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Fix CVE-2024-50349 CVE-2024-52006

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fly_fzc 2025-01-15 18:38:20 +08:00
parent 4cbb33984f
commit 579eb9f122
6 changed files with 705 additions and 1 deletions
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276
backport-CVE-2024-50349-credential-sanitize-the-user-prompt.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,276 @@
From 7725b8100ffbbff2750ee4d61a0fcc1f53a086e8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
Date: Wed, 30 Oct 2024 13:26:10 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] credential: sanitize the user prompt
When asking the user interactively for credentials, we want to avoid
misleading them e.g. via control sequences that pretend that the URL
targets a trusted host when it does not.
While Git learned, over the course of the preceding commits, to disallow
URLs containing URL-encoded control characters by default, credential
helpers are still allowed to specify values very freely (apart from Line
Feed and NUL characters, anything is allowed), and this would allow,
say, a username containing control characters to be specified that would
then be displayed in the interactive terminal prompt asking the user for
the password, potentially sending those control characters directly to
the terminal. This is undesirable because control characters can be used
to mislead users to divulge secret information to untrusted sites.
To prevent such an attack vector, let's add a `git_prompt()` that forces
the displayed text to be sanitized, i.e. displaying question marks
instead of control characters.
Note: While this commit's diff changes a lot of `user@host` strings to
`user%40host`, which may look suspicious on the surface, there is a good
reason for that: this string specifies a user name, not a
<username>@<hostname> combination! In the context of t5541, the actual
combination looks like this: `user%40@127.0.0.1:5541`. Therefore, these
string replacements document a net improvement introduced by this
commit, as `user@host@127.0.0.1` could have left readers wondering where
the user name ends and where the host name begins.
Hinted-at-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net>
Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
---
Documentation/config/credential.txt | 6 ++++++
credential.c | 7 ++++++-
credential.h | 4 +++-
t/t0300-credentials.sh | 20 ++++++++++++++++++++
t/t5541-http-push-smart.sh | 6 +++---
t/t5550-http-fetch-dumb.sh | 14 +++++++-------
t/t5551-http-fetch-smart.sh | 16 ++++++++--------
7 files changed, 53 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-)
diff --git a/Documentation/config/credential.txt b/Documentation/config/credential.txt
index 512f3187..fd8113d6 100644
--- a/Documentation/config/credential.txt
+++ b/Documentation/config/credential.txt
@@ -14,6 +14,12 @@ credential.useHttpPath::
or https URL to be important. Defaults to false. See
linkgit:gitcredentials[7] for more information.
+credential.sanitizePrompt::
+ By default, user names and hosts that are shown as part of the
+ password prompt are not allowed to contain control characters (they
+ will be URL-encoded by default). Configure this setting to `false` to
+ override that behavior.
+
credential.username::
If no username is set for a network authentication, use this username
by default. See credential.<context>.* below, and
diff --git a/credential.c b/credential.c
index 572f1785..1392a54d 100644
--- a/credential.c
+++ b/credential.c
@@ -67,6 +67,8 @@ static int credential_config_callback(const char *var, const char *value,
}
else if (!strcmp(key, "usehttppath"))
c->use_http_path = git_config_bool(var, value);
+ else if (!strcmp(key, "sanitizeprompt"))
+ c->sanitize_prompt = git_config_bool(var, value);
return 0;
}
@@ -179,7 +181,10 @@ static char *credential_ask_one(const char *what, struct credential *c,
