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!94 fix CVE-2019-11098

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From: @huiyingc 
Reviewed-by: @caojinhuahw 
Signed-off-by: @caojinhuahw
This commit is contained in:
openeuler-ci-bot 2022-09-29 12:10:22 +00:00 committed by Gitee
commit 9dad3ff18f
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GPG Key ID: 173E9B9CA92EEF8F
11 changed files with 3230 additions and 2 deletions
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119
0027-UefiCpuPkg-Correct-some-typos.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,119 @@
From 92c19c68cb8f3f5313ff886c664b9286fb50632d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Guomin Jiang <guomin.jiang@intel.com>
Date: Tue, 7 Jul 2020 15:46:45 +0800
Subject: [PATCH] UefiCpuPkg: Correct some typos.
Correct some typos.
Cc: Eric Dong <eric.dong@intel.com>
Cc: Ray Ni <ray.ni@intel.com>
Cc: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Cc: Rahul Kumar <rahul1.kumar@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Guomin Jiang <guomin.jiang@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Liming Gao <liming.gao@intel.com>
---
UefiCpuPkg/CpuMpPei/CpuMpPei.h | 2 +-
UefiCpuPkg/CpuMpPei/CpuPaging.c | 4 ++--
.../Library/CpuExceptionHandlerLib/CpuExceptionCommon.h | 4 ++--
.../CpuExceptionHandlerLib/Ia32/ArchExceptionHandler.c | 4 ++--
.../Library/CpuExceptionHandlerLib/SecPeiCpuException.c | 2 +-
.../Library/CpuExceptionHandlerLib/X64/ArchExceptionHandler.c | 4 ++--
6 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
diff --git a/UefiCpuPkg/CpuMpPei/CpuMpPei.h b/UefiCpuPkg/CpuMpPei/CpuMpPei.h
index 309478cbe1..6a481a84dc 100644
--- a/UefiCpuPkg/CpuMpPei/CpuMpPei.h
+++ b/UefiCpuPkg/CpuMpPei/CpuMpPei.h
@@ -424,7 +424,7 @@ InitializeCpuMpWorker (
);
/**
- Enabl/setup stack guard for each processor if PcdCpuStackGuard is set to TRUE.
+ Enable/setup stack guard for each processor if PcdCpuStackGuard is set to TRUE.
Doing this in the memory-discovered callback is to make sure the Stack Guard
feature to cover as most PEI code as possible.
diff --git a/UefiCpuPkg/CpuMpPei/CpuPaging.c b/UefiCpuPkg/CpuMpPei/CpuPaging.c
index 8ab7dfcce3..50ad4277af 100644
--- a/UefiCpuPkg/CpuMpPei/CpuPaging.c
+++ b/UefiCpuPkg/CpuMpPei/CpuPaging.c
@@ -153,7 +153,7 @@ GetPhysicalAddressWidth (
Get the type of top level page table.
@retval Page512G PML4 paging.
- @retval Page1G PAE paing.
+ @retval Page1G PAE paging.
**/
PAGE_ATTRIBUTE
@@ -583,7 +583,7 @@ SetupStackGuardPage (
}
/**
- Enabl/setup stack guard for each processor if PcdCpuStackGuard is set to TRUE.
+ Enable/setup stack guard for each processor if PcdCpuStackGuard is set to TRUE.
Doing this in the memory-discovered callback is to make sure the Stack Guard
feature to cover as most PEI code as possible.
