!90 Fix CVE-2024-42472

From: @wk333 Reviewed-by: @lyn1001 Signed-off-by: @lyn1001
Fix CVE-2024-42472
2024-08-19 06:58:04 +00:00 · 2024-08-19 10:13:06 +08:00 · 2024-04-19 06:48:04 +00:00 · 2024-04-13 02:53:05 +08:00 · 2022-02-17 02:36:49 +00:00 · 2022-02-15 14:28:40 +08:00
23 changed files with 2462 additions and 1 deletions
--- a/CVE-2024-32462.patch
+++ b/CVE-2024-32462.patch
@ -0,0 +1,72 @@
+From 72016e3fce8fcbeab707daf4f1a02b931fcc004d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Alexander Larsson <alexl@redhat.com>
+Date: Mon, 15 Apr 2024 16:10:36 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] When starting non-static command using bwrap use "--"
+
+Origin: https://github.com/flatpak/flatpak/commit/72016e3fce8fcbeab707daf4f1a02b931fcc004d
+
+This ensures that the command is not taken to be a bwrap option.
+
+Resolves: CVE-2024-32462
+Resolves: GHSA-phv6-cpc2-2fgj
+Signed-off-by: Alexander Larsson <alexl@redhat.com>
+[smcv: Fix DISABLE_SANDBOXED_TRIGGERS code path]
+[smcv: Make flatpak_run_maybe_start_dbus_proxy() more obviously correct]
+Signed-off-by: Simon McVittie <smcv@collabora.com>
+---
+ app/flatpak-builtins-build.c | 2 +-
+ common/flatpak-dir.c         | 1 +
+ common/flatpak-run.c         | 5 ++++-
+ 3 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/app/flatpak-builtins-build.c b/app/flatpak-builtins-build.c
+index ce9ff7e..bb4bd06 100644
+--- a/app/flatpak-builtins-build.c
+++ b/app/flatpak-builtins-build.c
+@@ -569,7 +569,7 @@ flatpak_builtin_build (int argc, char **argv, GCancellable *cancellable, GError
+   if (!flatpak_bwrap_bundle_args (bwrap, 1, -1, FALSE, error))
+     return FALSE;
+ 
+-  flatpak_bwrap_add_args (bwrap, command, NULL);
+  flatpak_bwrap_add_args (bwrap, "--", command, NULL);
+   flatpak_bwrap_append_argsv (bwrap,
+                               &argv[rest_argv_start + 2],
+                               rest_argc - 2);
+diff --git a/common/flatpak-dir.c b/common/flatpak-dir.c
+index f00e6bf..e7bc1f8 100644
+--- a/common/flatpak-dir.c
+++ b/common/flatpak-dir.c
+@@ -5391,6 +5391,7 @@ flatpak_dir_run_triggers (FlatpakDir   *self,
+           g_ptr_array_add (argv_array, g_strdup ("--dev"));
+           g_ptr_array_add (argv_array, g_strdup ("/dev"));
+           g_ptr_array_add (argv_array, g_strdup ("--bind"));
+          g_ptr_array_add (argv_array, g_strdup ("--"));
+           g_ptr_array_add (argv_array, g_strdup (basedir));
+           g_ptr_array_add (argv_array, g_strdup (basedir));
+ #endif
+diff --git a/common/flatpak-run.c b/common/flatpak-run.c
+index d48be1f..0b2bada 100644
+--- a/common/flatpak-run.c
+++ b/common/flatpak-run.c
+@@ -754,6 +754,9 @@ add_bwrap_wrapper (FlatpakBwrap *bwrap,
+   if (!flatpak_bwrap_bundle_args (bwrap, 1, -1, FALSE, error))
+     return FALSE;
+ 
+  /* End of options: the next argument will be the executable name */
+  flatpak_bwrap_add_arg (bwrap, "--");
+
+   return TRUE;
+ }
+ 
+@@ -3176,7 +3179,7 @@ flatpak_run_app (const char     *app_ref,
+   if (!flatpak_bwrap_bundle_args (bwrap, 1, -1, FALSE, error))
+     return FALSE;
+ 
+-  flatpak_bwrap_add_arg (bwrap, command);
+  flatpak_bwrap_add_args (bwrap, "--", command, NULL);
+ 
+   if (!add_rest_args (bwrap, app_ref_parts[1],
+                       exports, (flags & FLATPAK_RUN_FLAG_FILE_FORWARDING) != 0,
+-- 
+2.33.0
+
--- a/CVE-2024-42472.patch
+++ b/CVE-2024-42472.patch
@ -0,0 +1,225 @@
+Origin:
+https://github.com/flatpak/flatpak/commit/8a18137d7e80f0575e8defabf677d81e5cc3a788
+https://github.com/flatpak/flatpak/commit/db3a785241fda63bf53f0ec12bb519aa5210de19
+https://github.com/flatpak/flatpak/commit/847dfb88cebbdf8825332730b837489684dfb91e
+https://github.com/flatpak/flatpak/commit/7c63e53bb2af0aae9097fd2edfd6a9ba9d453e97
+
+From 7c63e53bb2af0aae9097fd2edfd6a9ba9d453e97 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Simon McVittie <smcv@collabora.com>
+Date: Wed, 14 Aug 2024 13:44:30 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] persist directories: Pass using new bwrap --bind-fd option
+
+Instead of passing a /proc/self/fd bind mount we use --bind-fd, which
+has two advantages:
+ * bwrap closes the fd when used, so it doesn't leak into the started app
+ * bwrap ensures that what was mounted was the passed in fd (same dev/ino),
+   as there is a small (required) gap between symlink resolve and mount
+   where the target path could be replaced.
+
+Please note that this change requires an updated version of bubblewrap.
+
+Resolves: CVE-2024-42472, GHSA-7hgv-f2j8-xw87
+[smcv: Make whitespace consistent]
+Co-authored-by: Simon McVittie <smcv@collabora.com>
+Signed-off-by: Simon McVittie <smcv@collabora.com>
+
+---
+ common/flatpak-context.c | 109 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
+ configure.ac             |   3 ++
+ tests/test-run.sh        |  39 ++++++++++++++
+ 3 files changed, 148 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/common/flatpak-context.c b/common/flatpak-context.c
+index 6303c71..09dd440 100644
+--- a/common/flatpak-context.c
+++ b/common/flatpak-context.c
+@@ -2616,6 +2616,90 @@ flatpak_context_get_run_flags (FlatpakContext *context)
+   return flags;
+ }
+ 
+/* This creates zero or more directories unders base_fd+basedir, each
+ * being guaranteed to either exist and be a directory (no symlinks)
+ * or be created as a directory. The last directory is opened
+ * and the fd is returned.
+ */
+static gboolean
+mkdir_p_open_nofollow_at (int          base_fd,
+                          const char  *basedir,
+                          int          mode,
+                          const char  *subdir,
+                          int         *out_fd,
+                          GError     **error)
+{
+  glnx_autofd int parent_fd = -1;
+
+  if (g_path_is_absolute (subdir))
+    {
+      const char *skipped_prefix = subdir;
+
+      while (*skipped_prefix == '/')
+        skipped_prefix++;
+
+      g_warning ("--persist=\"%s\" is deprecated, treating it as --persist=\"%s\"", subdir, skipped_prefix);
+      subdir = skipped_prefix;
+    }
+
+  g_autofree char *subdir_dirname = g_path_get_dirname (subdir);
+
+  if (strcmp (subdir_dirname, ".") == 0)
+    {
+      /* It is ok to open basedir with follow=true */
+      if (!glnx_opendirat (base_fd, basedir, TRUE, &parent_fd, error))
+        return FALSE;
+    }
+  else if (strcmp (subdir_dirname, "..") == 0)
+    {
+      return glnx_throw (error, "'..' not supported in --persist paths");
+    }
+  else
+    {
+      if (!mkdir_p_open_nofollow_at (base_fd, basedir, mode,
+                                     subdir_dirname, &parent_fd, error))
+        return FALSE;
+    }
+
+  g_autofree char *subdir_basename = g_path_get_basename (subdir);
+
+  if (strcmp (subdir_basename, ".") == 0)
+    {
+      *out_fd = glnx_steal_fd (&parent_fd);
+      return TRUE;
+    }
+  else if (strcmp (subdir_basename, "..") == 0)
+    {
+      return glnx_throw (error, "'..' not supported in --persist paths");
+    }
+
+  if (!glnx_shutil_mkdir_p_at (parent_fd, subdir_basename, mode, NULL, error))
+    return FALSE;
+
+  int fd = openat (parent_fd, subdir_basename, O_PATH | O_NONBLOCK | O_DIRECTORY | O_CLOEXEC | O_NOCTTY | O_NOFOLLOW);
+  if (fd == -1)
+    {
+      int saved_errno = errno;
+      struct stat stat_buf;
+
+      /* If it's a symbolic link, that could be a user trying to offload
+       * large data to another filesystem, but it could equally well be
+       * a malicious or compromised app trying to exploit GHSA-7hgv-f2j8-xw87.
+       * Produce a clearer error message in this case.
+       * Unfortunately the errno we get in this case is ENOTDIR, so we have
+       * to ask again to find out whether it's really a symlink. */
+      if (saved_errno == ENOTDIR &&
+          fstatat (parent_fd, subdir_basename, &stat_buf, AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW) == 0 &&
+          S_ISLNK (stat_buf.st_mode))
+        return glnx_throw (error, "Symbolic link \"%s\" not allowed to avoid sandbox escape", subdir_basename);
+
+      return glnx_throw_errno_prefix (error, "openat(%s)", subdir_basename);
+    }
+
+  *out_fd = fd;
+  return TRUE;
+}
+
+ void
+ flatpak_context_append_bwrap_filesystem (FlatpakContext  *context,
+                                          FlatpakBwrap    *bwrap,
+@@ -2643,12 +2727,31 @@ flatpak_context_append_bwrap_filesystem (FlatpakContext  *context,
+       while (g_hash_table_iter_next (&iter, &key, NULL))
+         {
+           const char *persist = key;
+-          g_autofree char *src = g_build_filename (g_get_home_dir (), ".var/app", app_id, persist, NULL);
+          g_autofree char *appdir = g_build_filename (g_get_home_dir (), ".var/app", app_id, NULL);
+           g_autofree char *dest = g_build_filename (g_get_home_dir (), persist, NULL);
+ 
+-          g_mkdir_with_parents (src, 0755);
+          g_autoptr(GError) local_error = NULL;
+
+          if (g_mkdir_with_parents (appdir, 0755) != 0)
+            {
+              g_warning ("Unable to create directory %s", appdir);
+              continue;
+            }
+
+          /* Don't follow symlinks from the persist directory, as it is under user control */
+          glnx_autofd int src_fd = -1;
+          if (!mkdir_p_open_nofollow_at (AT_FDCWD, appdir, 0755,
+                                         persist, &src_fd,
+                                         &local_error))
+            {
+              g_warning ("Failed to create persist path %s: %s", persist, local_error->message);
+              continue;
+            }
+
+	  g_autofree char *src_via_proc = g_strdup_printf ("%d", src_fd);
+ 
+-          flatpak_bwrap_add_bind_arg (bwrap, "--bind", src, dest);
+	  flatpak_bwrap_add_fd (bwrap, glnx_steal_fd (&src_fd));
+	  flatpak_bwrap_add_bind_arg (bwrap, "--bind-fd", src_via_proc, dest);
+         }
+     }
+ 
+diff --git a/configure.ac b/configure.ac
+index 8bf37b0..0862ae5 100644
+--- a/configure.ac
+++ b/configure.ac
+@@ -175,6 +175,9 @@ if test "x$BWRAP" != xfalse; then
+    BWRAP_VERSION=`$BWRAP --version | sed 's,.*\ \([0-9]*\.[0-9]*\.[0-9]*\)$,\1,'`
+    AX_COMPARE_VERSION([$SYSTEM_BWRAP_REQS],[gt],[$BWRAP_VERSION],
+                       [AC_MSG_ERROR([You need at least version $SYSTEM_BWRAP_REQS of bubblewrap to use the system installed version])])
+   AS_IF([$BWRAP --help | grep '@<:@-@:>@-bind-fd' >/dev/null],
+         [:],
+         [AC_MSG_ERROR([$BWRAP does not list required option --bind-fd in its --help])])
+    AM_CONDITIONAL([WITH_SYSTEM_BWRAP], [true])
+ else
+    AC_CHECK_LIB(cap, cap_from_text, CAP_LIB=-lcap)
+diff --git a/tests/test-run.sh b/tests/test-run.sh
+index 3c344df..f087ff2 100644
+--- a/tests/test-run.sh
+++ b/tests/test-run.sh
+@@ -494,3 +494,42 @@ ${FLATPAK} ${U} info -m org.test.App > out
+ assert_file_has_content err2.txt [Ii]nvalid
+
+ echo "ok no setuid"
+
+rm -fr "$HOME/.var/app/org.test.Hello"
+mkdir -p "$HOME/.var/app/org.test.Hello"
+run --command=sh --persist=.persist org.test.Hello -c 'echo can-persist > .persist/rc'
+sed -e 's,^,#--persist=.persist# ,g' < "$HOME/.var/app/org.test.Hello/.persist/rc" >&2
+assert_file_has_content "$HOME/.var/app/org.test.Hello/.persist/rc" "can-persist"
+
+ok "--persist=.persist persists a directory"
+
+rm -fr "$HOME/.var/app/org.test.Hello"
+mkdir -p "$HOME/.var/app/org.test.Hello"
+# G_DEBUG= to avoid the deprecation warning being fatal
+G_DEBUG= run --command=sh --persist=/.persist org.test.Hello -c 'echo can-persist > .persist/rc'
+sed -e 's,^,#--persist=/.persist# ,g' < "$HOME/.var/app/org.test.Hello/.persist/rc" >&2
+assert_file_has_content "$HOME/.var/app/org.test.Hello/.persist/rc" "can-persist"
+
+ok "--persist=/.persist is a deprecated form of --persist=.persist"
+
+rm -fr "$HOME/.var/app/org.test.Hello"
+mkdir -p "$HOME/.var/app/org.test.Hello"
+run --command=sh --persist=. org.test.Hello -c 'echo can-persist > .persistrc'
+sed -e 's,^,#--persist=.# ,g' < "$HOME/.var/app/org.test.Hello/.persistrc" >&2
+assert_file_has_content "$HOME/.var/app/org.test.Hello/.persistrc" "can-persist"
+
+ok "--persist=. persists all files"
+
+mkdir "${TEST_DATA_DIR}/inaccessible"
+echo FOO > ${TEST_DATA_DIR}/inaccessible/secret-file
+rm -fr "$HOME/.var/app/org.test.Hello"
+mkdir -p "$HOME/.var/app/org.test.Hello"
+ln -fns "${TEST_DATA_DIR}/inaccessible" "$HOME/.var/app/org.test.Hello/persist"
+# G_DEBUG= to avoid the warnings being fatal when we reject a --persist option.