struct strbuf prompt = STRBUF_INIT;
char *r;
- credential_describe(c, &desc);
+ if (c->sanitize_prompt)
+ credential_format(c, &desc);
+ else
+ credential_describe(c, &desc);
if (desc.len)
strbuf_addf(&prompt, "%s for '%s': ", what, desc.buf);
else
diff --git a/credential.h b/credential.h
index 935b28a7..0364d436 100644
--- a/credential.h
+++ b/credential.h
@@ -119,7 +119,8 @@ struct credential {
configured:1,
quit:1,
use_http_path:1,
- username_from_proto:1;
+ username_from_proto:1,
+ sanitize_prompt:1;
char *username;
char *password;
@@ -132,7 +133,10 @@ struct credential {
char *path;
};
-#define CREDENTIAL_INIT { STRING_LIST_INIT_DUP }
+#define CREDENTIAL_INIT { \
+ .helpers = STRING_LIST_INIT_DUP, \
+ .sanitize_prompt = 1, \
+};
/* Initialize a credential structure, setting all fields to empty. */
void credential_init(struct credential *);
diff --git a/t/t0300-credentials.sh b/t/t0300-credentials.sh
index cb91be14..b62c70c1 100755
--- a/t/t0300-credentials.sh
+++ b/t/t0300-credentials.sh
@@ -45,6 +45,10 @@ test_expect_success 'setup helper scripts' '
test -z "$pass" || echo password=$pass
EOF
+ write_script git-credential-cntrl-in-username <<-\EOF &&
+ printf "username=\\007latrix Lestrange\\n"
+ EOF
+
PATH="$PWD:$PATH"
'
@@ -825,4 +829,20 @@ test_expect_success 'credential config with partial URLs' '
test_i18ngrep "skipping credential lookup for key" stderr
'
+BEL="$(printf '\007')"
+
+test_expect_success 'interactive prompt is sanitized' '
+ check fill cntrl-in-username <<-EOF
+ protocol=https
+ host=example.org
+ --
+ protocol=https
+ host=example.org
+ username=${BEL}latrix Lestrange
+ password=askpass-password
+ --
+ askpass: Password for ${SQ}https://%07latrix%20Lestrange@example.org${SQ}:
+ EOF
+'
+
test_done
diff --git a/t/t5541-http-push-smart.sh b/t/t5541-http-push-smart.sh
index d0211cd8..2cd2e1a0 100755
--- a/t/t5541-http-push-smart.sh
+++ b/t/t5541-http-push-smart.sh
@@ -351,7 +351,7 @@ test_expect_success 'push over smart http with auth' '
git push "$HTTPD_URL"/auth/smart/test_repo.git &&
git --git-dir="$HTTPD_DOCUMENT_ROOT_PATH/test_repo.git" \
log -1 --format=%s >actual &&
- expect_askpass both user@host &&
+ expect_askpass both user%40host &&
test_cmp expect actual
'
@@ -363,7 +363,7 @@ test_expect_success 'push to auth-only-for-push repo' '
git push "$HTTPD_URL"/auth-push/smart/test_repo.git &&
git --git-dir="$HTTPD_DOCUMENT_ROOT_PATH/test_repo.git" \
log -1 --format=%s >actual &&
- expect_askpass both user@host &&
+ expect_askpass both user%40host &&
test_cmp expect actual
'
@@ -393,7 +393,7 @@ test_expect_success 'push into half-auth-complete requires password' '
git push "$HTTPD_URL/half-auth-complete/smart/half-auth.git" &&
git --git-dir="$HTTPD_DOCUMENT_ROOT_PATH/half-auth.git" \
log -1 --format=%s >actual &&
- expect_askpass both user@host &&
+ expect_askpass both user%40host &&
test_cmp expect actual
'
diff --git a/t/t5550-http-fetch-dumb.sh b/t/t5550-http-fetch-dumb.sh
index 8f182a3c..5d0e3946 100755
--- a/t/t5550-http-fetch-dumb.sh
+++ b/t/t5550-http-fetch-dumb.sh
@@ -90,13 +90,13 @@ test_expect_success 'http auth can use user/pass in URL' '
test_expect_success 'http auth can use just user in URL' '
set_askpass wrong pass@host &&
git clone "$HTTPD_URL_USER/auth/dumb/repo.git" clone-auth-pass &&
- expect_askpass pass user@host
+ expect_askpass pass user%40host
'
test_expect_success 'http auth can request both user and pass' '
set_askpass user@host pass@host &&
git clone "$HTTPD_URL/auth/dumb/repo.git" clone-auth-both &&
- expect_askpass both user@host
+ expect_askpass both user%40host
'
test_expect_success 'http auth respects credential helper config' '
@@ -114,14 +114,14 @@ test_expect_success 'http auth can get username from config' '
test_config_global "credential.$HTTPD_URL.username" user@host &&
set_askpass wrong pass@host &&
git clone "$HTTPD_URL/auth/dumb/repo.git" clone-auth-user &&