diff --git a/UefiCpuPkg/Library/CpuExceptionHandlerLib/CpuExceptionCommon.h b/UefiCpuPkg/Library/CpuExceptionHandlerLib/CpuExceptionCommon.h
index 805dd9cbb4..0544d6dba6 100644
--- a/UefiCpuPkg/Library/CpuExceptionHandlerLib/CpuExceptionCommon.h
+++ b/UefiCpuPkg/Library/CpuExceptionHandlerLib/CpuExceptionCommon.h
@@ -90,8 +90,8 @@ AsmGetTemplateAddressMap (
**/
VOID
ArchUpdateIdtEntry (
- IN IA32_IDT_GATE_DESCRIPTOR *IdtEntry,
- IN UINTN InterruptHandler
+ OUT IA32_IDT_GATE_DESCRIPTOR *IdtEntry,
+ IN UINTN InterruptHandler
);
/**
diff --git a/UefiCpuPkg/Library/CpuExceptionHandlerLib/Ia32/ArchExceptionHandler.c b/UefiCpuPkg/Library/CpuExceptionHandlerLib/Ia32/ArchExceptionHandler.c
index 1aafb7dac1..903449e0da 100644
--- a/UefiCpuPkg/Library/CpuExceptionHandlerLib/Ia32/ArchExceptionHandler.c
+++ b/UefiCpuPkg/Library/CpuExceptionHandlerLib/Ia32/ArchExceptionHandler.c
@@ -18,8 +18,8 @@
**/
VOID
ArchUpdateIdtEntry (
- IN IA32_IDT_GATE_DESCRIPTOR *IdtEntry,
- IN UINTN InterruptHandler
+ OUT IA32_IDT_GATE_DESCRIPTOR *IdtEntry,
+ IN UINTN InterruptHandler
)
{
IdtEntry->Bits.OffsetLow = (UINT16)(UINTN)InterruptHandler;
diff --git a/UefiCpuPkg/Library/CpuExceptionHandlerLib/SecPeiCpuException.c b/UefiCpuPkg/Library/CpuExceptionHandlerLib/SecPeiCpuException.c
index 20148db74c..d4ae153c57 100644
--- a/UefiCpuPkg/Library/CpuExceptionHandlerLib/SecPeiCpuException.c
+++ b/UefiCpuPkg/Library/CpuExceptionHandlerLib/SecPeiCpuException.c
@@ -87,7 +87,7 @@ InitializeCpuExceptionHandlers (
IdtEntryCount = (IdtDescriptor.Limit + 1) / sizeof (IA32_IDT_GATE_DESCRIPTOR);
if (IdtEntryCount > CPU_EXCEPTION_NUM) {
//
- // CPU exeption library only setup CPU_EXCEPTION_NUM exception handler at most
+ // CPU exception library only setup CPU_EXCEPTION_NUM exception handler at most
//
IdtEntryCount = CPU_EXCEPTION_NUM;
}
diff --git a/UefiCpuPkg/Library/CpuExceptionHandlerLib/X64/ArchExceptionHandler.c b/UefiCpuPkg/Library/CpuExceptionHandlerLib/X64/ArchExceptionHandler.c
index 894c1cfb75..d3da16e4df 100644
--- a/UefiCpuPkg/Library/CpuExceptionHandlerLib/X64/ArchExceptionHandler.c
+++ b/UefiCpuPkg/Library/CpuExceptionHandlerLib/X64/ArchExceptionHandler.c
@@ -17,8 +17,8 @@
**/
VOID
ArchUpdateIdtEntry (
- IN IA32_IDT_GATE_DESCRIPTOR *IdtEntry,
- IN UINTN InterruptHandler
+ OUT IA32_IDT_GATE_DESCRIPTOR *IdtEntry,
+ IN UINTN InterruptHandler
)
{
IdtEntry->Bits.OffsetLow = (UINT16)(UINTN)InterruptHandler;
--
2.27.0

857
0028-UefiCpuPkg-SecMigrationPei-Add-initial-PEIM-CVE-2019.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,857 @@
From 479613bd06546e30652354d5dd76ee7b377fb92c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Michael Kubacki <michael.a.kubacki@intel.com>
Date: Sun, 21 Apr 2019 14:21:55 -0700
Subject: [PATCH] UefiCpuPkg/SecMigrationPei: Add initial PEIM (CVE-2019-11098)
REF:https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1614
Adds a PEIM that republishes structures produced in SEC. This
is done because SEC modules may not be shadowed in some platforms
due to space constraints or special alignment requirements. The
SecMigrationPei module locates interfaces that may be published in
SEC and reinstalls the interface with permanent memory addresses.