+# LC_ALL=C so we get the expected non-localized string.
+LC_ALL=C G_DEBUG= run --command=ls --persist=persist --persist=relative/../escape org.test.Hello -la ~/persist &> hello_out || true
+sed -e 's,^,#--persist=symlink# ,g' < hello_out >&2
+assert_file_has_content hello_out "not allowed to avoid sandbox escape"
+assert_not_file_has_content hello_out "secret-file"
+
+ok "--persist doesn't allow sandbox escape via a symlink (CVE-2024-42472)"
+-- 
+2.33.0
+
--- a/backport-0001-CVE-2021-41133.patch
+++ b/backport-0001-CVE-2021-41133.patch
@ -0,0 +1,146 @@
+From e26ac7586c392b5eb35ff4609fe232c52523b2cf Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Simon McVittie <smcv@collabora.com>
+Date: Wed, 1 Sep 2021 11:53:23 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] run: Add an errno value to seccomp filters
+
+At the moment, if we block a syscall we always make it fail with EPERM,
+but this is risky: user-space libraries can start to use new replacements
+for old syscalls at any time, and will often treat EPERM as a fatal error.
+For new syscalls, we should make the syscall fail with ENOSYS, which is
+indistinguishable from running on an older kernel and will cause fallback
+to an older implementation, for example clone3() to clone().
+
+In future we should probably move from EPERM to ENOSYS for some of the
+syscalls we already block, but for now keep the status quo.
+
+This is a prerequisite for fixing the vulnerability tracked as
+GHSA-67h7-w3jq-vh4q.
+
+Signed-off-by: Simon McVittie <smcv@collabora.com>
+
+Conflict:NA   
+Reference:https://github.com/flatpak/flatpak/commit/e26ac7586c392b5eb35ff4609fe232c52523b2cf
+
+---
+ common/flatpak-run.c | 62 +++++++++++++++++++++++++-------------------
+ 1 file changed, 36 insertions(+), 26 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/common/flatpak-run.c b/common/flatpak-run.c
+index 79b30cb..7476d86 100644
+--- a/common/flatpak-run.c
+++ b/common/flatpak-run.c
+@@ -2098,54 +2098,56 @@ setup_seccomp (FlatpakBwrap   *bwrap,
+   struct
+   {
+     int                  scall;
+    int                  errnum;
+     struct scmp_arg_cmp *arg;
+   } syscall_blacklist[] = {
+     /* Block dmesg */
+-    {SCMP_SYS (syslog)},
+    {SCMP_SYS (syslog), EPERM},
+     /* Useless old syscall */
+-    {SCMP_SYS (uselib)},
+    {SCMP_SYS (uselib), EPERM},
+     /* Don't allow disabling accounting */
+-    {SCMP_SYS (acct)},
+    {SCMP_SYS (acct), EPERM},
+     /* 16-bit code is unnecessary in the sandbox, and modify_ldt is a
+        historic source of interesting information leaks. */
+-    {SCMP_SYS (modify_ldt)},
+    {SCMP_SYS (modify_ldt), EPERM},
+     /* Don't allow reading current quota use */
+-    {SCMP_SYS (quotactl)},
+    {SCMP_SYS (quotactl), EPERM},
+ 
+     /* Don't allow access to the kernel keyring */
+-    {SCMP_SYS (add_key)},
+-    {SCMP_SYS (keyctl)},
+-    {SCMP_SYS (request_key)},
+    {SCMP_SYS (add_key), EPERM},
+    {SCMP_SYS (keyctl), EPERM},
+    {SCMP_SYS (request_key), EPERM},
+ 
+     /* Scary VM/NUMA ops */
+-    {SCMP_SYS (move_pages)},
+-    {SCMP_SYS (mbind)},
+-    {SCMP_SYS (get_mempolicy)},
+-    {SCMP_SYS (set_mempolicy)},
+-    {SCMP_SYS (migrate_pages)},
+    {SCMP_SYS (move_pages), EPERM},
+    {SCMP_SYS (mbind), EPERM},
+    {SCMP_SYS (get_mempolicy), EPERM},
+    {SCMP_SYS (set_mempolicy), EPERM},
+    {SCMP_SYS (migrate_pages), EPERM},
+ 
+     /* Don't allow subnamespace setups: */
+-    {SCMP_SYS (unshare)},
+-    {SCMP_SYS (mount)},
+-    {SCMP_SYS (pivot_root)},
+-    {SCMP_SYS (clone), &SCMP_A0 (SCMP_CMP_MASKED_EQ, CLONE_NEWUSER, CLONE_NEWUSER)},
+    {SCMP_SYS (unshare), EPERM},
+    {SCMP_SYS (mount), EPERM},
+    {SCMP_SYS (pivot_root), EPERM},
+    {SCMP_SYS (clone), EPERM, &SCMP_A0 (SCMP_CMP_MASKED_EQ, CLONE_NEWUSER, CLONE_NEWUSER)},
+ 
+     /* Don't allow faking input to the controlling tty (CVE-2017-5226) */
+-    {SCMP_SYS (ioctl), &SCMP_A1 (SCMP_CMP_MASKED_EQ, 0xFFFFFFFFu, (int) TIOCSTI)},
+    {SCMP_SYS (ioctl), EPERM, &SCMP_A1 (SCMP_CMP_MASKED_EQ, 0xFFFFFFFFu, (int) TIOCSTI)},
+   };
+ 
+   struct
+   {
+     int                  scall;
+    int                  errnum;
+     struct scmp_arg_cmp *arg;
+   } syscall_nondevel_blacklist[] = {
+     /* Profiling operations; we expect these to be done by tools from outside
+      * the sandbox.  In particular perf has been the source of many CVEs.
+      */
+-    {SCMP_SYS (perf_event_open)},
+    {SCMP_SYS (perf_event_open), EPERM},
+     /* Don't allow you to switch to bsd emulation or whatnot */
+-    {SCMP_SYS (personality), &SCMP_A0 (SCMP_CMP_NE, allowed_personality)},
+-    {SCMP_SYS (ptrace)}
+    {SCMP_SYS (personality), EPERM, &SCMP_A0 (SCMP_CMP_NE, allowed_personality)},
+    {SCMP_SYS (ptrace), EPERM}
+   };
+   /* Blacklist all but unix, inet, inet6 and netlink */
+   struct
+@@ -2230,10 +2232,14 @@ setup_seccomp (FlatpakBwrap   *bwrap,
+   for (i = 0; i < G_N_ELEMENTS (syscall_blacklist); i++)
+     {
+       int scall = syscall_blacklist[i].scall;
+      int errnum = syscall_blacklist[i].errnum;
+
+      g_return_val_if_fail (errnum == EPERM || errnum == ENOSYS, FALSE);
+
+       if (syscall_blacklist[i].arg)
+-        r = seccomp_rule_add (seccomp, SCMP_ACT_ERRNO (EPERM), scall, 1, *syscall_blacklist[i].arg);
+        r = seccomp_rule_add (seccomp, SCMP_ACT_ERRNO (errnum), scall, 1, *syscall_blacklist[i].arg);
+       else
+-        r = seccomp_rule_add (seccomp, SCMP_ACT_ERRNO (EPERM), scall, 0);
+        r = seccomp_rule_add (seccomp, SCMP_ACT_ERRNO (errnum), scall, 0);
+       if (r < 0 && r == -EFAULT /* unknown syscall */)
+         return flatpak_fail_error (error, FLATPAK_ERROR_SETUP_FAILED, _("Failed to block syscall %d"), scall);
+     }
+@@ -2243,10 +2249,14 @@ setup_seccomp (FlatpakBwrap   *bwrap,
+       for (i = 0; i < G_N_ELEMENTS (syscall_nondevel_blacklist); i++)
+         {
+           int scall = syscall_nondevel_blacklist[i].scall;
+	  int errnum = syscall_nondevel_blacklist[i].errnum;
+
+          g_return_val_if_fail (errnum == EPERM || errnum == ENOSYS, FALSE);
+
+           if (syscall_nondevel_blacklist[i].arg)
+-            r = seccomp_rule_add (seccomp, SCMP_ACT_ERRNO (EPERM), scall, 1, *syscall_nondevel_blacklist[i].arg);
+            r = seccomp_rule_add (seccomp, SCMP_ACT_ERRNO (errnum), scall, 1, *syscall_nondevel_blacklist[i].arg);
+           else
+-            r = seccomp_rule_add (seccomp, SCMP_ACT_ERRNO (EPERM), scall, 0);
+            r = seccomp_rule_add (seccomp, SCMP_ACT_ERRNO (errnum), scall, 0);
+ 
+           if (r < 0 && r == -EFAULT /* unknown syscall */)
+             return flatpak_fail_error (error, FLATPAK_ERROR_SETUP_FAILED, _("Failed to block syscall %d"), scall);
+-- 
+2.19.1
+
--- a/backport-0001-CVE-2021-43860.patch
+++ b/backport-0001-CVE-2021-43860.patch
@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
+From 65cbfac982cb1c83993a9e19aa424daee8e9f042 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Alexander Larsson <alexl@redhat.com>
+Date: Wed, 12 Jan 2022 11:00:56 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] Ensure that bundles have metadata on install
+
+If we have a bundle without metadata we wouldn't properly present
+the permissions in the transaction.
+
+Conflict:NA
+Reference:https://github.com/flatpak/flatpak/commit/65cbfac982cb1c83993a9e19aa424daee8e9f042
+
+---
+ common/flatpak-dir.c | 7 +++++++
+ 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/common/flatpak-dir.c b/common/flatpak-dir.c
+index 56bca24..d6929ba 100644
+--- a/common/flatpak-dir.c
+++ b/common/flatpak-dir.c
+@@ -7608,6 +7608,13 @@ flatpak_dir_ensure_bundle_remote (FlatpakDir   *self,
+   if (metadata == NULL)
+     return NULL;
+ 
+  /* If we rely on metadata (to e.g. print permissions), check it exists before creating the remote */
+  if (out_metadata && fp_metadata == NULL)
+    {
+      flatpak_fail_error (error, FLATPAK_ERROR_INVALID_DATA, "No metadata in bundler header");
+      return NULL;
+    }
+
+   gpg_data = extra_gpg_data ? extra_gpg_data : included_gpg_data;
+ 
+   parts = flatpak_decompose_ref (ref, error);
+-- 
+2.27.0
+
--- a/backport-0001-CVE-2022-21682.patch
+++ b/backport-0001-CVE-2022-21682.patch
@ -0,0 +1,60 @@
+From 949a3ec479d5ca0c962cf12adec70aea30bf0186 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Simon McVittie <smcv@collabora.com>
+Date: Mon, 20 Jan 2020 19:20:14 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH] context: Generalize handling of special filesystems a bit
+
+Currently there are only "home" and "host", but I'm going to add one
+that represents /usr and friends (/usr, /lib, ...), and one for /etc.
+These differ from ordinary filesystem mounts because they are redirected
+into /run/host to avoid conflicting with the runtime.
+
+Signed-off-by: Simon McVittie <smcv@collabora.com>
+
+Conflict:NA
+Reference:https://github.com/flatpak/flatpak/commit/949a3ec479d5ca0c962cf12adec70aea30bf0186
+
+---
+ common/flatpak-context.c | 13 ++++++++-----
+ 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/common/flatpak-context.c b/common/flatpak-context.c
+index 6df9b1e..4892d7b 100644
+--- a/common/flatpak-context.c
+++ b/common/flatpak-context.c
+@@ -78,6 +78,12 @@ const char *flatpak_context_features[] = {
+   NULL
+ };
+ 
+const char *flatpak_context_special_filesystems[] = {
+  "home",
+  "host",
+  NULL
+};
+
+ FlatpakContext *
+ flatpak_context_new (void)
+ {
+@@ -747,9 +753,7 @@ flatpak_context_verify_filesystem (const char *filesystem_and_mode,
+ {
+   g_autofree char *filesystem = parse_filesystem_flags (filesystem_and_mode, NULL);
+ 
+-  if (strcmp (filesystem, "host") == 0)
+-    return TRUE;
+-  if (strcmp (filesystem, "home") == 0)
+  if (g_strv_contains (flatpak_context_special_filesystems, filesystem))
+     return TRUE;
+   if (get_xdg_user_dir_from_string (filesystem, NULL, NULL, NULL))
+     return TRUE;
+@@ -1988,8 +1992,7 @@ flatpak_context_export (FlatpakContext *context,
+       const char *filesystem = key;
+       FlatpakFilesystemMode mode = GPOINTER_TO_INT (value);
+ 
+-      if (strcmp (filesystem, "host") == 0 ||
+-          strcmp (filesystem, "home") == 0)
+      if (g_strv_contains (flatpak_context_special_filesystems, filesystem))
+         continue;
+ 
+       if (g_str_has_prefix (filesystem, "xdg-"))
+-- 
+2.27.0
+
--- a/backport-0002-CVE-2021-41133.patch
+++ b/backport-0002-CVE-2021-41133.patch
@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
+From 89ae9fe74c6d445bb1b3a40e568d77cf5de47e48 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Simon McVittie <smcv@collabora.com>
+Date: Wed, 1 Sep 2021 12:44:04 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] run: Add cross-references for some other seccomp syscall
+ filters
+
+Signed-off-by: Simon McVittie <smcv@collabora.com>
+
+Conflict:NA
+Reference:https://github.com/flatpak/flatpak/commit/89ae9fe74c6d445bb1b3a40e568d77cf5de47e48
+
+---
+ common/flatpak-run.c | 4 ++++
+ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
+
+
+diff --git a/common/flatpak-run.c b/common/flatpak-run.c
+index 7476d86..f2f296e 100644
+--- a/common/flatpak-run.c
+++ b/common/flatpak-run.c
+@@ -2093,6 +2093,10 @@ setup_seccomp (FlatpakBwrap   *bwrap,
+    *  https://git.gnome.org/browse/linux-user-chroot
+    *    in src/setup-seccomp.c
+    *
+   * Other useful resources:
+   * https://github.com/systemd/systemd/blob/HEAD/src/shared/seccomp-util.c
+   * https://github.com/moby/moby/blob/HEAD/profiles/seccomp/default.json
+   *
+    **** END NOTE ON CODE SHARING
+    */
+   struct
+-- 
+2.19.1
+
--- a/backport-0002-CVE-2021-43860.patch
+++ b/backport-0002-CVE-2021-43860.patch
@ -0,0 +1,115 @@
+From ba818f504c926baaf6e362be8159cfacf994310e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Ryan Gonzalez <ryan.gonzalez@collabora.com>
+Date: Thu, 23 Dec 2021 18:30:17 -0600
+Subject: [PATCH] Fix metadata file contents after null terminators being
+ ignored
+
+In particular, if a null terminator is placed inside the metadata file,
+Flatpak will only compare the text *before* it to the value of
+xa.metadata, but the full file will be parsed when permissions are set
+at runtime. This means that any app can include a null terminator in its
+permissions metadata, and Flatpak will only show the user the
+permissions *preceding* the terminator during install, but the
+permissions *after* the terminator are applied at runtime.