- expect_askpass pass user@host
+ expect_askpass pass user%40host
'
test_expect_success 'configured username does not override URL' '
test_config_global "credential.$HTTPD_URL.username" wrong &&
set_askpass wrong pass@host &&
git clone "$HTTPD_URL_USER/auth/dumb/repo.git" clone-auth-user2 &&
- expect_askpass pass user@host
+ expect_askpass pass user%40host
'
test_expect_success 'set up repo with http submodules' '
@@ -142,7 +142,7 @@ test_expect_success 'cmdline credential config passes to submodule via clone' '
set_askpass wrong pass@host &&
git -c "credential.$HTTPD_URL.username=user@host" \
clone --recursive super super-clone &&
- expect_askpass pass user@host
+ expect_askpass pass user%40host
'
test_expect_success 'cmdline credential config passes submodule via fetch' '
@@ -153,7 +153,7 @@ test_expect_success 'cmdline credential config passes submodule via fetch' '
git -C super-clone \
-c "credential.$HTTPD_URL.username=user@host" \
fetch --recurse-submodules &&
- expect_askpass pass user@host
+ expect_askpass pass user%40host
'
test_expect_success 'cmdline credential config passes submodule update' '
@@ -170,7 +170,7 @@ test_expect_success 'cmdline credential config passes submodule update' '
git -C super-clone \
-c "credential.$HTTPD_URL.username=user@host" \
submodule update &&
- expect_askpass pass user@host
+ expect_askpass pass user%40host
'
test_expect_success 'fetch changes via http' '
diff --git a/t/t5551-http-fetch-smart.sh b/t/t5551-http-fetch-smart.sh
index 0908534f..8a27768d 100755
--- a/t/t5551-http-fetch-smart.sh
+++ b/t/t5551-http-fetch-smart.sh
@@ -181,7 +181,7 @@ test_expect_success 'clone from password-protected repository' '
echo two >expect &&
set_askpass user@host pass@host &&
git clone --bare "$HTTPD_URL/auth/smart/repo.git" smart-auth &&
- expect_askpass both user@host &&
+ expect_askpass both user%40host &&
git --git-dir=smart-auth log -1 --format=%s >actual &&
test_cmp expect actual
'
@@ -199,7 +199,7 @@ test_expect_success 'clone from auth-only-for-objects repository' '
echo two >expect &&
set_askpass user@host pass@host &&
git clone --bare "$HTTPD_URL/auth-fetch/smart/repo.git" half-auth &&
- expect_askpass both user@host &&
+ expect_askpass both user%40host &&
git --git-dir=half-auth log -1 --format=%s >actual &&
test_cmp expect actual
'
@@ -224,7 +224,7 @@ test_expect_success 'redirects send auth to new location' '
set_askpass user@host pass@host &&
git -c credential.useHttpPath=true \
clone $HTTPD_URL/smart-redir-auth/repo.git repo-redir-auth &&
- expect_askpass both user@host auth/smart/repo.git
+ expect_askpass both user%40host auth/smart/repo.git
'
test_expect_success 'disable dumb http on server' '
--
2.23.0

98
backport-CVE-2024-50349-credential_format-also-encode-host-port.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,98 @@
From c903985bf7e772e2d08275c1a95c8a55ab011577 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
Date: Thu, 7 Nov 2024 08:57:52 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] credential_format(): also encode <host>[:<port>]
An upcoming change wants to sanitize the credential password prompt
where a URL is displayed that may potentially come from a `.gitmodules`
file. To this end, the `credential_format()` function is employed.
To sanitize the host name (and optional port) part of the URL, we need a
new mode of the `strbuf_add_percentencode()` function because the
current mode is both too strict and too lenient: too strict because it
encodes `:`, `[` and `]` (which should be left unencoded in
`<host>:<port>` and in IPv6 addresses), and too lenient because it does
not encode invalid host name characters `/`, `_` and `~`.
So let's introduce and use a new mode specifically to encode the host
name and optional port part of a URI, leaving alpha-numerical
characters, periods, colons and brackets alone and encoding all others.