This is important if pre-memory address access is forbidden after
memory initialization and data such as a PPI descriptor, PPI GUID,
or PPI inteface reside in pre-memory.
Cc: Eric Dong <eric.dong@intel.com>
Cc: Ray Ni <ray.ni@intel.com>
Cc: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Cc: Rahul Kumar <rahul1.kumar@intel.com>
Cc: Debkumar De <debkumar.de@intel.com>
Cc: Harry Han <harry.han@intel.com>
Cc: Catharine West <catharine.west@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Kubacki <michael.a.kubacki@intel.com>
Acked-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Liming Gao <liming.gao@intel.com>
---
UefiCpuPkg/Include/Ppi/RepublishSecPpi.h | 54 +++
UefiCpuPkg/SecCore/SecCore.inf | 2 +
UefiCpuPkg/SecCore/SecMain.c | 26 +-
UefiCpuPkg/SecCore/SecMain.h | 1 +
UefiCpuPkg/SecMigrationPei/SecMigrationPei.c | 385 ++++++++++++++++++
UefiCpuPkg/SecMigrationPei/SecMigrationPei.h | 158 +++++++
.../SecMigrationPei/SecMigrationPei.inf | 68 ++++
.../SecMigrationPei/SecMigrationPei.uni | 13 +
UefiCpuPkg/UefiCpuPkg.dec | 3 +
UefiCpuPkg/UefiCpuPkg.dsc | 1 +
10 files changed, 709 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 UefiCpuPkg/Include/Ppi/RepublishSecPpi.h
create mode 100644 UefiCpuPkg/SecMigrationPei/SecMigrationPei.c
create mode 100644 UefiCpuPkg/SecMigrationPei/SecMigrationPei.h
create mode 100644 UefiCpuPkg/SecMigrationPei/SecMigrationPei.inf
create mode 100644 UefiCpuPkg/SecMigrationPei/SecMigrationPei.uni
diff --git a/UefiCpuPkg/Include/Ppi/RepublishSecPpi.h b/UefiCpuPkg/Include/Ppi/RepublishSecPpi.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..ea865acbb5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/UefiCpuPkg/Include/Ppi/RepublishSecPpi.h
@@ -0,0 +1,54 @@
+/** @file
+ This file declares Sec Platform Information PPI.
+
+ This service is the primary handoff state into the PEI Foundation.
+ The Security (SEC) component creates the early, transitory memory
+ environment and also encapsulates knowledge of at least the
+ location of the Boot Firmware Volume (BFV).
+
+ Copyright (c) 2020, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.<BR>
+ SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause-Patent
+
+ @par Revision Reference:
+ This PPI is introduced in PI Version 1.0.
+
+**/
+
+#ifndef __REPUBLISH_SEC_PPI_H__
+#define __REPUBLISH_SEC_PPI_H__
+
+#include <Pi/PiPeiCis.h>
+
+#define REPUBLISH_SEC_PPI_PPI_GUID \
+ { \
+ 0x27a71b1e, 0x73ee, 0x43d6, { 0xac, 0xe3, 0x52, 0x1a, 0x2d, 0xc5, 0xd0, 0x92 } \
+ }
+
+typedef struct _REPUBLISH_SEC_PPI_PPI REPUBLISH_SEC_PPI_PPI;
+
+/**
+ This interface re-installs PPIs installed in SecCore from a post-memory PEIM.
+
+ This is to allow a platform that may not support relocation of SecCore to update the PPI instance to a post-memory
+ copy from a PEIM that has been shadowed to permanent memory.
+
+ @retval EFI_SUCCESS The SecCore PPIs were re-installed successfully.
+ @retval Others An error occurred re-installing the SecCore PPIs.