+
+Fixes GHSA-qpjc-vq3c-572j / CVE-2021-43860
+
+Signed-off-by: Ryan Gonzalez <ryan.gonzalez@collabora.com>
+
+Conflict:NA
+Reference:https://github.com/flatpak/flatpak/commit/ba818f504c926baaf6e362be8159cfacf994310e
+
+---
+ common/flatpak-dir.c         | 5 +++--
+ common/flatpak-transaction.c | 4 ++--
+ common/flatpak-utils.c       | 9 +++++----
+ 3 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/common/flatpak-dir.c b/common/flatpak-dir.c
+index 56bca24..5af4b4b 100644
+--- a/common/flatpak-dir.c
+++ b/common/flatpak-dir.c
+@@ -6608,6 +6608,7 @@ flatpak_dir_deploy (FlatpakDir          *self,
+   g_autoptr(GFile) metadata_file = NULL;
+   g_autofree char *metadata_contents = NULL;
+   g_autofree char *application_runtime = NULL;
+  gsize metadata_size = 0;
+   gboolean is_app;
+ 
+   if (!flatpak_dir_ensure_repo (self, cancellable, error))
+@@ -6850,12 +6851,12 @@ flatpak_dir_deploy (FlatpakDir          *self,
+ 
+   metadata_file = g_file_resolve_relative_path (checkoutdir, "metadata");
+   if (g_file_load_contents (metadata_file, NULL,
+-                            &metadata_contents, NULL, NULL, NULL))
+                            &metadata_contents, &metadata_size, NULL, NULL))
+     {
+       g_autoptr(GKeyFile) keyfile = g_key_file_new ();
+       if (!g_key_file_load_from_data (keyfile,
+                                       metadata_contents,
+-                                      -1,
+                                      metadata_size,
+                                       0, error))
+         return FALSE;
+ 
+diff --git a/common/flatpak-transaction.c b/common/flatpak-transaction.c
+index 396d75c..4e19e5d 100644
+--- a/common/flatpak-transaction.c
+++ b/common/flatpak-transaction.c
+@@ -1604,7 +1604,7 @@ flatpak_transaction_add_ref (FlatpakTransaction             *self,
+ 
+   op = flatpak_transaction_add_op (self, remote, ref, subpaths, commit, bundle, kind);
+   if (external_metadata)
+-    op->external_metadata = g_bytes_new (external_metadata, strlen (external_metadata) + 1);
+    op->external_metadata = g_bytes_new (external_metadata, strlen (external_metadata));
+ 
+   return TRUE;
+ }
+@@ -1839,7 +1839,7 @@ load_deployed_metadata (FlatpakTransaction *self, const char *ref)
+       return NULL;
+     }
+ 
+-  return g_bytes_new_take (g_steal_pointer (&metadata_contents), metadata_contents_length + 1);
+  return g_bytes_new_take (g_steal_pointer (&metadata_contents), metadata_contents_length);
+ }
+ 
+ static void
+diff --git a/common/flatpak-utils.c b/common/flatpak-utils.c
+index 23b72d6..accf230 100644
+--- a/common/flatpak-utils.c
+++ b/common/flatpak-utils.c
+@@ -4674,6 +4674,7 @@ flatpak_pull_from_bundle (OstreeRepo   *repo,
+                           GCancellable *cancellable,
+                           GError      **error)
+ {
+  gsize metadata_size = 0;	
+   g_autofree char *metadata_contents = NULL;
+   g_autofree char *to_checksum = NULL;
+ 
+@@ -4691,6 +4692,8 @@ flatpak_pull_from_bundle (OstreeRepo   *repo,
+   if (metadata == NULL)
+     return FALSE;
+ 
+  metadata_size = strlen (metadata_contents);
+
+   if (!ostree_repo_get_remote_option (repo, remote, "collection-id", NULL,
+                                       &remote_collection_id, NULL))
+     remote_collection_id = NULL;
+@@ -4760,12 +4763,10 @@ flatpak_pull_from_bundle (OstreeRepo   *repo,
+                                   cancellable, error) < 0)
+         return FALSE;
+ 
+-      /* Null terminate */
+-      g_output_stream_write (G_OUTPUT_STREAM (data_stream), "\0", 1, NULL, NULL);
+-
+       metadata_valid =
+         metadata_contents != NULL &&
+-        strcmp (metadata_contents, g_memory_output_stream_get_data (data_stream)) == 0;
+	metadata_size == g_memory_output_stream_get_data_size (data_stream) &&
+	memcmp (metadata_contents, g_memory_output_stream_get_data (data_stream), metadata_size) == 0;
+     }
+   else
+     {
+-- 
+2.27.0
+
--- a/backport-0002-CVE-2022-21682.patch
+++ b/backport-0002-CVE-2022-21682.patch
@ -0,0 +1,276 @@
+From 517ad25b5fe83376af258acef646551cb97af97c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Simon McVittie <smcv@collabora.com>
+Date: Mon, 10 Aug 2020 23:58:11 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] context: Only parse filesystem/mode strings in one place
+
+This gives us the ability for the parse function (the former verify
+function) to carry out a normalization step as well.
+
+Signed-off-by: Simon McVittie <smcv@collabora.com>
+
+Conflict:NA
+Reference:https://github.com/flatpak/flatpak/commit/517ad25b5fe83376af258acef646551cb97af97c
+
+---
+ common/flatpak-context.c         | 77 +++++++++++++++++---------------
+ common/flatpak-exports-private.h |  1 +
+ common/flatpak-exports.c         | 14 +++---
+ 3 files changed, 48 insertions(+), 44 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/common/flatpak-context.c b/common/flatpak-context.c
+index 4892d7b..3a99646 100644
+--- a/common/flatpak-context.c
+++ b/common/flatpak-context.c
+@@ -92,6 +92,7 @@ flatpak_context_new (void)
+   context = g_slice_new0 (FlatpakContext);
+   context->env_vars = g_hash_table_new_full (g_str_hash, g_str_equal, g_free, g_free);
+   context->persistent = g_hash_table_new_full (g_str_hash, g_str_equal, g_free, NULL);
+  /* filename or special filesystem name => FlatpakFilesystemMode */
+   context->filesystems = g_hash_table_new_full (g_str_hash, g_str_equal, g_free, NULL);
+   context->session_bus_policy = g_hash_table_new_full (g_str_hash, g_str_equal, g_free, NULL);
+   context->system_bus_policy = g_hash_table_new_full (g_str_hash, g_str_equal, g_free, NULL);
+@@ -748,19 +749,23 @@ parse_filesystem_flags (const char            *filesystem,
+ }
+ 
+ static gboolean
+-flatpak_context_verify_filesystem (const char *filesystem_and_mode,
+-                                   GError    **error)
+flatpak_context_parse_filesystem (const char             *filesystem_and_mode,
+                                  char                  **filesystem_out,
+                                  FlatpakFilesystemMode  *mode_out,
+                                  GError                **error)
+ {
+-  g_autofree char *filesystem = parse_filesystem_flags (filesystem_and_mode, NULL);
+  g_autofree char *filesystem = parse_filesystem_flags (filesystem_and_mode, mode_out);
+ 
+-  if (g_strv_contains (flatpak_context_special_filesystems, filesystem))
+-    return TRUE;
+-  if (get_xdg_user_dir_from_string (filesystem, NULL, NULL, NULL))
+-    return TRUE;
+-  if (g_str_has_prefix (filesystem, "~/"))
+-    return TRUE;
+-  if (g_str_has_prefix (filesystem, "/"))
+-    return TRUE;
+  if (g_strv_contains (flatpak_context_special_filesystems, filesystem) ||
+      get_xdg_user_dir_from_string (filesystem, NULL, NULL, NULL) ||
+      g_str_has_prefix (filesystem, "~/") ||
+      g_str_has_prefix (filesystem, "/"))
+    {
+      if (filesystem_out != NULL)
+        *filesystem_out = g_steal_pointer (&filesystem);
+
+      return TRUE;
+    }
+ 
+   g_set_error (error, G_OPTION_ERROR, G_OPTION_ERROR_FAILED,
+                _("Unknown filesystem location %s, valid locations are: host, home, xdg-*[/...], ~/dir, /dir"), filesystem);
+@@ -768,24 +773,13 @@ flatpak_context_verify_filesystem (const char *filesystem_and_mode,
+ }
+ 
+ static void
+-flatpak_context_add_filesystem (FlatpakContext *context,
+-                                const char     *what)
+flatpak_context_take_filesystem (FlatpakContext        *context,
+                                 char                  *fs,
+                                 FlatpakFilesystemMode  mode)
+ {
+-  FlatpakFilesystemMode mode;
+-  char *fs = parse_filesystem_flags (what, &mode);
+-
+   g_hash_table_insert (context->filesystems, fs, GINT_TO_POINTER (mode));
+ }
+ 
+-static void
+-flatpak_context_remove_filesystem (FlatpakContext *context,
+-                                   const char     *what)
+-{
+-  g_hash_table_insert (context->filesystems,
+-                       parse_filesystem_flags (what, NULL),
+-                       NULL);
+-}
+-
+ void
+ flatpak_context_merge (FlatpakContext *context,
+                        FlatpakContext *other)
+@@ -999,11 +993,13 @@ option_filesystem_cb (const gchar *option_name,
+                       GError     **error)
+ {
+   FlatpakContext *context = data;
+  g_autofree char *fs = NULL;
+  FlatpakFilesystemMode mode;
+ 
+-  if (!flatpak_context_verify_filesystem (value, error))
+  if (!flatpak_context_parse_filesystem (value, &fs, &mode, error))
+     return FALSE;
+ 
+-  flatpak_context_add_filesystem (context, value);
+  flatpak_context_take_filesystem (context, g_steal_pointer (&fs), mode);
+   return TRUE;
+ }
+ 
+@@ -1014,11 +1010,14 @@ option_nofilesystem_cb (const gchar *option_name,
+                         GError     **error)
+ {
+   FlatpakContext *context = data;
+  g_autofree char *fs = NULL;
+  FlatpakFilesystemMode mode;
+ 
+-  if (!flatpak_context_verify_filesystem (value, error))
+  if (!flatpak_context_parse_filesystem (value, &fs, &mode, error))
+     return FALSE;
+ 
+-  flatpak_context_remove_filesystem (context, value);
+  flatpak_context_take_filesystem (context, g_steal_pointer (&fs),
+                                   FLATPAK_FILESYSTEM_MODE_NONE);
+   return TRUE;
+ }
+ 
+@@ -1441,14 +1440,18 @@ flatpak_context_load_metadata (FlatpakContext *context,
+       for (i = 0; filesystems[i] != NULL; i++)
+         {
+           const char *fs = parse_negated (filesystems[i], &remove);
+-          if (!flatpak_context_verify_filesystem (fs, NULL))
+	  g_autofree char *filesystem = NULL;
+          FlatpakFilesystemMode mode;
+
+          if (!flatpak_context_parse_filesystem (fs, &filesystem, &mode, NULL))
+             g_debug ("Unknown filesystem type %s", filesystems[i]);
+           else
+             {
+               if (remove)
+-                flatpak_context_remove_filesystem (context, fs);
+	        flatpak_context_take_filesystem (context, g_steal_pointer (&filesystem),
+                                                 FLATPAK_FILESYSTEM_MODE_NONE);
+               else
+-                flatpak_context_add_filesystem (context, fs);
+	        flatpak_context_take_filesystem (context, g_steal_pointer (&filesystem), mode);
+             }
+         }
+     }
+@@ -1674,7 +1677,7 @@ flatpak_context_save_metadata (FlatpakContext *context,
+         {
+           FlatpakFilesystemMode mode = GPOINTER_TO_INT (value);
+ 
+-          if (mode != 0)
+          if (mode != FLATPAK_FILESYSTEM_MODE_NONE)
+             g_ptr_array_add (array, unparse_filesystem_flags (key, mode));
+           else
+             g_ptr_array_add (array, g_strconcat ("!", key, NULL));
+@@ -1781,7 +1784,7 @@ flatpak_context_save_metadata (FlatpakContext *context,
+ void
+ flatpak_context_allow_host_fs (FlatpakContext *context)
+ {
+-  flatpak_context_add_filesystem (context, "host");
+  flatpak_context_take_filesystem (context, g_strdup ("host"), FLATPAK_FILESYSTEM_MODE_READ_WRITE);
+ }
+ 
+ gboolean
+@@ -1846,7 +1849,7 @@ flatpak_context_to_args (FlatpakContext *context,
+     {
+       FlatpakFilesystemMode mode = GPOINTER_TO_INT (value);
+ 
+-      if (mode != 0)
+      if (mode != FLATPAK_FILESYSTEM_MODE_NONE)
+         {
+           g_autofree char *fs = unparse_filesystem_flags (key, mode);
+           g_ptr_array_add (args, g_strdup_printf ("--filesystem=%s", fs));