This only leads to a change of behavior for URLs that contain invalid
host names.
Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
---
credential.c | 3 ++-
strbuf.c | 4 +++-
strbuf.h | 1 +
t/t0300-credentials.sh | 13 +++++++++++++
4 files changed, 19 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/credential.c b/credential.c
index f3201134..572f1785 100644
--- a/credential.c
+++ b/credential.c
@@ -164,7 +164,8 @@ static void credential_format(struct credential *c, struct strbuf *out)
strbuf_addch(out, '@');
}
if (c->host)
- strbuf_addstr(out, c->host);
+ strbuf_add_percentencode(out, c->host,
+ STRBUF_ENCODE_HOST_AND_PORT);
if (c->path) {
strbuf_addch(out, '/');
strbuf_add_percentencode(out, c->path, 0);
diff --git a/strbuf.c b/strbuf.c
index c383f41a..756b96c5 100644
--- a/strbuf.c
+++ b/strbuf.c
@@ -492,7 +492,9 @@ void strbuf_add_percentencode(struct strbuf *dst, const char *src, int flags)
unsigned char ch = src[i];
if (ch <= 0x1F || ch >= 0x7F ||
(ch == '/' && (flags & STRBUF_ENCODE_SLASH)) ||
- strchr(URL_UNSAFE_CHARS, ch))
+ ((flags & STRBUF_ENCODE_HOST_AND_PORT) ?
+ !isalnum(ch) && !strchr("-.:[]", ch) :
+ !!strchr(URL_UNSAFE_CHARS, ch)))
strbuf_addf(dst, "%%%02X", (unsigned char)ch);
else
strbuf_addch(dst, ch);
diff --git a/strbuf.h b/strbuf.h
index f6dbb968..f9f8bb03 100644
--- a/strbuf.h
+++ b/strbuf.h
@@ -380,6 +380,7 @@ size_t strbuf_expand_dict_cb(struct strbuf *sb,
void strbuf_addbuf_percentquote(struct strbuf *dst, const struct strbuf *src);
#define STRBUF_ENCODE_SLASH 1
+#define STRBUF_ENCODE_HOST_AND_PORT 2
/**
* Append the contents of a string to a strbuf, percent-encoding any characters
diff --git a/t/t0300-credentials.sh b/t/t0300-credentials.sh
index c66d91e8..cb91be14 100755
--- a/t/t0300-credentials.sh
+++ b/t/t0300-credentials.sh
@@ -514,6 +514,19 @@ test_expect_success 'match percent-encoded values in username' '
EOF
'
+test_expect_success 'match percent-encoded values in hostname' '
+ test_config "credential.https://a%20b%20c/.helper" "$HELPER" &&
+ check fill <<-\EOF
+ url=https://a b c/
+ --
+ protocol=https
+ host=a b c
+ username=foo
+ password=bar
+ --
+ EOF
+'
+
test_expect_success 'fetch with multiple path components' '
test_unconfig credential.helper &&
test_config credential.https://example.com/foo/repo.git.helper "verbatim foo bar" &&
--
2.23.0

160
backport-CVE-2024-52006-credential-disallow-Carriage-Returns-in-the-protocol.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,160 @@
From b01b9b81d36759cdcd07305e78765199e1bc2060 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
Date: Mon, 4 Nov 2024 14:48:22 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] credential: disallow Carriage Returns in the protocol by
default
While Git has documented that the credential protocol is line-based,
with newlines as terminators, the exact shape of a newline has not been
documented.
From Git's perspective, which is firmly rooted in the Linux ecosystem,
it is clear that "a newline" means a Line Feed character.
However, even Git's credential protocol respects Windows line endings
(a Carriage Return character followed by a Line Feed character, "CR/LF")
by virtue of using `strbuf_getline()`.
There is a third category of line endings that has been used originally
by MacOS, and that is respected by the default line readers of .NET and
node.js: bare Carriage Returns.
Git cannot handle those, and what is worse: Git's remedy against
CVE-2020-5260 does not catch when credential helpers are used that
interpret bare Carriage Returns as newlines.
Git Credential Manager addressed this as CVE-2024-50338, but other
credential helpers may still be vulnerable. So let's not only disallow
Line Feed characters as part of the values in the credential protocol,
but also disallow Carriage Return characters.