+
+**/
+typedef
+EFI_STATUS
+(EFIAPI *REPUBLISH_SEC_PPI_REPUBLISH_SEC_PPIS)(
+ VOID
+ );
+
+///
+/// Republish SEC PPIs
+///
+struct _REPUBLISH_SEC_PPI_PPI {
+ REPUBLISH_SEC_PPI_REPUBLISH_SEC_PPIS RepublishSecPpis;
+};
+
+extern EFI_GUID gRepublishSecPpiPpiGuid;
+
+#endif
diff --git a/UefiCpuPkg/SecCore/SecCore.inf b/UefiCpuPkg/SecCore/SecCore.inf
index 0562820c95..545781d6b4 100644
--- a/UefiCpuPkg/SecCore/SecCore.inf
+++ b/UefiCpuPkg/SecCore/SecCore.inf
@@ -68,6 +68,8 @@
## SOMETIMES_CONSUMES
gPeiSecPerformancePpiGuid
gEfiPeiCoreFvLocationPpiGuid
+ ## CONSUMES
+ gRepublishSecPpiPpiGuid
[Guids]
## SOMETIMES_PRODUCES ## HOB
diff --git a/UefiCpuPkg/SecCore/SecMain.c b/UefiCpuPkg/SecCore/SecMain.c
index 5d5e7f17dc..155be49a60 100644
--- a/UefiCpuPkg/SecCore/SecMain.c
+++ b/UefiCpuPkg/SecCore/SecMain.c
@@ -370,13 +370,35 @@ SecTemporaryRamDone (
VOID
)
{
- BOOLEAN State;
+ EFI_STATUS Status;
+ EFI_STATUS Status2;
+ UINTN Index;
+ BOOLEAN State;
+ EFI_PEI_PPI_DESCRIPTOR *PeiPpiDescriptor;
+ REPUBLISH_SEC_PPI_PPI *RepublishSecPpiPpi;
//
// Republish Sec Platform Information(2) PPI
//
RepublishSecPlatformInformationPpi ();
+ //
+ // Re-install SEC PPIs using a PEIM produced service if published
+ //
+ for (Index = 0, Status = EFI_SUCCESS; Status == EFI_SUCCESS; Index++) {
+ Status = PeiServicesLocatePpi (
+ &gRepublishSecPpiPpiGuid,
+ Index,
+ &PeiPpiDescriptor,
+ (VOID **) &RepublishSecPpiPpi
+ );
+ if (!EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
+ DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, "Calling RepublishSecPpi instance %d.\n", Index));
+ Status2 = RepublishSecPpiPpi->RepublishSecPpis ();
+ ASSERT_EFI_ERROR (Status2);
+ }
+ }
+
//
// Migrate DebugAgentContext.
//
@@ -385,7 +407,7 @@ SecTemporaryRamDone (
//
// Disable interrupts and save current interrupt state
//
- State = SaveAndDisableInterrupts();
+ State = SaveAndDisableInterrupts ();
//
// Disable Temporary RAM after Stack and Heap have been migrated at this point.
diff --git a/UefiCpuPkg/SecCore/SecMain.h b/UefiCpuPkg/SecCore/SecMain.h
index e8c05d7136..e20bcf8653 100644
--- a/UefiCpuPkg/SecCore/SecMain.h
+++ b/UefiCpuPkg/SecCore/SecMain.h
@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@
#include <Ppi/TemporaryRamDone.h>
#include <Ppi/SecPerformance.h>
#include <Ppi/PeiCoreFvLocation.h>
+#include <Ppi/RepublishSecPpi.h>
#include <Guid/FirmwarePerformance.h>
diff --git a/UefiCpuPkg/SecMigrationPei/SecMigrationPei.c b/UefiCpuPkg/SecMigrationPei/SecMigrationPei.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..4813a06f13
--- /dev/null
+++ b/UefiCpuPkg/SecMigrationPei/SecMigrationPei.c
@@ -0,0 +1,385 @@
+/** @file
+ Migrates SEC structures after permanent memory is installed.