+@@ -1949,7 +1952,7 @@ flatpak_context_export (FlatpakContext *context,
+   gpointer key, value;
+ 
+   fs_mode = (FlatpakFilesystemMode) g_hash_table_lookup (context->filesystems, "host");
+-  if (fs_mode != 0)
+  if (fs_mode != FLATPAK_FILESYSTEM_MODE_NONE)
+     {
+       DIR *dir;
+       struct dirent *dirent;
+@@ -1978,7 +1981,7 @@ flatpak_context_export (FlatpakContext *context,
+     }
+ 
+   home_mode = (FlatpakFilesystemMode) g_hash_table_lookup (context->filesystems, "home");
+-  if (home_mode != 0)
+  if (home_mode != FLATPAK_FILESYSTEM_MODE_NONE)
+     {
+       g_debug ("Allowing homedir access");
+       home_access = TRUE;
+diff --git a/common/flatpak-exports-private.h b/common/flatpak-exports-private.h
+index 64cf59a..e4b2c14 100644
+--- a/common/flatpak-exports-private.h
+++ b/common/flatpak-exports-private.h
+@@ -26,6 +26,7 @@
+ 
+ /* In numerical order of more privs */
+ typedef enum {
+  FLATPAK_FILESYSTEM_MODE_NONE         = 0,
+   FLATPAK_FILESYSTEM_MODE_READ_ONLY    = 1,
+   FLATPAK_FILESYSTEM_MODE_READ_WRITE   = 2,
+   FLATPAK_FILESYSTEM_MODE_CREATE       = 3,
+diff --git a/common/flatpak-exports.c b/common/flatpak-exports.c
+index 21a8b17..d31ef95 100644
+--- a/common/flatpak-exports.c
+++ b/common/flatpak-exports.c
+@@ -80,7 +80,7 @@ make_relative (const char *base, const char *path)
+ }
+ 
+ #define FAKE_MODE_DIR -1 /* Ensure a dir, either on tmpfs or mapped parent */
+-#define FAKE_MODE_TMPFS 0
+#define FAKE_MODE_TMPFS FLATPAK_FILESYSTEM_MODE_NONE
+ #define FAKE_MODE_SYMLINK G_MAXINT
+ 
+ typedef struct
+@@ -278,7 +278,7 @@ flatpak_exports_append_bwrap_args (FlatpakExports *exports,
+         }
+     }
+ 
+-  if (exports->host_fs != 0)
+  if (exports->host_fs != FLATPAK_FILESYSTEM_MODE_NONE)
+     {
+       if (g_file_test ("/usr", G_FILE_TEST_IS_DIR))
+         flatpak_bwrap_add_args (bwrap,
+@@ -337,7 +337,7 @@ flatpak_exports_path_get_mode (FlatpakExports *exports,
+                   break;
+                 }
+ 
+-              return 0;
+              return FLATPAK_FILESYSTEM_MODE_NONE;
+             }
+ 
+           if (S_ISLNK (st.st_mode))
+@@ -347,7 +347,7 @@ flatpak_exports_path_get_mode (FlatpakExports *exports,
+               int j;
+ 
+               if (resolved == NULL)
+-                return 0;
+                return FLATPAK_FILESYSTEM_MODE_NONE;
+ 
+               path2_builder = g_string_new (resolved);
+ 
+@@ -361,7 +361,7 @@ flatpak_exports_path_get_mode (FlatpakExports *exports,
+             }
+         }
+       else if (parts[i + 1] == NULL)
+-        return 0; /* Last part was not mapped */
+        return FLATPAK_FILESYSTEM_MODE_NONE; /* Last part was not mapped */
+     }
+ 
+   if (is_readonly)
+@@ -374,7 +374,7 @@ gboolean
+ flatpak_exports_path_is_visible (FlatpakExports *exports,
+                                  const char     *path)
+ {
+-  return flatpak_exports_path_get_mode (exports, path) > 0;
+  return flatpak_exports_path_get_mode (exports, path) > FLATPAK_FILESYSTEM_MODE_NONE;
+ }
+ 
+ static gboolean
+@@ -605,7 +605,7 @@ flatpak_exports_add_path_expose_or_hide (FlatpakExports       *exports,
+                                          FlatpakFilesystemMode mode,
+                                          const char           *path)
+ {
+-  if (mode == 0)
+  if (mode == FLATPAK_FILESYSTEM_MODE_NONE)
+     flatpak_exports_add_path_tmpfs (exports, path);
+   else
+     flatpak_exports_add_path_expose (exports, mode, path);
+-- 
+2.27.0
+
--- a/backport-0003-CVE-2021-41133.patch
+++ b/backport-0003-CVE-2021-41133.patch
@ -0,0 +1,254 @@
+From 26b12484eb8a6219b9e7aa287b298a894b2f34ca Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Simon McVittie <smcv@collabora.com>
+Date: Wed, 1 Sep 2021 14:17:04 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] common: Add a list of recently-added Linux syscalls
+
+Historically, syscalls could take arbitrarily-different values on
+different architectures, but new syscalls are added with syscall numbers
+that align on each architecture.
+
+Signed-off-by: Simon McVittie <smcv@collabora.com>
+
+Conflict:NA
+Reference:https://github.com/flatpak/flatpak/commit/26b12484eb8a6219b9e7aa287b298a894b2f34ca
+
+---
+
+ common/Makefile.am.inc            |   1 +
+ common/flatpak-run.c              |   2 +
+ common/flatpak-syscalls-private.h | 197 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
+ 3 files changed, 200 insertions(+)
+ create mode 100644 common/flatpak-syscalls-private.h
+
+
+diff --git a/common/Makefile.am.inc b/common/Makefile.am.inc
+index 794bd4e..986a1ea 100644
+--- a/common/Makefile.am.inc
+++ b/common/Makefile.am.inc
+@@ -85,6 +85,7 @@ libflatpak_common_la_SOURCES = \
+ 	common/flatpak-dir.c \
+ 	common/flatpak-dir-private.h \
+ 	common/flatpak-run.c \
+	common/flatpak-syscalls-private.h \
+ 	common/flatpak-run-private.h \
+ 	common/flatpak-context.c \
+ 	common/flatpak-context-private.h \
+diff --git a/common/flatpak-run.c b/common/flatpak-run.c
+index f2f296e..de3dd38 100644
+--- a/common/flatpak-run.c
+++ b/common/flatpak-run.c
+@@ -33,6 +33,8 @@
+ #include <unistd.h>
+ #include <gio/gunixfdlist.h>
+ 
+#include "flatpak-syscalls-private.h"
+
+ #ifdef ENABLE_SECCOMP
+ #include <seccomp.h>
+ #endif
+diff --git a/common/flatpak-syscalls-private.h b/common/flatpak-syscalls-private.h
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..04eb38c
+--- /dev/null
+++ b/common/flatpak-syscalls-private.h
+@@ -0,0 +1,197 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2021 Collabora Ltd.
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: LGPL-2.1-or-later
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public
+ * License as published by the Free Software Foundation; either
+ * version 2.1 of the License, or (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ * This library is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
+ * Lesser General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU Lesser General Public
+ * License along with this library. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
+ */
+
+#pragma once
+
+#include <sys/syscall.h>
+
+#if defined(_MIPS_SIM)
+# if _MIPS_SIM == _MIPS_SIM_ABI32
+#   define FLATPAK_MISSING_SYSCALL_BASE 4000
+# elif _MIPS_SIM == _MIPS_SIM_ABI64
+#   define FLATPAK_MISSING_SYSCALL_BASE 5000
+# elif _MIPS_SIM == _MIPS_SIM_NABI32
+#   define FLATPAK_MISSING_SYSCALL_BASE 6000
+# else
+#   error "Unknown MIPS ABI"
+# endif
+#endif
+
+#if defined(__ia64__)
+# define FLATPAK_MISSING_SYSCALL_BASE 1024
+#endif
+
+#if defined(__alpha__)
+# define FLATPAK_MISSING_SYSCALL_BASE 110
+#endif
+
+#if defined(__x86_64__) && defined(__ILP32__)
+# define FLATPAK_MISSING_SYSCALL_BASE 0x40000000
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * FLATPAK_MISSING_SYSCALL_BASE:
+ *
+ * Number to add to the syscall numbers of recently-added syscalls
+ * to get the appropriate syscall for the current ABI.
+ */
+#ifndef FLATPAK_MISSING_SYSCALL_BASE
+# define FLATPAK_MISSING_SYSCALL_BASE 0
+#endif
+
+#ifndef __NR_open_tree
+# define __NR_open_tree (FLATPAK_MISSING_SYSCALL_BASE + 428)
+#endif
+#ifndef __SNR_open_tree
+# define __SNR_open_tree __NR_open_tree
+#endif
+
+#ifndef __NR_move_mount
+# define __NR_move_mount (FLATPAK_MISSING_SYSCALL_BASE + 429)
+#endif
+#ifndef __SNR_move_mount
+# define __SNR_move_mount __NR_move_mount
+#endif
+
+#ifndef __NR_fsopen
+# define __NR_fsopen (FLATPAK_MISSING_SYSCALL_BASE + 430)
+#endif
+#ifndef __SNR_fsopen
+# define __SNR_fsopen __NR_fsopen
+#endif
+
+#ifndef __NR_fsconfig
+# define __NR_fsconfig (FLATPAK_MISSING_SYSCALL_BASE + 431)
+#endif
+#ifndef __SNR_fsconfig
+# define __SNR_fsconfig __NR_fsconfig
+#endif
+
+#ifndef __NR_fsmount
+# define __NR_fsmount (FLATPAK_MISSING_SYSCALL_BASE + 432)
+#endif
+#ifndef __SNR_fsmount
+# define __SNR_fsmount __NR_fsmount
+#endif
+
+#ifndef __NR_fspick
+# define __NR_fspick (FLATPAK_MISSING_SYSCALL_BASE + 433)
+#endif
+#ifndef __SNR_fspick
+# define __SNR_fspick __NR_fspick
+#endif
+
+#ifndef __NR_pidfd_open
+# define __NR_pidfd_open (FLATPAK_MISSING_SYSCALL_BASE + 434)
+#endif
+#ifndef __SNR_pidfd_open
+# define __SNR_pidfd_open __NR_pidfd_open
+#endif
+
+#ifndef __NR_clone3
+# define __NR_clone3 (FLATPAK_MISSING_SYSCALL_BASE + 435)
+#endif
+#ifndef __SNR_clone3
+# define __SNR_clone3 __NR_clone3
+#endif
+
+#ifndef __NR_close_range
+# define __NR_close_range (FLATPAK_MISSING_SYSCALL_BASE + 436)
+#endif
+#ifndef __SNR_close_range
+# define __SNR_close_range __NR_close_range
+#endif
+
+#ifndef __NR_openat2
+# define __NR_openat2 (FLATPAK_MISSING_SYSCALL_BASE + 437)
+#endif
+#ifndef __SNR_openat2
+# define __SNR_openat2 __NR_openat2
+#endif
+
+#ifndef __NR_pidfd_getfd
+# define __NR_pidfd_getfd (FLATPAK_MISSING_SYSCALL_BASE + 438)
+#endif
+#ifndef __SNR_pidfd_getfd
+# define __SNR_pidfd_getfd __NR_pidfd_getfd
+#endif
+
+#ifndef __NR_faccessat2
+# define __NR_faccessat2 (FLATPAK_MISSING_SYSCALL_BASE + 439)
+#endif
+#ifndef __SNR_faccessat2
+# define __SNR_faccessat2 __NR_faccessat2
+#endif
+
+#ifndef __NR_process_madvise
+# define __NR_process_madvise (FLATPAK_MISSING_SYSCALL_BASE + 440)
+#endif
+#ifndef __SNR_process_madvise
+# define __SNR_process_madvise __NR_process_madvise
+#endif
+
+#ifndef __NR_epoll_pwait2
+# define __NR_epoll_pwait2 (FLATPAK_MISSING_SYSCALL_BASE + 441)
+#endif
+#ifndef __SNR_epoll_pwait2
+# define __SNR_epoll_pwait2 __NR_epoll_pwait2
+#endif
+
+#ifndef __NR_mount_setattr
+# define __NR_mount_setattr (FLATPAK_MISSING_SYSCALL_BASE + 442)
+#endif
+#ifndef __SNR_mount_setattr
+# define __SNR_mount_setattr __NR_mount_setattr
+#endif
+
+#ifndef __NR_quotactl_fd
+# define __NR_quotactl_fd (FLATPAK_MISSING_SYSCALL_BASE + 443)
+#endif
+#ifndef __SNR_quotactl_fd
+# define __SNR_quotactl_fd __NR_quotactl_fd
+#endif
+
+#ifndef __NR_landlock_create_ruleset
+# define __NR_landlock_create_ruleset (FLATPAK_MISSING_SYSCALL_BASE + 444)
+#endif
+#ifndef __SNR_landlock_create_ruleset
+# define __SNR_landlock_create_ruleset __NR_landlock_create_ruleset
+#endif
+
+#ifndef __NR_landlock_add_rule
+# define __NR_landlock_add_rule (FLATPAK_MISSING_SYSCALL_BASE + 445)
+#endif
+#ifndef __SNR_landlock_add_rule
+# define __SNR_landlock_add_rule __NR_landlock_add_rule
+#endif
+
+#ifndef __NR_landlock_restrict_self
+# define __NR_landlock_restrict_self (FLATPAK_MISSING_SYSCALL_BASE + 446)
+#endif
+#ifndef __SNR_landlock_restrict_self
+# define __SNR_landlock_restrict_self __NR_landlock_restrict_self
+#endif
+
+#ifndef __NR_memfd_secret
+# define __NR_memfd_secret (FLATPAK_MISSING_SYSCALL_BASE + 447)
+#endif
+#ifndef __SNR_memfd_secret
+# define __SNR_memfd_secret __NR_memfd_secret
+#endif
+
+/* Last updated: Linux 5.14, syscall numbers < 448 */
+-- 
+2.19.1
+
--- a/backport-0003-CVE-2021-43860.patch
+++ b/backport-0003-CVE-2021-43860.patch
@ -0,0 +1,136 @@
+From d9a8f9d8ccc0b7c1135d0ecde006a75d25f66aee Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Alexander Larsson <alexl@redhat.com>
+Date: Mon, 10 Jan 2022 16:43:08 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] Transaction: Fail the resolve if xa.metadata invalid or
+ missing
+
+If we fail to parse xa.metadata from the summary cache or the commit
+xa.metadata we fail the resolve.
+
+If xa.metadata is missing in the commit we fail the resolve (it is
+always set in the summary cache, because summary update converts
+missing xa.metadata to "", so we either get that, or cache miss which
+leads to resolving from the commit.
