatter: SandboxedFormatter
++        if isinstance(f_self, Markup):
++            formatter = SandboxedEscapeFormatter(self, escape=f_self.escape)
+         else:
+             formatter = SandboxedFormatter(self)
+ 
+-        if format_func is not None and format_func.__name__ == "format_map":
+-            if len(args) != 1 or kwargs:
+-                raise TypeError(
+-                    "format_map() takes exactly one argument %d given"
+-                    % (len(args) + (kwargs is not None))
+-                )
++        vformat = formatter.vformat
++
++        def wrapper(*args: t.Any, **kwargs: t.Any) -> str:
++            if is_format_map:
++                if kwargs:
++                    raise TypeError("format_map() takes no keyword arguments")
++
++                if len(args) != 1:
++                    raise TypeError(
++                        f"format_map() takes exactly one argument ({len(args)} given)"
++                    )
++
++                kwargs = args[0]
++                args = ()
++            return str_type(vformat(f_self, args, kwargs))
+ 
+-            kwargs = args[0]
+-            args = None
+ 
+-        kwargs = _MagicFormatMapping(args, kwargs)
+-        rv = formatter.vformat(s, args, kwargs)
+-        return type(s)(rv)
++        return update_wrapper(wrapper, value)
+ 
+     def call(__self, __context, __obj, *args, **kwargs):  # noqa: B902
+         """Call an object from sandboxed code."""
+-        fmt = inspect_format_method(__obj)
+-        if fmt is not None:
+-            return __self.format_string(fmt, args, kwargs, __obj)
+ 
+         # the double prefixes are to avoid double keyword argument
+         # errors when proxying the call.
+diff --git a/Jinja2-2.11.2/tests/test_security.py b/Jinja2-2.11.2/tests/test_security.py
+index 7e8974c..2e2af69 100644
+--- a/Jinja2-2.11.2/tests/test_security.py
++++ b/Jinja2-2.11.2/tests/test_security.py
+@@ -208,3 +208,20 @@ class TestStringFormatMap(object):
+             '{{ ("a{x.foo}b{y}"|safe).format_map({"x":{"foo": 42}, "y":"<foo>"}) }}'
+         )
+         assert t.render() == "a42b&lt;foo&gt;"
++
++    def test_indirect_call(self):
++        def run(value, arg):
++            return value.run(arg)
++
++        env = SandboxedEnvironment()
++        env.filters["run"] = run
++        t = env.from_string(
++            """{% set
++                ns = namespace(run="{0.__call__.__builtins__[__import__]}".format)
++            %}
++            {{ ns | run(not_here) }}
++            """
++        )
++
++        with pytest.raises(SecurityError):
++            t.render()
+-- 
+2.43.0
+

python-jinja2.spec

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 
 Name:           python-jinja2
 Version:        2.11.2
-Release:        4
+Release:        9
 Summary:        A full-featured template engine for Python
 License:        BSD
 URL:            http://jinja.pocoo.org/
@@ -10,8 +10,13 @@ Source0:        https://files.pythonhosted.org/packages/source/J/Jinja2/Jinja2-%
 
 Patch6000:      backport-CVE-2020-28493.patch
 Patch6001:      backport-CVE-2024-22195.patch
+Patch6002:      backport-CVE-2024-34064.patch
 
 Patch9000:      huawei-replace-instances-of-the-older-style-tmpdir-fixture.patch
+Patch9001:      backport-CVE-2024-56326.patch
+Patch9002:      backport-CVE-2024-56326-2.patch
+Patch9003:      backport-CVE-2024-56326-3.patch
+Patch9004:      backport-CVE-2024-56201.patch
 
 BuildArch:      noarch
 
@@ -21,6 +26,19 @@ templating system but extends it with an expressive language that gives template
 a more powerful set of tools. On top of that it adds sandboxed execution and optional
 automatic escaping for applications where security is important.
 
+%if %{with python2}
+%package -n python2-jinja2
+Summary:        General purpose template engine for python2
+
+BuildRequires:  python2-markupsafe python2-babel
+BuildRequires:  python2-pytest python2-devel python2-setuptools
+Requires:       python2-babel python2-markupsafe python2-setuptools
+%{?python_provide:%python_provide python2-jinja2}
+
+%description -n python2-jinja2
+This package is the python2 version of python-jinja2.
+%endif
+
 %package -n python3-jinja2
 Summary:        General purpose template engine for python3
 
@@ -43,22 +61,49 @@ sed -i 's|\r$||g' Jinja2-%{version}/LICENSE.rst
 cp -a Jinja2-%{version} python3
 
 %build
+%if %{with python2}
+pushd Jinja2-%{version}
+%py2_build
+popd
+%endif
 
 pushd python3
 %py3_build
 popd
 
 %install
+%if %{with python2}
+pushd Jinja2-%{version}
+%py2_install
+
+#valid on python above 3.6, if not removed, installation will fail
+rm %{buildroot}%{python2_sitelib}/jinja2/asyncsupport.py
+rm %{buildroot}%{python2_sitelib}/jinja2/asyncfilters.py
+
+popd
+%endif
 
 pushd python3
 %py3_install
 popd
 
 %check
+%if %{with python2}
+pushd Jinja2-%{version}
+PYTHONPATH=$(pwd)/src %{__python2} -m pytest tests
+popd
+%endif
 pushd python3
 PYTHONPATH=$(pwd)/src %{__python3} -m pytest tests
 popd
 
+%if %{with python2}
+%files -n python2-jinja2
+%license Jinja2-%{version}/LICENSE.rst
+%{python2_sitelib}/jinja2
+%{python2_sitelib}/Jinja2*-info
+%endif
+
 %files -n python3-jinja2
 %license Jinja2-%{version}/LICENSE.rst
 %{python3_sitelib}/jinja2
@@ -69,6 +114,36 @@ popd
 %doc Jinja2-%{version}/ext Jinja2-%{version}/examples
 
 %changelog
+* Thu Dec 26 2024 weihaohao <weihaohao2@huawei.com> - 2.11.2-9
+ Type:CVE
+ CVE:CVE-2024-56201
+ SUG:NA
+ DESC:fix CVE-2024-56201
+
+* Wed Dec 25 2024 changtao <changtao@kylinos.cn> - 2.11.2-8
+  Type:CVE
+  CVE:CVE-2024-56326
+  SUG:NA
+  DESC:fix CVE-2024-56326
+
+* Fri May 10 2024 weihaohao <weihaohao2@huawei.com> - 2.11.2-7
+  Type:CVE
+  CVE:CVE-2024-34064
+  SUG:NA
+  DESC:fix CVE-2024-34064
+
+* Fri Jan 26 2024 zhuofeng <zhuofeng2@huawei.com> - 2.11.2-6
+  Type:bugfix
+  CVE:NA
+  SUG:NA
+  DESC:make the test check and adapt python2 grammer
+
+* Thu Jan 25 2024 zhuofeng <zhuofeng2@huawei.com> - 2.11.2-5
+  Type:bugfix
+  CVE:NA
+  SUG:NA
+  DESC:add python2 and adpat python2
+
 * Mon Jan 22 2024 weihaohao <weihaohao2@huawei.com> - 2.11.2-4
   Type:CVE
   CVE:CVE-2024-22195