+
+ Copyright (c) 2020, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.<BR>
+ SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause-Patent
+
+**/
+
+#include <Base.h>
+
+#include <Library/BaseLib.h>
+#include <Library/BaseMemoryLib.h>
+#include <Library/DebugLib.h>
+#include <Library/HobLib.h>
+#include <Library/MemoryAllocationLib.h>
+#include <Library/PeiServicesLib.h>
+#include <Library/PeiServicesTablePointerLib.h>
+
+#include "SecMigrationPei.h"
+
+STATIC REPUBLISH_SEC_PPI_PPI mEdkiiRepublishSecPpiPpi = {
+ RepublishSecPpis
+ };
+
+GLOBAL_REMOVE_IF_UNREFERENCED EFI_SEC_PLATFORM_INFORMATION_PPI mSecPlatformInformationPostMemoryPpi = {
+ SecPlatformInformationPostMemory
+ };
+
+
+GLOBAL_REMOVE_IF_UNREFERENCED EFI_PEI_TEMPORARY_RAM_DONE_PPI mSecTemporaryRamDonePostMemoryPpi = {
+ SecTemporaryRamDonePostMemory
+ };
+
+GLOBAL_REMOVE_IF_UNREFERENCED EFI_PEI_TEMPORARY_RAM_SUPPORT_PPI mSecTemporaryRamSupportPostMemoryPpi = {
+ SecTemporaryRamSupportPostMemory
+ };
+
+GLOBAL_REMOVE_IF_UNREFERENCED PEI_SEC_PERFORMANCE_PPI mSecPerformancePpi = {
+ GetPerformancePostMemory
+ };
+
+STATIC EFI_PEI_PPI_DESCRIPTOR mEdkiiRepublishSecPpiDescriptor = {
+ (EFI_PEI_PPI_DESCRIPTOR_PPI | EFI_PEI_PPI_DESCRIPTOR_TERMINATE_LIST),
+ &gRepublishSecPpiPpiGuid,
+ &mEdkiiRepublishSecPpiPpi
+ };
+
+GLOBAL_REMOVE_IF_UNREFERENCED EFI_PEI_PPI_DESCRIPTOR mSecPlatformInformationPostMemoryDescriptor = {
+ (EFI_PEI_PPI_DESCRIPTOR_PPI | EFI_PEI_PPI_DESCRIPTOR_TERMINATE_LIST),
+ &gEfiSecPlatformInformationPpiGuid,
+ &mSecPlatformInformationPostMemoryPpi
+ };
+
+GLOBAL_REMOVE_IF_UNREFERENCED EFI_PEI_PPI_DESCRIPTOR mSecTemporaryRamDonePostMemoryDescriptor = {
+ (EFI_PEI_PPI_DESCRIPTOR_PPI | EFI_PEI_PPI_DESCRIPTOR_TERMINATE_LIST),
+ &gEfiTemporaryRamDonePpiGuid,
+ &mSecTemporaryRamDonePostMemoryPpi
+ };
+
+GLOBAL_REMOVE_IF_UNREFERENCED EFI_PEI_PPI_DESCRIPTOR mSecTemporaryRamSupportPostMemoryDescriptor = {
+ (EFI_PEI_PPI_DESCRIPTOR_PPI | EFI_PEI_PPI_DESCRIPTOR_TERMINATE_LIST),
+ &gEfiTemporaryRamSupportPpiGuid,
+ &mSecTemporaryRamSupportPostMemoryPpi
+ };
+
+GLOBAL_REMOVE_IF_UNREFERENCED EFI_PEI_PPI_DESCRIPTOR mSecPerformancePpiDescriptor = {
+ (EFI_PEI_PPI_DESCRIPTOR_PPI | EFI_PEI_PPI_DESCRIPTOR_TERMINATE_LIST),
+ &gPeiSecPerformancePpiGuid,
+ &mSecPerformancePpi
+ };
+
+/**
+ Disables the use of Temporary RAM.
+
+ If present, this service is invoked by the PEI Foundation after
+ the EFI_PEI_PERMANANT_MEMORY_INSTALLED_PPI is installed.