+
+This means that op->resolved_metadata is always set during install and
+updates, which means we will show the app permissions. The transaction
+will also always make sure that this data actually matches what gets
+deployed.
+
+Before this change an invalid metadata in the summary cache could lead
+to a NULL resolved_metadata, which means we wouldn't print the app
+permissions, yet we would still deploy some metadata file that could
+have permissions. (NOTE: It would fail to deploy unless the
+xa.metadata in the commit matched the metadata file, but in this
+corner case we would't compare the summary and commit metadata, so
+they may differ.)
+
+Conflict:NA
+Reference:https://github.com/flatpak/flatpak/commit/d9a8f9d8ccc0b7c1135d0ecde006a75d25f66aee
+
+---
+ common/flatpak-transaction.c | 36 +++++++++++++++++++++---------------
+ 1 file changed, 21 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/common/flatpak-transaction.c b/common/flatpak-transaction.c
+index 4e19e5d..2134a3e 100644
+--- a/common/flatpak-transaction.c
+++ b/common/flatpak-transaction.c
+@@ -1842,11 +1842,12 @@ load_deployed_metadata (FlatpakTransaction *self, const char *ref)
+   return g_bytes_new_take (g_steal_pointer (&metadata_contents), metadata_contents_length);
+ }
+ 
+-static void
+static gboolean
+ mark_op_resolved (FlatpakTransactionOperation *op,
+                   const char                  *commit,
+                   GBytes                      *metadata,
+-                  GBytes                      *old_metadata)
+                  GBytes                      *old_metadata,
+		  GError                     **error)
+ {
+   g_debug ("marking op %s:%s resolved to %s", kind_to_str (op->kind), op->ref, commit ? commit : "-");
+ 
+@@ -1860,13 +1861,12 @@ mark_op_resolved (FlatpakTransactionOperation *op,
+   if (metadata)
+     {
+       g_autoptr(GKeyFile) metakey = g_key_file_new ();
+-      if (g_key_file_load_from_bytes (metakey, metadata, G_KEY_FILE_NONE, NULL))
+-        {
+-          op->resolved_metadata = g_bytes_ref (metadata);
+-          op->resolved_metakey = g_steal_pointer (&metakey);
+-        }
+-      else
+-        g_message ("Warning: Failed to parse metadata for %s\n", op->ref);
+      if (!g_key_file_load_from_bytes (metakey, metadata, G_KEY_FILE_NONE, NULL))
+        return flatpak_fail_error (error, FLATPAK_ERROR_INVALID_DATA,
+                                   _("Invalid .flatpakref: %s"), op->ref);
+
+      op->resolved_metadata = g_bytes_ref (metadata);
+      op->resolved_metakey = g_steal_pointer (&metakey);
+     }
+   if (old_metadata)
+     {
+@@ -1877,8 +1877,13 @@ mark_op_resolved (FlatpakTransactionOperation *op,
+           op->resolved_old_metakey = g_steal_pointer (&metakey);
+         }
+       else
+-        g_message ("Warning: Failed to parse old metadata for %s\n", op->ref);
+	{
+	  /* This shouldn't happen, but a NULL old metadata is safe (all permisssions are considered new) */
+          g_message ("Warning: Failed to parse old metadata for %s\n", op->ref);
+	}
+     }
+
+   return TRUE;
+ }
+ 
+ static gboolean
+@@ -1922,7 +1927,7 @@ resolve_p2p_ops (FlatpakTransaction *self,
+       g_autoptr(GBytes) old_metadata_bytes = NULL;
+ 
+       old_metadata_bytes = load_deployed_metadata (self, op->ref);
+-      mark_op_resolved (op, resolve->resolved_commit, resolve->resolved_metadata, old_metadata_bytes);
+      mark_op_resolved (op, resolve->resolved_commit, resolve->resolved_metadata, old_metadata_bytes,error);
+     }
+ 
+   return TRUE;
+@@ -1960,14 +1965,15 @@ resolve_ops (FlatpakTransaction *self,
+           /* We resolve to the deployed metadata, becasue we need it to uninstall related ops */
+ 
+           metadata_bytes = load_deployed_metadata (self, op->ref);
+-          mark_op_resolved (op, NULL, metadata_bytes, NULL);
+          mark_op_resolved (op, NULL, metadata_bytes, NULL,error);
+           continue;
+         }
+ 
+       if (op->kind == FLATPAK_TRANSACTION_OPERATION_INSTALL_BUNDLE)
+         {
+           g_assert (op->commit != NULL);
+-          mark_op_resolved (op, op->commit, op->external_metadata, NULL);
+	  if (!mark_op_resolved (op, op->commit, NULL, NULL, error))
+ 	    return FALSE;
+           continue;
+         }
+ 
+@@ -1993,7 +1999,7 @@ resolve_ops (FlatpakTransaction *self,
+             metadata_bytes = g_bytes_new (xa_metadata, strlen (xa_metadata) + 1);
+ 
+           old_metadata_bytes = load_deployed_metadata (self, op->ref);
+-          mark_op_resolved (op, checksum, metadata_bytes, old_metadata_bytes);
+          mark_op_resolved (op, checksum, metadata_bytes, old_metadata_bytes,error);
+         }
+       else if (state->collection_id == NULL) /* In the non-p2p case we have all the info available in the summary, so use it */
+         {
+@@ -2031,7 +2037,7 @@ resolve_ops (FlatpakTransaction *self,
+             metadata_bytes = g_bytes_new (metadata, strlen (metadata) + 1);
+ 
+           old_metadata_bytes = load_deployed_metadata (self, op->ref);
+-          mark_op_resolved (op, checksum, metadata_bytes, old_metadata_bytes);
+          mark_op_resolved (op, checksum, metadata_bytes, old_metadata_bytes,error);
+         }
+       else
+         {
+-- 
+2.27.0
+
--- a/backport-0003-CVE-2022-21682.patch
+++ b/backport-0003-CVE-2022-21682.patch
@ -0,0 +1,49 @@
+From 5a83c73ed859fe3e4bd93a228a4bc8981d649c5e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Simon McVittie <smcv@collabora.com>
+Date: Thu, 27 Aug 2020 18:01:12 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] context: Implement MODE_NONE in unparse_filesystem_flags
+
+flatpak doesn't yet use -Wswitch-enum, but perhaps it should at some
+point. Now that FLATPAK_FILESYSTEM_MODE_NONE is a member of the enum,
+it should be handled; and if we're doing that, we might as well make
+the same function fully responsible for it.
+
+Signed-off-by: Simon McVittie <smcv@collabora.com>
+
+Conflict:NA
+Reference:https://github.com/flatpak/flatpak/commit/5a83c73ed859fe3e4bd93a228a4bc8981d649c5e
+
+---
+ common/flatpak-context.c | 9 +++++----
+ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/common/flatpak-context.c b/common/flatpak-context.c
+index 3a99646..0d53b13 100644
+--- a/common/flatpak-context.c
+++ b/common/flatpak-context.c
+@@ -697,6 +697,10 @@ unparse_filesystem_flags (const char           *path,
+     case FLATPAK_FILESYSTEM_MODE_READ_WRITE:
+       break;
+ 
+    case FLATPAK_FILESYSTEM_MODE_NONE:
+      g_string_insert_c (s, 0, '!');
+      break;
+
+     default:
+       g_warning ("Unexpected filesystem mode %d", mode);
+       break;
+@@ -1677,10 +1681,7 @@ flatpak_context_save_metadata (FlatpakContext *context,
+         {
+           FlatpakFilesystemMode mode = GPOINTER_TO_INT (value);
+ 
+-          if (mode != FLATPAK_FILESYSTEM_MODE_NONE)
+-            g_ptr_array_add (array, unparse_filesystem_flags (key, mode));
+-          else
+-            g_ptr_array_add (array, g_strconcat ("!", key, NULL));
+	   g_ptr_array_add (array, unparse_filesystem_flags (key, mode));
+         }
+ 
+       g_key_file_set_string_list (metakey,
+-- 
+2.27.0
+
--- a/backport-0004-CVE-2021-41133.patch
+++ b/backport-0004-CVE-2021-41133.patch
@ -0,0 +1,43 @@
+From a10f52a7565c549612c92b8e736a6698a53db330 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Simon McVittie <smcv@collabora.com>
+Date: Wed, 1 Sep 2021 11:59:00 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] run: Block clone3() in sandbox
+
+clone3() can be used to implement clone() with CLONE_NEWUSER, allowing
+a sandboxed process to get CAP_SYS_ADMIN in a new namespace and
+manipulate its root directory. We need to block this so that AF_UNIX-based
+socket servers (X11, Wayland, etc.) can rely on
+/proc/PID/root/.flatpak-info existing for all Flatpak-sandboxed apps.
+
+Partially fixes GHSA-67h7-w3jq-vh4q.
+
+Thanks: an anonymous reporter
+Signed-off-by: Simon McVittie <smcv@collabora.com>
+
+Conflict:NA
+Reference:https://github.com/flatpak/flatpak/commit/a10f52a7565c549612c92b8e736a6698a53db330
+
+---
+ common/flatpak-run.c | 6 ++++++
+ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/common/flatpak-run.c b/common/flatpak-run.c
+index de3dd38..818df58 100644
+--- a/common/flatpak-run.c
+++ b/common/flatpak-run.c
+@@ -2139,6 +2139,12 @@ setup_seccomp (FlatpakBwrap   *bwrap,
+ 
+     /* Don't allow faking input to the controlling tty (CVE-2017-5226) */
+     {SCMP_SYS (ioctl), EPERM, &SCMP_A1 (SCMP_CMP_MASKED_EQ, 0xFFFFFFFFu, (int) TIOCSTI)},
+
+    /* seccomp can't look into clone3()'s struct clone_args to check whether
+     * the flags are OK, so we have no choice but to block clone3().
+     * Return ENOSYS so user-space will fall back to clone().
+     * (GHSA-67h7-w3jq-vh4q; see also https://github.com/moby/moby/commit/9f6b562d) */
+    {SCMP_SYS (clone3), ENOSYS},
+   };
+ 
+   struct
+-- 
+2.19.1
+
--- a/backport-0004-CVE-2021-43860.patch
+++ b/backport-0004-CVE-2021-43860.patch
@ -0,0 +1,210 @@
+From 54ec1a482dfc668127eaae57f135e6a8e0bc52da Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Phaedrus Leeds <mwleeds@protonmail.com>
+Date: Tue, 28 Dec 2021 11:48:16 -0800
+Subject: [PATCH] Add test for metadata validation
+
+This tests for invalid metadata, missing xa.metadata and mismatched
+values in xa.metadata and the real metadata, including the embedded
+null leading to the hidden permissions of CVE-2021-43860.