In the unlikely event that a credential helper relies on Carriage
Returns in the protocol, introduce an escape hatch via the
`credential.protectProtocol` config setting.
This addresses CVE-2024-52006.
Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
---
Documentation/config/credential.txt | 5 +++++
credential.c | 21 ++++++++++++++-------
credential.h | 4 +++-
t/t0300-credentials.sh | 16 ++++++++++++++++
4 files changed, 38 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
diff --git a/Documentation/config/credential.txt b/Documentation/config/credential.txt
index fd8113d6..9cadca7f 100644
--- a/Documentation/config/credential.txt
+++ b/Documentation/config/credential.txt
@@ -20,6 +20,11 @@ credential.sanitizePrompt::
will be URL-encoded by default). Configure this setting to `false` to
override that behavior.
+credential.protectProtocol::
+ By default, Carriage Return characters are not allowed in the protocol
+ that is used when Git talks to a credential helper. This setting allows
+ users to override this default.
+
credential.username::
If no username is set for a network authentication, use this username
by default. See credential.<context>.* below, and
diff --git a/credential.c b/credential.c
index 1392a54d..b76a7309 100644
--- a/credential.c
+++ b/credential.c
@@ -69,6 +69,8 @@ static int credential_config_callback(const char *var, const char *value,
c->use_http_path = git_config_bool(var, value);
else if (!strcmp(key, "sanitizeprompt"))
c->sanitize_prompt = git_config_bool(var, value);
+ else if (!strcmp(key, "protectprotocol"))
+ c->protect_protocol = git_config_bool(var, value);
return 0;
}
@@ -262,7 +264,8 @@ int credential_read(struct credential *c, FILE *fp)
return 0;
}
-static void credential_write_item(FILE *fp, const char *key, const char *value,
+static void credential_write_item(const struct credential *c,
+ FILE *fp, const char *key, const char *value,
int required)
{
if (!value && required)
@@ -271,16 +274,20 @@ static void credential_write_item(FILE *fp, const char *key, const char *value,
return;
if (strchr(value, '\n'))
die("credential value for %s contains newline", key);
+ if (c->protect_protocol && strchr(value, '\r'))
+ die("credential value for %s contains carriage return\n"
+ "If this is intended, set `credential.protectProtocol=false`",
+ key);
fprintf(fp, "%s=%s\n", key, value);
}
void credential_write(const struct credential *c, FILE *fp)
{
- credential_write_item(fp, "protocol", c->protocol, 1);
- credential_write_item(fp, "host", c->host, 1);
- credential_write_item(fp, "path", c->path, 0);
- credential_write_item(fp, "username", c->username, 0);
- credential_write_item(fp, "password", c->password, 0);
+ credential_write_item(c, fp, "protocol", c->protocol, 1);
+ credential_write_item(c, fp, "host", c->host, 1);
+ credential_write_item(c, fp, "path", c->path, 0);
+ credential_write_item(c, fp, "username", c->username, 0);
+ credential_write_item(c, fp, "password", c->password, 0);
}
static int run_credential_helper(struct credential *c,
diff --git a/credential.h b/credential.h
index 0364d436..2c0b39a9 100644
--- a/credential.h
+++ b/credential.h
@@ -120,7 +120,8 @@ struct credential {
quit:1,
use_http_path:1,
username_from_proto:1,
- sanitize_prompt:1;
+ sanitize_prompt:1,
+ protect_protocol:1;
char *username;
char *password;
@@ -134,6 +135,7 @@ struct credential {
#define CREDENTIAL_INIT { \
.helpers = STRING_LIST_INIT_DUP, \
.sanitize_prompt = 1, \
+ .protect_protocol = 1, \
};
/* Initialize a credential structure, setting all fields to empty. */
diff --git a/t/t0300-credentials.sh b/t/t0300-credentials.sh
index b62c70c1..168ae765 100755
--- a/t/t0300-credentials.sh
+++ b/t/t0300-credentials.sh
@@ -720,6 +720,22 @@ test_expect_success 'url parser rejects embedded newlines' '
test_i18ncmp expect stderr
'
+test_expect_success 'url parser rejects embedded carriage returns' '
+ test_config credential.helper "!true" &&