+
+ @retval EFI_SUCCESS Dummy function, alway return this value.
+
+**/
+EFI_STATUS
+EFIAPI
+SecTemporaryRamDonePostMemory (
+ VOID
+ )
+{
+ //
+ // Temporary RAM Done is already done in post-memory
+ // install a stub function that is located in permanent memory
+ //
+ return EFI_SUCCESS;
+}
+
+/**
+ This service of the EFI_PEI_TEMPORARY_RAM_SUPPORT_PPI that migrates temporary RAM into
+ permanent memory.
+
+ @param PeiServices Pointer to the PEI Services Table.
+ @param TemporaryMemoryBase Source Address in temporary memory from which the SEC or PEIM will copy the
+ Temporary RAM contents.
+ @param PermanentMemoryBase Destination Address in permanent memory into which the SEC or PEIM will copy the
+ Temporary RAM contents.
+ @param CopySize Amount of memory to migrate from temporary to permanent memory.
+
+ @retval EFI_SUCCESS The data was successfully returned.
+ @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER PermanentMemoryBase + CopySize > TemporaryMemoryBase when
+ TemporaryMemoryBase > PermanentMemoryBase.
+
+**/
+EFI_STATUS
+EFIAPI
+SecTemporaryRamSupportPostMemory (
+ IN CONST EFI_PEI_SERVICES **PeiServices,
+ IN EFI_PHYSICAL_ADDRESS TemporaryMemoryBase,
+ IN EFI_PHYSICAL_ADDRESS PermanentMemoryBase,
+ IN UINTN CopySize
+ )
+{
+ //
+ // Temporary RAM Support is already done in post-memory
+ // install a stub function that is located in permanent memory
+ //
+ return EFI_SUCCESS;
+}
+
+/**
+ This interface conveys performance information out of the Security (SEC) phase into PEI.
+
+ This service is published by the SEC phase. The SEC phase handoff has an optional
+ EFI_PEI_PPI_DESCRIPTOR list as its final argument when control is passed from SEC into the
+ PEI Foundation. As such, if the platform supports collecting performance data in SEC,
+ this information is encapsulated into the data structure abstracted by this service.
+ This information is collected for the boot-strap processor (BSP) on IA-32.
+
+ @param[in] PeiServices The pointer to the PEI Services Table.
+ @param[in] This The pointer to this instance of the PEI_SEC_PERFORMANCE_PPI.
+ @param[out] Performance The pointer to performance data collected in SEC phase.
+
+ @retval EFI_SUCCESS The performance data was successfully returned.
+ @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER The This or Performance is NULL.
+ @retval EFI_NOT_FOUND Can't found the HOB created by the SecMigrationPei component.
+
+**/
+EFI_STATUS
+EFIAPI
+GetPerformancePostMemory (
+ IN CONST EFI_PEI_SERVICES **PeiServices,
+ IN PEI_SEC_PERFORMANCE_PPI *This,
+ OUT FIRMWARE_SEC_PERFORMANCE *Performance
+ )
+{
+ SEC_PLATFORM_INFORMATION_CONTEXT_HOB *SecPlatformInformationContexHob;
+
+ if (This == NULL || Performance == NULL) {
+ return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;
+ }
+
+ SecPlatformInformationContexHob = GetFirstGuidHob (&gEfiCallerIdGuid);
+ if (SecPlatformInformationContexHob == NULL) {
+ return EFI_NOT_FOUND;
+ }
+
+ Performance->ResetEnd = SecPlatformInformationContexHob->FirmwareSecPerformance.ResetEnd;
+
+ return EFI_SUCCESS;
+}
+
+/**
+ This interface conveys state information out of the Security (SEC) phase into PEI.
+
+ @param[in] PeiServices Pointer to the PEI Services Table.
+ @param[in,out] StructureSize Pointer to the variable describing size of the input buffer.
+ @param[out] PlatformInformationRecord Pointer to the EFI_SEC_PLATFORM_INFORMATION_RECORD.