+
+Conflict:NA
+Reference:https://github.com/flatpak/flatpak/commit/54ec1a482dfc668127eaae57f135e6a8e0bc52da
+
+---
+ tests/Makefile-test-matrix.am.inc |   1 +
+ tests/Makefile.am.inc             |   1 +
+ tests/test-metadata-validation.sh | 158 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
+ 3 files changed, 160 insertions(+)
+ create mode 100644 tests/test-metadata-validation.sh
+
+diff --git a/tests/Makefile-test-matrix.am.inc b/tests/Makefile-test-matrix.am.inc
+index fcbfcd9..afde01c 100644
+--- a/tests/Makefile-test-matrix.am.inc
+++ b/tests/Makefile-test-matrix.am.inc
+@@ -17,6 +17,7 @@ TEST_MATRIX_DIST= \
+ 	tests/test-basic.sh \
+ 	tests/test-build-update-repo.sh \
+ 	tests/test-http-utils.sh \
+	tests/test-metadata-validation.sh \
+ 	tests/test-extensions.sh \
+ 	tests/test-oci.sh \
+ 	tests/test-unsigned-summaries.sh \
+diff --git a/tests/Makefile.am.inc b/tests/Makefile.am.inc
+index d72de8a..b9a6f61 100644
+--- a/tests/Makefile.am.inc
+++ b/tests/Makefile.am.inc
+@@ -93,6 +93,7 @@ TEST_MATRIX_SOURCE = \
+ 	tests/test-http-utils.sh \
+ 	tests/test-run.sh{{user+system},{nodeltas+deltas}} \
+ 	tests/test-repo.sh{user+system+collections+collections-server-only} \
+	tests/test-metadata-validation.sh \
+ 	tests/test-extensions.sh \
+ 	tests/test-bundle.sh{user+system} \
+ 	tests/test-oci.sh \
+diff --git a/tests/test-metadata-validation.sh b/tests/test-metadata-validation.sh
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..7e3efcc
+--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/test-metadata-validation.sh
+@@ -0,0 +1,158 @@
+#!/bin/bash
+#
+# Copyright (C) 2021 Matthew Leeds <mwleeds@protonmail.com>
+#
+# SPDX-License-Identifier: LGPL-2.0-or-later
+
+set -euo pipefail
+
+. $(dirname $0)/libtest.sh
+
+echo "1..7"
+
+setup_repo
+
+COUNTER=1
+
+create_app () {
+    local OPTIONS="$1"
+    local DIR=`mktemp -d`
+
+    mkdir ${DIR}/files
+    echo $COUNTER > ${DIR}/files/counter
+    let COUNTER=COUNTER+1
+
+    local INVALID=""
+    if [[ $OPTIONS =~ "invalid" ]]; then
+        INVALID=invalidkeyfileline
+    fi
+    cat > ${DIR}/metadata <<EOF
+[Application]
+name=org.test.Malicious
+runtime=org.test.Platform/${ARCH}/master
+$INVALID
+
+[Context]
+EOF
+    if [[ $OPTIONS =~ "mismatch" ]]; then
+        echo -e "filesystems=host;" >> ${DIR}/metadata
+    fi
+    if [[ $OPTIONS =~ "hidden" ]]; then
+        echo -ne "\0" >> ${DIR}/metadata
+        echo -e "\nfilesystems=home;" >> ${DIR}/metadata
+    fi
+    local XA_METADATA=--add-metadata-string=xa.metadata="$(head -n6 ${DIR}/metadata)"$'\n'
+    if [[ $OPTIONS =~ "no-xametadata" ]]; then
+        XA_METADATA="--add-metadata-string=xa.nometadata=1"
+    fi
+    ostree commit --repo=repos/test --branch=app/org.test.Malicious/${ARCH}/master ${FL_GPGARGS} "$XA_METADATA" ${DIR}/
+    if [[ $OPTIONS =~ "no-cache-in-summary" ]]; then
+        ostree --repo=repos/test ${FL_GPGARGS} summary -u
+        # force use of legacy summary format
+        rm -rf repos/test/summary.idx repos/test/summaries
+    else
+        update_repo
+    fi
+    rm -rf ${DIR}
+}
+
+cleanup_repo () {
+    ostree refs --repo=repos/test --delete app/org.test.Malicious/${ARCH}/master
+    update_repo
+}
+
+create_app "hidden"
+
+if ${FLATPAK} ${U} install -y test-repo org.test.Malicious 2>install-error-log; then
+    assert_not_reached "Should not be able to install app with hidden permissions"
+fi
+
+assert_file_has_content install-error-log "not matching expected metadata"
+
+assert_not_has_dir $FL_DIR/app/org.test.Malicious/current/active
+
+cleanup_repo
+
+ok "app with hidden permissions can't be installed (CVE-2021-43860)"
+
+create_app no-xametadata
+
+# The install will fail because the metadata in the summary doesn't match the metadata on the commit
+# The missing xa.metadata in the commit got turned into "" in the xa.cache
+if ${FLATPAK} ${U} install -y test-repo org.test.Malicious 2>install-error-log; then
+    assert_not_reached "Should not be able to install app with missing xa.metadata"
+fi
+
+assert_file_has_content install-error-log "not matching expected metadata"
+
+assert_not_has_dir $FL_DIR/app/org.test.Malicious/current/active
+
+cleanup_repo
+
+ok "app with no xa.metadata can't be installed"
+
+create_app "no-xametadata no-cache-in-summary"
+
+# The install will fail because there's no metadata in the summary or on the commit
+if ${FLATPAK} ${U} install -y test-repo org.test.Malicious 2>install-error-log; then
+    assert_not_reached "Should not be able to install app with missing metadata"
+fi
+assert_file_has_content install-error-log "No xa.metadata in local commit"
+
+assert_not_has_dir $FL_DIR/app/org.test.Malicious/current/active
+
+cleanup_repo
+
+ok "app with no xa.metadata and no metadata in summary can't be installed"
+
+create_app "invalid"
+
+if ${FLATPAK} ${U} install -y test-repo org.test.Malicious 2>install-error-log; then
+    assert_not_reached "Should not be able to install app with invalid metadata"
+fi
+assert_file_has_content install-error-log "Metadata for .* is invalid"
+
+assert_not_has_dir $FL_DIR/app/org.test.Malicious/current/active
+
+cleanup_repo
+
+ok "app with invalid metadata (in summary) can't be installed"
+
+create_app "invalid no-cache-in-summary"
+
+if ${FLATPAK} ${U} install -y test-repo org.test.Malicious 2>install-error-log; then
+    assert_not_reached "Should not be able to install app with invalid metadata"
+fi
+assert_file_has_content install-error-log "Metadata for .* is invalid"
+
+assert_not_has_dir $FL_DIR/app/org.test.Malicious/current/active
+
+cleanup_repo
+
+ok "app with invalid metadata (in commit) can't be installed"
+
+create_app "mismatch no-cache-in-summary"
+
+if ${FLATPAK} ${U} install -y test-repo org.test.Malicious 2>install-error-log; then
+    assert_not_reached "Should not be able to install app with non-matching metadata"
+fi
+assert_file_has_content install-error-log "Commit metadata for .* not matching expected metadata"
+
+assert_not_has_dir $FL_DIR/app/org.test.Malicious/current/active
+
+cleanup_repo
+
+ok "app with mismatched metadata (in commit) can't be installed"
+
+create_app "mismatch"
+
+if ${FLATPAK} ${U} install -y test-repo org.test.Malicious 2>install-error-log; then
+    assert_not_reached "Should not be able to install app with non-matching metadata"
+fi
+assert_file_has_content install-error-log "Commit metadata for .* not matching expected metadata"
+
+assert_not_has_dir $FL_DIR/app/org.test.Malicious/current/active
+
+cleanup_repo
+
+ok "app with mismatched metadata (in summary) can't be installed"
+-- 
+2.27.0
+
--- a/backport-0004-CVE-2022-21682.patch
+++ b/backport-0004-CVE-2022-21682.patch
@ -0,0 +1,47 @@
+From 55b27b1393a3880b79dfe108b6f13f1a2fa1888b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Simon McVittie <smcv@collabora.com>
+Date: Wed, 26 Aug 2020 20:25:15 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] context: Expose flatpak_context_parse_filesystem for testing
+
+Signed-off-by: Simon McVittie <smcv@collabora.com>
+
+Conflict:NA
+Reference:https://github.com/flatpak/flatpak/commit/55b27b1393a3880b79dfe108b6f13f1a2fa1888b
+
+---
+ common/flatpak-context-private.h | 5 +++++
+ common/flatpak-context.c         | 2 +-
+ 2 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/common/flatpak-context-private.h b/common/flatpak-context-private.h
+index f47079b..d84f4e0 100644
+--- a/common/flatpak-context-private.h
+++ b/common/flatpak-context-private.h
+@@ -79,6 +79,11 @@ extern const char *flatpak_context_devices[];
+ extern const char *flatpak_context_features[];
+ extern const char *flatpak_context_shares[];
+ 
+gboolean       flatpak_context_parse_filesystem (const char             *filesystem_and_mode,
+                                                 char                  **filesystem_out,
+                                                 FlatpakFilesystemMode  *mode_out,
+                                                 GError                **error);
+
+ FlatpakContext *flatpak_context_new (void);
+ void           flatpak_context_free (FlatpakContext *context);
+ void           flatpak_context_merge (FlatpakContext *context,
+diff --git a/common/flatpak-context.c b/common/flatpak-context.c
+index 0d53b13..3b2bcfe 100644
+--- a/common/flatpak-context.c
+++ b/common/flatpak-context.c
+@@ -752,7 +752,7 @@ parse_filesystem_flags (const char            *filesystem,
+   return g_string_free (g_steal_pointer (&s), FALSE);
+ }
+ 
+-static gboolean
+gboolean
+ flatpak_context_parse_filesystem (const char             *filesystem_and_mode,
+                                   char                  **filesystem_out,
+                                   FlatpakFilesystemMode  *mode_out,
+-- 
+2.27.0
+
--- a/backport-0005-CVE-2021-41133.patch
+++ b/backport-0005-CVE-2021-41133.patch
@ -0,0 +1,45 @@
+From 9766ee05b1425db397d2cf23afd24c7f6146a69f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Simon McVittie <smcv@collabora.com>
+Date: Wed, 1 Sep 2021 12:45:54 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] run: Disallow recently-added mount-manipulation syscalls
+
+If we don't allow mount() then we shouldn't allow these either.
+
+Partially fixes GHSA-67h7-w3jq-vh4q.
+
+Thanks: an anonymous reporter
+Signed-off-by: Simon McVittie <smcv@collabora.com>
+
+Conflict:NA
+Reference:https://github.com/flatpak/flatpak/commit/9766ee05b1425db397d2cf23afd24c7f6146a69f
+
+---
+ common/flatpak-run.c | 12 ++++++++++++
+ 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/common/flatpak-run.c b/common/flatpak-run.c
+index 818df58..0fbd5a9 100644
+--- a/common/flatpak-run.c
+++ b/common/flatpak-run.c
+@@ -2145,6 +2145,18 @@ setup_seccomp (FlatpakBwrap   *bwrap,
+      * Return ENOSYS so user-space will fall back to clone().
+      * (GHSA-67h7-w3jq-vh4q; see also https://github.com/moby/moby/commit/9f6b562d) */
+     {SCMP_SYS (clone3), ENOSYS},
+
+    /* New mount manipulation APIs can also change our VFS. There's no
+     * legitimate reason to do these in the sandbox, so block all of them
+     * rather than thinking about which ones might be dangerous.
+     * (GHSA-67h7-w3jq-vh4q) */
+    {SCMP_SYS (open_tree), ENOSYS},
+    {SCMP_SYS (move_mount), ENOSYS},
+    {SCMP_SYS (fsopen), ENOSYS},
+    {SCMP_SYS (fsconfig), ENOSYS},
+    {SCMP_SYS (fsmount), ENOSYS},
+    {SCMP_SYS (fspick), ENOSYS},
+    {SCMP_SYS (mount_setattr), ENOSYS},
+   };
+ 
+   struct
+-- 
+2.19.1
+
--- a/backport-0005-CVE-2022-21682.patch
+++ b/backport-0005-CVE-2022-21682.patch
@ -0,0 +1,81 @@
+From aafe1d36e0225f54db8ca2ba03d8b1981c2d09e0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Simon McVittie <smcv@collabora.com>
+Date: Wed, 26 Aug 2020 19:05:21 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] context: Do some syntactic normalization on filesystems
+
+Paths containing ".." are rejected: they're almost certainly a
+terrible idea.
+
+Paths containing "." or multiple slashes are syntactically normalized.
+
+This assumes that nobody is going to use "--filesystem=/foo/bar/" to
+mean "make /foo/bar available, unless it's a non-directory, in which
+case fail".
+
+Signed-off-by: Simon McVittie <smcv@collabora.com>
+
+Conflict:NA
+Reference:https://github.com/flatpak/flatpak/commit/aafe1d36e0225f54db8ca2ba03d8b1981c2d09e0
+
+---
+ common/flatpak-context.c | 44 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
+ 1 file changed, 44 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/common/flatpak-context.c b/common/flatpak-context.c
+index 3b2bcfe..84b292e 100644
+--- a/common/flatpak-context.c
+++ b/common/flatpak-context.c
+@@ -759,6 +759,50 @@ flatpak_context_parse_filesystem (const char             *filesystem_and_mode,
+                                   GError                **error)
+ {
+   g_autofree char *filesystem = parse_filesystem_flags (filesystem_and_mode, mode_out);
+  char *slash;
+
+  slash = strchr (filesystem, '/');
+
+  /* Forbid /../ in paths */
+  if (slash != NULL)
+    {
+      if (g_str_has_prefix (slash + 1, "../") ||
+          g_str_has_suffix (slash + 1, "/..") ||
+          strstr (slash + 1, "/../") != NULL)
+        {
+          g_set_error (error, G_OPTION_ERROR, G_OPTION_ERROR_BAD_VALUE,
+                       _("Filesystem location \"%s\" contains \"..\""),
+                       filesystem);
+          return FALSE;
+        }
+
+      /* Convert "//" and "/./" to "/" */
+      for (; slash != NULL; slash = strchr (slash + 1, '/'))
+        {
+          while (TRUE)
+            {
+              if (slash[1] == '/')
+                memmove (slash + 1, slash + 2, strlen (slash + 2) + 1);
+              else if (slash[1] == '.' && slash[2] == '/')
+                memmove (slash + 1, slash + 3, strlen (slash + 3) + 1);
+              else
+                break;
+            }
+        }
+
+      /* Eliminate trailing "/." or "/". */
+      while (TRUE)
+        {
+          slash = strrchr (filesystem, '/');
+
+          if (slash != NULL &&
+              ((slash != filesystem && slash[1] == '\0') ||
+               (slash[1] == '.' && slash[2] == '\0')))
+            *slash = '\0';
+          else
+            break;
+        }
+    }
+ 
+   if (g_strv_contains (flatpak_context_special_filesystems, filesystem) ||
+       get_xdg_user_dir_from_string (filesystem, NULL, NULL, NULL) ||
+-- 
+2.27.0
+
--- a/backport-0006-CVE-2021-41133.patch
+++ b/backport-0006-CVE-2021-41133.patch
@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
+From 4c34815784e9ffda5733225c7d95824f96375e36 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Simon McVittie <smcv@collabora.com>
+Date: Wed, 1 Sep 2021 14:19:31 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] run: Block setns()
+
+If we don't allow unshare() or clone() with CLONE_NEWUSER, we also
+shouldn't allow joining an existing (but different) namespace.
+
+Partially fixes GHSA-67h7-w3jq-vh4q.
+
+Signed-off-by: Simon McVittie <smcv@collabora.com>
+
+Conflict:NA
+Reference:https://github.com/flatpak/flatpak/commit/4c34815784e9ffda5733225c7d95824f96375e36
+
+---
+ common/flatpak-run.c | 1 +
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
+
+diff --git a/common/flatpak-run.c b/common/flatpak-run.c
+index 0fbd5a9..458e3c3 100644
+--- a/common/flatpak-run.c
+++ b/common/flatpak-run.c
+@@ -2133,6 +2133,7 @@ setup_seccomp (FlatpakBwrap   *bwrap,
+ 
+     /* Don't allow subnamespace setups: */
+     {SCMP_SYS (unshare), EPERM},
+    {SCMP_SYS (setns), EPERM},
+     {SCMP_SYS (mount), EPERM},
+     {SCMP_SYS (pivot_root), EPERM},
+     {SCMP_SYS (clone), EPERM, &SCMP_A0 (SCMP_CMP_MASKED_EQ, CLONE_NEWUSER, CLONE_NEWUSER)},
+-- 
+2.19.1
+
--- a/backport-0006-CVE-2022-21682.patch
+++ b/backport-0006-CVE-2022-21682.patch
@ -0,0 +1,381 @@
+From 5709f1aaed6579f0136976e14e7f3cae399134ca Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Simon McVittie <smcv@collabora.com>
+Date: Sun, 16 Jan 2022 12:42:30 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH] context: Introduce new --nofilesystem=host:reset
+
+This reintroduces the special case that existed in Flatpak 1.12.3, but
+under a different name, so that it will be backwards-compatible. With
+this change, flatpak-builder will be able to resolve CVE-2022-21682 by
+using --filesystem=host:reset.
+
+We want to implement this as a suffix rather than as a new keyword,
+because unknown suffixes are ignored with a warning, rather than causing
+a fatal error. This means that the new version of flatpak-builder will
+be able to run against older versions of flatpak: it will still be
+vulnerable to CVE-2022-21682 in that situation, but at least it will run.