+ test_must_fail git credential fill 2>stderr <<-\EOF &&
+ url=https://example%0d.com/
+ EOF
+ cat >expect <<-\EOF &&
+ fatal: credential value for host contains carriage return
+ If this is intended, set `credential.protectProtocol=false`
+ EOF
+ test_cmp expect stderr &&
+ GIT_ASKPASS=true \
+ git -c credential.protectProtocol=false credential fill <<-\EOF
+ url=https://example%0d.com/
+ EOF
+'
+
test_expect_success 'host-less URLs are parsed as empty host' '
check fill "verbatim foo bar" <<-\EOF
url=cert:///path/to/cert.pem
--
2.23.0

59
backport-pre-001-CVE-2024-52006.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,59 @@
From 356c473295097f4aeaacc1a2dcd70271b7080788 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Nikita Leonov <nykyta.leonov@gmail.com>
Date: Sat, 3 Oct 2020 13:29:12 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] credential: treat CR/LF as line endings in the credential
protocol
This fix makes using Git credentials more friendly to Windows users: it
allows a credential helper to communicate using CR/LF line endings ("DOS
line endings" commonly found on Windows) instead of LF-only line endings
("Unix line endings").
Note that this changes the behavior a bit: if a credential helper
produces, say, a password with a trailing Carriage Return character,
that will now be culled even when the rest of the lines end only in Line
Feed characters, indicating that the Carriage Return was not meant to be
part of the line ending.
In practice, it seems _very_ unlikely that something like this happens.
Passwords usually need to consist of non-control characters, URLs need
to have special characters URL-encoded, and user names, well, are names.
However, it _does_ help on Windows, where CR/LF line endings are common:
as unrecognized commands are simply ignored by the credential machinery,
even a command like `quit\r` (which is clearly intended to abort) would
simply be ignored (silently) by Git.
So let's change the credential machinery to accept both CR/LF and LF
line endings.
While we do this for the credential helper protocol, we do _not_ adjust
`git credential-cache--daemon` (which won't work on Windows, anyway,
because it requires Unix sockets) nor `git credential-store` (which
writes the file `~/.git-credentials` which we consider an implementation
detail that should be opaque to the user, read: we do expect users _not_
to edit this file manually).
Signed-off-by: Nikita Leonov <nykyta.leonov@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
---
credential.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/credential.c b/credential.c
index efc29dc5e1..e5202fbef2 100644
--- a/credential.c
+++ b/credential.c
@@ -202,7 +202,7 @@ int credential_read(struct credential *c, FILE *fp)
{
struct strbuf line = STRBUF_INIT;
- while (strbuf_getline_lf(&line, fp) != EOF) {
+ while (strbuf_getline(&line, fp) != EOF) {
char *key = line.buf;
char *value = strchr(key, '=');
--
2.33.0

100
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@ -0,0 +1,100 @@
From 5726a6b4012cd41701927a6637b9f2070e7760ee Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: =?UTF-8?q?=C3=86var=20Arnfj=C3=B6r=C3=B0=20Bjarmason?=
<avarab@gmail.com>
Date: Thu, 1 Jul 2021 12:51:26 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] *.c *_init(): define in terms of corresponding *_INIT macro
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
Change the common patter in the codebase of duplicating the
initialization logic between an *_INIT macro and a
corresponding *_init() function to use the macro as the canonical
source of truth.
Now we no longer need to keep the function up-to-date with the macro
version. This implements a suggestion by Jeff King who found that
under -O2 [1] modern compilers will init new version in place without
the extra copy[1]. The performance of a single *_init() won't matter
in most cases, but even if it does we're going to be producing
efficient machine code to perform these operations.