+
+ @retval EFI_SUCCESS The data was successfully returned.
+ @retval EFI_NOT_FOUND Can't found the HOB created by SecMigrationPei component.
+ @retval EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL The size of buffer pointed by StructureSize is too small and will return
+ the minimal required size in the buffer pointed by StructureSize.
+ @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER The StructureSize is NULL or PlatformInformationRecord is NULL.
+
+**/
+EFI_STATUS
+EFIAPI
+SecPlatformInformationPostMemory (
+ IN CONST EFI_PEI_SERVICES **PeiServices,
+ IN OUT UINT64 *StructureSize,
+ OUT EFI_SEC_PLATFORM_INFORMATION_RECORD *PlatformInformationRecord
+ )
+{
+ SEC_PLATFORM_INFORMATION_CONTEXT_HOB *SecPlatformInformationContexHob;
+
+ if (StructureSize == NULL) {
+ return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;
+ }
+
+ SecPlatformInformationContexHob = GetFirstGuidHob (&gEfiCallerIdGuid);
+ if (SecPlatformInformationContexHob == NULL) {
+ return EFI_NOT_FOUND;
+ }
+
+ if (*StructureSize < SecPlatformInformationContexHob->Context.StructureSize) {
+ *StructureSize = SecPlatformInformationContexHob->Context.StructureSize;
+ return EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL;
+ }
+
+ if (PlatformInformationRecord == NULL) {
+ return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;
+ }
+
+ *StructureSize = SecPlatformInformationContexHob->Context.StructureSize;
+ CopyMem (
+ (VOID *) PlatformInformationRecord,
+ (VOID *) SecPlatformInformationContexHob->Context.PlatformInformationRecord,
+ (UINTN) SecPlatformInformationContexHob->Context.StructureSize
+ );
+
+ return EFI_SUCCESS;
+}
+
+/**
+ This interface re-installs PPIs installed in SecCore from a post-memory PEIM.
+
+ This is to allow a platform that may not support relocation of SecCore to update the PPI instance to a post-memory
+ copy from a PEIM that has been shadowed to permanent memory.
+
+ @retval EFI_SUCCESS The SecCore PPIs were re-installed successfully.
+ @retval Others An error occurred re-installing the SecCore PPIs.
+
+**/
+EFI_STATUS
+EFIAPI
+RepublishSecPpis (
+ VOID
+ )
+{
+ EFI_STATUS Status;
+ EFI_PEI_PPI_DESCRIPTOR *PeiPpiDescriptor;
+ VOID *PeiPpi;
+ SEC_PLATFORM_INFORMATION_CONTEXT_HOB *SecPlatformInformationContextHob;
+ EFI_SEC_PLATFORM_INFORMATION_RECORD *SecPlatformInformationPtr;
+ UINT64 SecStructureSize;
+
+ SecPlatformInformationPtr = NULL;
+ SecStructureSize = 0;
+
+ Status = PeiServicesLocatePpi (
+ &gEfiTemporaryRamDonePpiGuid,
+ 0,
+ &PeiPpiDescriptor,
+ (VOID **) &PeiPpi
+ );
+ if (!EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
+ Status = PeiServicesReInstallPpi (
+ PeiPpiDescriptor,
+ &mSecTemporaryRamDonePostMemoryDescriptor
+ );
+ ASSERT_EFI_ERROR (Status);
+ }
+
+ Status = PeiServicesLocatePpi (
+ &gEfiTemporaryRamSupportPpiGuid,
+ 0,
+ &PeiPpiDescriptor,
+ (VOID **) &PeiPpi
+ );
+ if (!EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
+ Status = PeiServicesReInstallPpi (
+ PeiPpiDescriptor,
+ &mSecTemporaryRamSupportPostMemoryDescriptor
+ );
+ ASSERT_EFI_ERROR (Status);
+ }
+
+ Status = PeiServicesCreateHob (
+ EFI_HOB_TYPE_GUID_EXTENSION,
+ sizeof (SEC_PLATFORM_INFORMATION_CONTEXT_HOB),