+
+Co-authored-by: Alexander Larsson <alexl@redhat.com>
+
+Conflict:NA
+Reference:https://github.com/flatpak/flatpak/commit/5709f1aaed6579f0136976e14e7f3cae399134ca
+
+---
+ common/flatpak-context-private.h |   1 +
+ common/flatpak-context.c         | 166 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---
+ doc/flatpak-override.xml         |   8 ++
+ doc/flatpak-run.xml              |   8 ++
+ 4 files changed, 169 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/common/flatpak-context-private.h b/common/flatpak-context-private.h
+index d84f4e0..2d2a40e 100644
+--- a/common/flatpak-context-private.h
+++ b/common/flatpak-context-private.h
+@@ -80,6 +80,7 @@ extern const char *flatpak_context_features[];
+ extern const char *flatpak_context_shares[];
+ 
+ gboolean       flatpak_context_parse_filesystem (const char             *filesystem_and_mode,
+                                                 gboolean                negated,
+                                                  char                  **filesystem_out,
+                                                  FlatpakFilesystemMode  *mode_out,
+                                                  GError                **error);
+diff --git a/common/flatpak-context.c b/common/flatpak-context.c
+index 84b292e..30a84bd 100644
+--- a/common/flatpak-context.c
+++ b/common/flatpak-context.c
+@@ -81,6 +81,7 @@ const char *flatpak_context_features[] = {
+ const char *flatpak_context_special_filesystems[] = {
+   "home",
+   "host",
+  "host-reset",
+   NULL
+ };
+ 
+@@ -699,6 +700,12 @@ unparse_filesystem_flags (const char           *path,
+ 
+     case FLATPAK_FILESYSTEM_MODE_NONE:
+       g_string_insert_c (s, 0, '!');
+
+      if (g_str_has_suffix (s->str, "-reset"))
+        {
+          g_string_truncate (s, s->len - 6);
+          g_string_append (s, ":reset");
+        }
+       break;
+ 
+     default:
+@@ -711,11 +718,14 @@ unparse_filesystem_flags (const char           *path,
+ 
+ static char *
+ parse_filesystem_flags (const char            *filesystem,
+-                        FlatpakFilesystemMode *mode_out)
+                        gboolean               negated,
+                        FlatpakFilesystemMode *mode_out,
+                        GError               **error)
+ {
+   g_autoptr(GString) s = g_string_new ("");
+   const char *p, *suffix;
+   FlatpakFilesystemMode mode;
+  gboolean reset = FALSE;
+ 
+   p = filesystem;
+   while (*p != 0 && *p != ':')
+@@ -730,7 +740,31 @@ parse_filesystem_flags (const char            *filesystem,
+         g_string_append_c (s, *p++);
+     }
+ 
+-  mode = FLATPAK_FILESYSTEM_MODE_READ_WRITE;
+  if (negated)
+    mode = FLATPAK_FILESYSTEM_MODE_NONE;
+  else
+    mode = FLATPAK_FILESYSTEM_MODE_READ_WRITE;
+
+  if (g_str_equal (s->str, "host-reset"))
+    {
+      reset = TRUE;
+
+      if (!negated)
+        {
+          g_set_error (error, G_OPTION_ERROR, G_OPTION_ERROR_FAILED,
+                       "Filesystem token \"%s\" is only applicable for --nofilesystem",
+                       s->str);
+          return NULL;
+        }
+
+      if (*p != '\0')
+        {
+          g_set_error (error, G_OPTION_ERROR, G_OPTION_ERROR_FAILED,
+                       "Filesystem token \"%s\" cannot be used with a suffix",
+                       s->str);
+          return NULL;
+        }
+    }
+ 
+   if (*p == ':')
+     {
+@@ -742,10 +776,63 @@ parse_filesystem_flags (const char            *filesystem,
+         mode = FLATPAK_FILESYSTEM_MODE_READ_WRITE;
+       else if (strcmp (suffix, "create") == 0)
+         mode = FLATPAK_FILESYSTEM_MODE_CREATE;
+      else if (strcmp (suffix, "reset") == 0)
+        reset = TRUE;
+       else if (*suffix != 0)
+         g_warning ("Unexpected filesystem suffix %s, ignoring", suffix);
+
+      if (negated && mode != FLATPAK_FILESYSTEM_MODE_NONE)
+        {
+          g_warning ("Filesystem suffix \"%s\" is not applicable for --nofilesystem",
+                     suffix);
+          mode = FLATPAK_FILESYSTEM_MODE_NONE;
+        }
+
+      if (reset)
+        {
+          if (!negated)
+            {
+              g_set_error (error, G_OPTION_ERROR, G_OPTION_ERROR_FAILED,
+                           "Filesystem suffix \"%s\" only applies to --nofilesystem",
+                           suffix);
+              return NULL;
+            }
+
+          if (!g_str_equal (s->str, "host"))
+            {
+              g_set_error (error, G_OPTION_ERROR, G_OPTION_ERROR_FAILED,
+                           "Filesystem suffix \"%s\" can only be applied to "
+                           "--nofilesystem=host",
+                           suffix);
+              return NULL;
+            }
+
+          /* We internally handle host:reset (etc) as host-reset, only exposing it as a flag in the public
+             part to allow it to be ignored (with a warning) for old flatpak versions */
+          g_string_append (s, "-reset");
+        }
+     }
+ 
+  /* Postcondition check: the code above should make some results
+   * impossible */
+  if (negated)
+    {
+      g_assert (mode == FLATPAK_FILESYSTEM_MODE_NONE);
+    }
+  else
+    {
+      g_assert (mode > FLATPAK_FILESYSTEM_MODE_NONE);
+      /* This flag is only applicable to --nofilesystem */
+      g_assert (!reset);
+    }
+
+  /* Postcondition check: filesystem token is host-reset iff reset flag
+   * was found */
+  if (reset)
+    g_assert (g_str_equal (s->str, "host-reset"));
+  else
+    g_assert (!g_str_equal (s->str, "host-reset"));
+
+   if (mode_out)
+     *mode_out = mode;
+ 
+@@ -754,13 +841,18 @@ parse_filesystem_flags (const char            *filesystem,
+ 
+ gboolean
+ flatpak_context_parse_filesystem (const char             *filesystem_and_mode,
+                                  gboolean                negated,
+                                   char                  **filesystem_out,
+                                   FlatpakFilesystemMode  *mode_out,
+                                   GError                **error)
+ {
+-  g_autofree char *filesystem = parse_filesystem_flags (filesystem_and_mode, mode_out);
+  g_autofree char *filesystem = NULL;
+   char *slash;
+ 
+  filesystem = parse_filesystem_flags (filesystem_and_mode, negated, mode_out, error);
+  if (filesystem == NULL)
+    return FALSE;
+
+   slash = strchr (filesystem, '/');
+ 
+   /* Forbid /../ in paths */
+@@ -825,6 +917,14 @@ flatpak_context_take_filesystem (FlatpakContext        *context,
+                                  char                  *fs,
+                                  FlatpakFilesystemMode  mode)
+ {
+  /* Special case: --nofilesystem=host-reset implies --nofilesystem=host.
+   * --filesystem=host-reset (or host:reset) is not allowed. */
+  if (g_str_equal (fs, "host-reset"))
+    {
+      g_return_if_fail (mode == FLATPAK_FILESYSTEM_MODE_NONE);
+      g_hash_table_insert (context->filesystems, g_strdup ("host"), GINT_TO_POINTER (mode));
+    }
+
+   g_hash_table_insert (context->filesystems, fs, GINT_TO_POINTER (mode));
+ }
+ 
+@@ -856,6 +956,14 @@ flatpak_context_merge (FlatpakContext *context,
+   while (g_hash_table_iter_next (&iter, &key, &value))
+     g_hash_table_insert (context->persistent, g_strdup (key), value);
+ 
+  /* We first handle host:reset, as it overrides all other keys from the parent */
+  if (g_hash_table_lookup_extended (other->filesystems, "host-reset", NULL, &value))
+    {
+      g_warn_if_fail (GPOINTER_TO_INT (value) == FLATPAK_FILESYSTEM_MODE_NONE);
+      g_hash_table_remove_all (context->filesystems);
+    }
+
+  /* Then set the new ones, which includes propagating host:reset. */
+   g_hash_table_iter_init (&iter, other->filesystems);
+   while (g_hash_table_iter_next (&iter, &key, &value))
+     g_hash_table_insert (context->filesystems, g_strdup (key), value);
+@@ -1044,7 +1152,7 @@ option_filesystem_cb (const gchar *option_name,
+   g_autofree char *fs = NULL;
+   FlatpakFilesystemMode mode;
+ 
+-  if (!flatpak_context_parse_filesystem (value, &fs, &mode, error))
+  if (!flatpak_context_parse_filesystem (value, FALSE, &fs, &mode, error))
+     return FALSE;
+ 
+   flatpak_context_take_filesystem (context, g_steal_pointer (&fs), mode);
+@@ -1061,7 +1169,7 @@ option_nofilesystem_cb (const gchar *option_name,
+   g_autofree char *fs = NULL;
+   FlatpakFilesystemMode mode;
+ 
+-  if (!flatpak_context_parse_filesystem (value, &fs, &mode, error))
+  if (!flatpak_context_parse_filesystem (value, TRUE, &fs, &mode, error))
+     return FALSE;
+ 
+   flatpak_context_take_filesystem (context, g_steal_pointer (&fs),
+@@ -1491,15 +1599,13 @@ flatpak_context_load_metadata (FlatpakContext *context,
+ 	  g_autofree char *filesystem = NULL;
+           FlatpakFilesystemMode mode;
+ 
+-          if (!flatpak_context_parse_filesystem (fs, &filesystem, &mode, NULL))
+          if (!flatpak_context_parse_filesystem (fs, remove,
+                                                 &filesystem, &mode, NULL))
+             g_debug ("Unknown filesystem type %s", filesystems[i]);
+           else
+             {
+-              if (remove)
+-	        flatpak_context_take_filesystem (context, g_steal_pointer (&filesystem),
+-                                                 FLATPAK_FILESYSTEM_MODE_NONE);
+-              else
+-	        flatpak_context_take_filesystem (context, g_steal_pointer (&filesystem), mode);
+              g_assert (mode == FLATPAK_FILESYSTEM_MODE_NONE || !remove);
+              flatpak_context_take_filesystem (context, g_steal_pointer (&filesystem), mode);
+             }
+         }
+     }
+@@ -1720,11 +1826,24 @@ flatpak_context_save_metadata (FlatpakContext *context,
+     {
+       g_autoptr(GPtrArray) array = g_ptr_array_new_with_free_func (g_free);
+ 
+      /* Serialize host-reset first, because order can matter in
+       * corner cases. */
+      if (g_hash_table_lookup_extended (context->filesystems, "host-reset",
+                                        NULL, &value))
+        {
+          g_warn_if_fail (GPOINTER_TO_INT (value) == FLATPAK_FILESYSTEM_MODE_NONE);
+          g_ptr_array_add (array, g_strdup ("!host:reset"));
+        }
+
+       g_hash_table_iter_init (&iter, context->filesystems);
+       while (g_hash_table_iter_next (&iter, &key, &value))
+         {
+           FlatpakFilesystemMode mode = GPOINTER_TO_INT (value);
+ 
+	  /* We already did this */
+          if (g_str_equal (key, "host-reset"))
+            continue;
+
+ 	   g_ptr_array_add (array, unparse_filesystem_flags (key, mode));
+         }
+ 
+@@ -1829,7 +1948,8 @@ flatpak_context_save_metadata (FlatpakContext *context,
+ void
+ flatpak_context_allow_host_fs (FlatpakContext *context)
+ {
+-  flatpak_context_take_filesystem (context, g_strdup ("host"), FLATPAK_FILESYSTEM_MODE_READ_WRITE);
+  flatpak_context_take_filesystem (context, g_strdup ("host"),
+                                   FLATPAK_FILESYSTEM_MODE_READ_WRITE);
+ }
+ 
+ gboolean
+@@ -1889,18 +2009,36 @@ flatpak_context_to_args (FlatpakContext *context,
+       g_ptr_array_add (args, g_strdup_printf ("--system-%s-name=%s", flatpak_policy_to_string (policy), name));
+     }
+ 
+  /* Serialize host-reset first, because order can matter in
+   * corner cases. */
+  if (g_hash_table_lookup_extended (context->filesystems, "host-reset",
+                                    NULL, &value))
+    {
+      g_warn_if_fail (GPOINTER_TO_INT (value) == FLATPAK_FILESYSTEM_MODE_NONE);
+      g_ptr_array_add (args, g_strdup ("--nofilesystem=host:reset"));
+    }
+
+   g_hash_table_iter_init (&iter, context->filesystems);
+   while (g_hash_table_iter_next (&iter, &key, &value))
+     {
+      g_autofree char *fs = NULL;
+       FlatpakFilesystemMode mode = GPOINTER_TO_INT (value);
+ 
+      /* We already did this */
+      if (g_str_equal (key, "host-reset"))
+        continue;
+
+      fs = unparse_filesystem_flags (key, mode);
+
+       if (mode != FLATPAK_FILESYSTEM_MODE_NONE)
+         {
+-          g_autofree char *fs = unparse_filesystem_flags (key, mode);
+           g_ptr_array_add (args, g_strdup_printf ("--filesystem=%s", fs));
+         }
+       else
+-        g_ptr_array_add (args, g_strdup_printf ("--nofilesystem=%s", (char *) key));
+        {
+          g_assert (fs[0] == '!');
+          g_ptr_array_add (args, g_strdup_printf ("--nofilesystem=%s", &fs[1]));
+        }
+     }
+ }
+ 
+diff --git a/doc/flatpak-override.xml b/doc/flatpak-override.xml
+index 60fa58c..bddb36e 100644
+--- a/doc/flatpak-override.xml
+++ b/doc/flatpak-override.xml
+@@ -221,6 +221,14 @@
+                     xdg-music, xdg-pictures, xdg-public-share, xdg-templates, xdg-videos,
+                     an absolute path, or a homedir-relative path like ~/dir.
+                     This option can be used multiple times.
+                </para><para>
+                    As a special case,
+                    <option>--nofilesystem=host:reset</option>
+                    will ignore all <option>--filesystem</option>
+                    permissions inherited from the app manifest or a
+                    lower-precedence layer of overrides, in addition to
+                    having the behaviour of
+                    <option>--nofilesystem=host</option>.
+                 </para></listitem>
+             </varlistentry>
+ 
+diff --git a/doc/flatpak-run.xml b/doc/flatpak-run.xml
+index 8e1a3fd..be77092 100644
+--- a/doc/flatpak-run.xml
+++ b/doc/flatpak-run.xml
+@@ -324,6 +324,14 @@
+                     xdg-music, xdg-pictures, xdg-public-share, xdg-templates, xdg-videos,
+                     an absolute path, or a homedir-relative path like ~/dir.