1. https://lore.kernel.org/git/YNyrDxUO1PlGJvCn@coredump.intra.peff.net/
Signed-off-by: Ævar Arnfjörð Bjarmason <avarab@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
---
credential.c | 4 ++--
json-writer.c | 6 ++----
run-command.c | 5 ++---
strbuf.c | 4 ++--
strmap.c | 3 ++-
strvec.c | 5 ++---
6 files changed, 12 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
diff --git a/credential.c b/credential.c
index e5202fbef2..3c05c7c669 100644
--- a/credential.c
+++ b/credential.c
@@ -10,8 +10,8 @@
void credential_init(struct credential *c)
{
- memset(c, 0, sizeof(*c));
- c->helpers.strdup_strings = 1;
+ struct credential blank = CREDENTIAL_INIT;
+ memcpy(c, &blank, sizeof(*c));
}
void credential_clear(struct credential *c)
diff --git a/json-writer.c b/json-writer.c
index aadb9dbddc..f1cfd8fa8c 100644
--- a/json-writer.c
+++ b/json-writer.c
@@ -3,10 +3,8 @@
void jw_init(struct json_writer *jw)
{
- strbuf_init(&jw->json, 0);
- strbuf_init(&jw->open_stack, 0);
- jw->need_comma = 0;
- jw->pretty = 0;
+ struct json_writer blank = JSON_WRITER_INIT;
+ memcpy(jw, &blank, sizeof(*jw));;
}
void jw_release(struct json_writer *jw)
diff --git a/run-command.c b/run-command.c
index be6bc128cd..8750df16d8 100644
--- a/run-command.c
+++ b/run-command.c
@@ -11,9 +11,8 @@
void child_process_init(struct child_process *child)
{
- memset(child, 0, sizeof(*child));
- argv_array_init(&child->args);
- argv_array_init(&child->env_array);
+ struct child_process blank = CHILD_PROCESS_INIT;
+ memcpy(child, &blank, sizeof(*child));
}
void child_process_clear(struct child_process *child)
diff --git a/strbuf.c b/strbuf.c
index 4df30b4549..c8a5789694 100644
--- a/strbuf.c
+++ b/strbuf.c
@@ -52,8 +52,8 @@ char strbuf_slopbuf[1];
void strbuf_init(struct strbuf *sb, size_t hint)
{
- sb->alloc = sb->len = 0;
- sb->buf = strbuf_slopbuf;
+ struct strbuf blank = STRBUF_INIT;
+ memcpy(sb, &blank, sizeof(*sb));
if (hint)
strbuf_grow(sb, hint);
}
--
2.33.0

13
git.spec
View File

@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
%global gitexecdir %{_libexecdir}/git-core
Name: git
Version: 2.27.0
Release: 20
Release: 21
Summary: A popular and widely used Version Control System
License: GPLv2+ or LGPLv2.1
URL: https://git-scm.com/
@ -74,6 +74,11 @@ Patch59: backport-CVE-2024-32465-wrapper.c-add-x-un-setenv-and-use-xsetenv-in
Patch60: backport-CVE-2024-32465-upload-pack-disable-lazy-fetching-by-default.patch
Patch61: backport-CVE-2024-32002-dir-introduce-readdir_skip_dot_and_dotdot-helper.patch
Patch62: backport-CVE-2024-32002-submodules-submodule-paths-must-not-contain-symlinks.patch
Patch63: backport-pre-001-CVE-2024-52006.patch
Patch64: backport-pre-002-CVE-2024-52006.patch
Patch65: backport-CVE-2024-50349-credential_format-also-encode-host-port.patch
Patch66: backport-CVE-2024-50349-credential-sanitize-the-user-prompt.patch
Patch67: backport-CVE-2024-52006-credential-disallow-Carriage-Returns-in-the-protocol.patch
BuildRequires: gcc gettext
BuildRequires: openssl-devel libcurl-devel expat-devel systemd asciidoc xmlto glib2-devel libsecret-devel pcre2-devel desktop-file-utils
@ -323,6 +328,12 @@ make %{?_smp_mflags} test
%{_mandir}/man7/git*.7.*
%changelog
* Wed Jan 15 2025 fuanan <fuanan3@h-partners.com> - 2.27.0-21
- Type:CVE
- ID:CVE-2024-50349 CVE-2024-52006
- SUG:NA
- DESC:Fix CVE-2024-50349 CVE-2024-52006
* Tue May 21 2024 qiaojijun <qiaojijun@kylinos.cn> - 2.27.0-20
- Type:CVE
- ID:CVE-2024-32002