+                     This option can be used multiple times.
+                </para><para>
+                    As a special case,
+                    <option>--nofilesystem=host:reset</option>
+                    will ignore all <option>--filesystem</option>
+                    permissions inherited from the app manifest or
+                    <citerefentry><refentrytitle>flatpak-override</refentrytitle><manvolnum>1</manvolnum></citerefentry>,
+                    in addition to having the behaviour of
+                    <option>--nofilesystem=host</option>.
+                 </para></listitem>
+             </varlistentry>
+ 
+-- 
+2.27.0
+
--- a/backport-0007-CVE-2021-41133.patch
+++ b/backport-0007-CVE-2021-41133.patch
@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
+From 1330662f33a55e88bfe18e76de28b7922d91a999 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Simon McVittie <smcv@collabora.com>
+Date: Wed, 1 Sep 2021 14:20:29 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] run: Don't allow unmounting filesystems
+
+If we don't allow mounting filesystems, we shouldn't allow unmounting
+either.
+
+Partially fixes GHSA-67h7-w3jq-vh4q.
+
+Signed-off-by: Simon McVittie <smcv@collabora.com>
+
+Conflict:NA
+Reference:https://github.com/flatpak/flatpak/commit/1330662f33a55e88bfe18e76de28b7922d91a999
+
+---
+ common/flatpak-run.c | 2 ++
+ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/common/flatpak-run.c b/common/flatpak-run.c
+index 458e3c3..3a229b9 100644
+--- a/common/flatpak-run.c
+++ b/common/flatpak-run.c
+@@ -2135,6 +2135,8 @@ setup_seccomp (FlatpakBwrap   *bwrap,
+     {SCMP_SYS (unshare), EPERM},
+     {SCMP_SYS (setns), EPERM},
+     {SCMP_SYS (mount), EPERM},
+    {SCMP_SYS (umount), EPERM},
+    {SCMP_SYS (umount2), EPERM},
+     {SCMP_SYS (pivot_root), EPERM},
+     {SCMP_SYS (clone), EPERM, &SCMP_A0 (SCMP_CMP_MASKED_EQ, CLONE_NEWUSER, CLONE_NEWUSER)},
+ 
+-- 
+2.19.1
+
--- a/backport-0008-CVE-2021-41133.patch
+++ b/backport-0008-CVE-2021-41133.patch
@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
+From 462fca2c666e0cd2b60d6d2593a7216a83047aaf Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Simon McVittie <smcv@collabora.com>
+Date: Wed, 1 Sep 2021 14:21:04 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] run: Don't allow chroot()
+
+If we don't allow pivot_root() then there seems no reason why we should
+allow chroot().
+
+Partially fixes GHSA-67h7-w3jq-vh4q.
+
+Signed-off-by: Simon McVittie <smcv@collabora.com>
+
+Conflict:NA
+Reference:https://github.com/flatpak/flatpak/commit/462fca2c666e0cd2b60d6d2593a7216a83047aaf
+
+---
+ common/flatpak-run.c | 1 +
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
+
+diff --git a/common/flatpak-run.c b/common/flatpak-run.c
+index 3a229b9..c2c0218 100644
+--- a/common/flatpak-run.c
+++ b/common/flatpak-run.c
+@@ -2138,6 +2138,7 @@ setup_seccomp (FlatpakBwrap   *bwrap,
+     {SCMP_SYS (umount), EPERM},
+     {SCMP_SYS (umount2), EPERM},
+     {SCMP_SYS (pivot_root), EPERM},
+    {SCMP_SYS (chroot), EPERM},
+     {SCMP_SYS (clone), EPERM, &SCMP_A0 (SCMP_CMP_MASKED_EQ, CLONE_NEWUSER, CLONE_NEWUSER)},
+ 
+     /* Don't allow faking input to the controlling tty (CVE-2017-5226) */
+-- 
+2.19.1
+
--- a/backport-Fix-handling-of-syscalls-only-allowed-by-devel.patch
+++ b/backport-Fix-handling-of-syscalls-only-allowed-by-devel.patch
@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
+From 3fc8c672676ae016f8e7cc90481b2feecbad9861 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Simon McVittie <smcv@collabora.com>
+Date: Fri, 8 Oct 2021 19:00:13 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] Fix handling of syscalls only allowed by --devel
+
+This was incorrectly looking at errno instead of -r.
+
+Fixes: 0b38b0f0 "run: Handle unknown syscalls as intended"
+Signed-off-by: Simon McVittie <smcv@collabora.com>
+
+Conflict:NA
+Reference:https://github.com/flatpak/flatpak/commit/3fc8c672676ae016f8e7cc90481b2feecbad9861
+
+---
+ common/flatpak-run.c | 2 +-
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/common/flatpak-run.c b/common/flatpak-run.c
+index 11f2f19..0130aef 100644
+--- a/common/flatpak-run.c
+++ b/common/flatpak-run.c
+@@ -2296,7 +2296,7 @@ setup_seccomp (FlatpakBwrap   *bwrap,
+             r = seccomp_rule_add (seccomp, SCMP_ACT_ERRNO (errnum), scall, 0);
+ 
+           /* See above for the meaning of EFAULT. */
+-          if (errno == EFAULT)
+          if (r == -EFAULT)
+             flatpak_debug2 ("Unable to block syscall %d: syscall not known to libseccomp?",
+                             scall);
+           else if (r < 0)
+-- 
+2.19.1
+
--- a/backport-run-Handle-unknown-syscalls-as-intended.patch
+++ b/backport-run-Handle-unknown-syscalls-as-intended.patch
@ -0,0 +1,72 @@
+From d419fa67038370e4f4c3ce8c3b5f672d4876cfc8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Simon McVittie <smcv@collabora.com>
+Date: Fri, 8 Oct 2021 17:05:07 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] run: Handle unknown syscalls as intended
+
+The error-handling here was
+
+    if (r < 0 && r == -EFAULT)
+
+but Alex says it was almost certainly intended to be
+
+    if (r < 0 && r != -EFAULT)
+
+so that syscalls not known to libseccomp are not a fatal error.
+
+Instead of literally making that change, emit a debug message on -EFAULT
+so we can see what is going on.
+
+This temporarily weakens our defence against CVE-2021-41133
+(GHSA-67h7-w3jq-vh4q) in order to avoid regressions: if the installed
+version of libseccomp does not know about the recently-added syscalls,
+but the kernel does, then we will not prevent non-native executables
+from using those syscalls.
+
+Resolves: https://github.com/flatpak/flatpak/issues/4458
+Signed-off-by: Simon McVittie <smcv@collabora.com>
+
+Conflict:NA
+Reference:https://github.com/flatpak/flatpak/commit/d419fa67038370e4f4c3ce8c3b5f672d4876cfc8
+
+---
+ common/flatpak-run.c | 17 +++++++++++++++--
+ 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/common/flatpak-run.c b/common/flatpak-run.c
+index c2c0218..11f2f19 100644
+--- a/common/flatpak-run.c
+++ b/common/flatpak-run.c
+@@ -2268,7 +2268,16 @@ setup_seccomp (FlatpakBwrap   *bwrap,
+         r = seccomp_rule_add (seccomp, SCMP_ACT_ERRNO (errnum), scall, 1, *syscall_blacklist[i].arg);
+       else
+         r = seccomp_rule_add (seccomp, SCMP_ACT_ERRNO (errnum), scall, 0);
+-      if (r < 0 && r == -EFAULT /* unknown syscall */)
+
+      /* EFAULT means "internal libseccomp error", but in practice we get
+       * this for syscall numbers added via flatpak-syscalls-private.h
+       * when trying to filter them on a non-native architecture, because
+       * libseccomp cannot map the syscall number to a name and back to a
+       * number for the non-native architecture. */
+      if (r == -EFAULT)
+        flatpak_debug2 ("Unable to block syscall %d: syscall not known to libseccomp?",
+                        scall);
+      else if (r < 0)
+         return flatpak_fail_error (error, FLATPAK_ERROR_SETUP_FAILED, _("Failed to block syscall %d"), scall);
+     }
+ 
+@@ -2286,7 +2295,11 @@ setup_seccomp (FlatpakBwrap   *bwrap,
+           else
+             r = seccomp_rule_add (seccomp, SCMP_ACT_ERRNO (errnum), scall, 0);
+ 
+-          if (r < 0 && r == -EFAULT /* unknown syscall */)
+          /* See above for the meaning of EFAULT. */
+          if (errno == EFAULT)
+            flatpak_debug2 ("Unable to block syscall %d: syscall not known to libseccomp?",
+                            scall);
+          else if (r < 0)
+             return flatpak_fail_error (error, FLATPAK_ERROR_SETUP_FAILED, _("Failed to block syscall %d"), scall);
+         }
+     }
+-- 
+2.19.1
+
--- a/flatpak.spec
+++ b/flatpak.spec
@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 Name:           flatpak
 Version:        1.0.3
-Release:        6
+Release:        13
 Summary:        Application deployment framework for desktop apps
 License:        LGPLv2+
 URL:            http://flatpak.org/
@ -16,6 +16,28 @@ Patch0007:      CVE-2021-21381-2.patch
 Patch0008:      CVE-2021-21381-3.patch
 Patch0009:      CVE-2019-8308.patch
 Patch0010:	CVE-2019-10063.patch
+Patch6000:      backport-0001-CVE-2021-41133.patch
+Patch6001:      backport-0002-CVE-2021-41133.patch
+Patch6002:      backport-0003-CVE-2021-41133.patch
+Patch6003:      backport-0004-CVE-2021-41133.patch
+Patch6004:      backport-0005-CVE-2021-41133.patch
+Patch6005:      backport-0006-CVE-2021-41133.patch
+Patch6006:      backport-0007-CVE-2021-41133.patch
+Patch6007:      backport-0008-CVE-2021-41133.patch
+Patch6008:      backport-run-Handle-unknown-syscalls-as-intended.patch
+Patch6009:      backport-Fix-handling-of-syscalls-only-allowed-by-devel.patch
+Patch6010:	backport-0001-CVE-2021-43860.patch
+Patch6011:	backport-0002-CVE-2021-43860.patch
+Patch6012:	backport-0003-CVE-2021-43860.patch
+Patch6013:	backport-0004-CVE-2021-43860.patch
+Patch6014:	backport-0001-CVE-2022-21682.patch
+Patch6015:	backport-0002-CVE-2022-21682.patch
+Patch6016:	backport-0003-CVE-2022-21682.patch
+Patch6017:	backport-0004-CVE-2022-21682.patch
+Patch6018:	backport-0005-CVE-2022-21682.patch
+Patch6019:	backport-0006-CVE-2022-21682.patch
+Patch6020:      CVE-2024-32462.patch
+Patch6021:      CVE-2024-42472.patch

 BuildRequires:  pkgconfig(appstream-glib) pkgconfig(gio-unix-2.0) pkgconfig(gobject-introspection-1.0) >= 1.40.0 pkgconfig(json-glib-1.0) pkgconfig(libarchive) >= 2.8.0
 BuildRequires:  pkgconfig(libsoup-2.4) pkgconfig(libxml-2.0) >= 2.4 pkgconfig(ostree-1) >= 2018.7 pkgconfig(polkit-gobject-1) pkgconfig(libseccomp) pkgconfig(xau)
@ -110,6 +132,27 @@ flatpak remote-list --system &> /dev/null || :
 %{_mandir}/man5/flatpak-remote.5*

 %changelog
+* Thu Aug 15 2024 wangkai <13474090681@163.com> - 1.0.3-13
+- Fix CVE-2024-42472
+
+* Fri Apr 19 2024 wangkai <13474090681@163.com> - 1.0.3-12
+- Fix CVE-2024-32462
+
+* Tue Feb 15 2022 dongyuzhen <dongyuzhen@h-partners.com> - 1.0.3-11
+- Fix CVE-2022-21682
+
+* Sat Jan 29 2022 dongyuzhen <dongyuzhen@h-partners.com> - 1.0.3-10
+- Fix CVE-2021-43860
+
+* Tue Jan 25 2022 hanhui <hanhui15@huawei.com> - 1.0.3-9 
+- revert CVE-2022-21682
+
+* Sat Jan 22 2022 wangkerong <wangkerong@huawei.com> - 1.0.3-8
+- Fix CVE-2022-21682
+
+* Wed Oct 20 2021 zhanzhimin <zhanhzimin@huawei.com> - 1.0.3-7
+- Fix CVE-2021-41133
+
 * Mon Sep 27 2021 houyingchao <houyingchao@huawei.com> - 1.0.3-6
 - Fix CVE-2019-10063
Author	SHA1	Message	Date
openeuler-ci-bot	901d28c8ab	!90 Fix CVE-2024-42472 From: @wk333 Reviewed-by: @lyn1001 Signed-off-by: @lyn1001	2024-08-19 06:58:04 +00:00
wk333	33d6af6586	Fix CVE-2024-42472	2024-08-19 10:13:06 +08:00
openeuler-ci-bot	de1df69514	!80 Fix CVE-2024-32462 From: @wk333 Reviewed-by: @lyn1001 Signed-off-by: @lyn1001	2024-04-19 06:48:04 +00:00
wk333	35fd35e02d	Fix CVE-2024-32462	2024-04-13 02:53:05 +08:00
openeuler-ci-bot	e981cf9ebe	!61 Fix CVE-2022-21682 From: @dongyuzhen Reviewed-by: @zzm_567, @small_leek Signed-off-by: @small_leek	2022-02-17 02:36:49 +00:00
dongyuzhen	36a9729ecf	Fix CVE-2022-21682	2022-02-15 14:28:40 +08:00
openeuler-ci-bot	c0f3b3adb9	!55 Fix CVE-2021-43860 Merge pull request !55 from dongyuzhen/openEuler-20.03-LTS-SP3	2022-01-30 02:44:55 +00:00
dongyuzhen	9eabf69994	Fix CVE-2021-43860	2022-01-29 19:07:09 +08:00
openeuler-ci-bot	44d5120775	!36 [sync] PR-33: fix CVE-2021-41133 From: @openeuler-sync-bot Reviewed-by: @t_feng,@small_leek Signed-off-by: @small_leek	2021-10-21 09:40:02 +00:00
zhanzhimin	07ead92226	fix CVE-2021-41133 (cherry picked from commit 22a178c97cde6a7fcebaff7dc2fdab21784edfa0)	2021-10-20 19:26:23 +08:00