+ (VOID **) &SecPlatformInformationContextHob
+ );
+ ASSERT_EFI_ERROR (Status);
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
+ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "SecPlatformInformation Context HOB could not be created.\n"));
+ return Status;
+ }
+
+ SecPlatformInformationContextHob->Header.Name = gEfiCallerIdGuid;
+ SecPlatformInformationContextHob->Revision = 1;
+
+ Status = PeiServicesLocatePpi (
+ &gPeiSecPerformancePpiGuid,
+ 0,
+ &PeiPpiDescriptor,
+ (VOID **) &PeiPpi
+ );
+ if (!EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
+ Status = ((PEI_SEC_PERFORMANCE_PPI *) PeiPpi)->GetPerformance (
+ GetPeiServicesTablePointer (),
+ (PEI_SEC_PERFORMANCE_PPI *) PeiPpi,
+ &SecPlatformInformationContextHob->FirmwareSecPerformance
+ );
+ ASSERT_EFI_ERROR (Status);
+ if (!EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
+ Status = PeiServicesReInstallPpi (
+ PeiPpiDescriptor,
+ &mSecPerformancePpiDescriptor
+ );
+ ASSERT_EFI_ERROR (Status);
+ }
+ }
+
+ Status = PeiServicesLocatePpi (
+ &gEfiSecPlatformInformationPpiGuid,
+ 0,
+ &PeiPpiDescriptor,
+ (VOID **) &PeiPpi
+ );
+ if (!EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
+ Status = ((EFI_SEC_PLATFORM_INFORMATION_PPI *) PeiPpi)->PlatformInformation (
+ GetPeiServicesTablePointer (),
+ &SecStructureSize,
+ SecPlatformInformationPtr
+ );
+ ASSERT (Status == EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL);
+ if (Status != EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL) {
+ return EFI_NOT_FOUND;
+ }
+
+ ZeroMem ((VOID *) &(SecPlatformInformationContextHob->Context), sizeof (SEC_PLATFORM_INFORMATION_CONTEXT));
+ SecPlatformInformationContextHob->Context.PlatformInformationRecord = AllocatePool ((UINTN) SecStructureSize);
+ ASSERT (SecPlatformInformationContextHob->Context.PlatformInformationRecord != NULL);
+ if (SecPlatformInformationContextHob->Context.PlatformInformationRecord == NULL) {
+ return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;
+ }
+ SecPlatformInformationContextHob->Context.StructureSize = SecStructureSize;
+
+ Status = ((EFI_SEC_PLATFORM_INFORMATION_PPI *) PeiPpi)->PlatformInformation (
+ GetPeiServicesTablePointer (),
+ &(SecPlatformInformationContextHob->Context.StructureSize),
+ SecPlatformInformationContextHob->Context.PlatformInformationRecord
+ );
+ ASSERT_EFI_ERROR (Status);
+ if (!EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
+ Status = PeiServicesReInstallPpi (
+ PeiPpiDescriptor,
+ &mSecPlatformInformationPostMemoryDescriptor
+ );
+ ASSERT_EFI_ERROR (Status);
+ }
+ }
+
+ return EFI_SUCCESS;
+}
+
+/**
+ This function is the entry point which installs an instance of REPUBLISH_SEC_PPI_PPI.
+
+ It install the RepublishSecPpi depent on PcdMigrateTemporaryRamFirmwareVolumes, install
+ the PPI when the PcdMigrateTemporaryRamFirmwareVolumes enabled.
+
+ @param[in] FileHandle Pointer to image file handle.
+ @param[in] PeiServices Pointer to PEI Services Table
+
+ @retval EFI_ABORTED Disable evacuate temporary memory feature by disable
+ PcdMigrateTemporaryRamFirmwareVolumes.
+ @retval EFI_SUCCESS An instance of REPUBLISH_SEC_PPI_PPI was installed successfully.
+ @retval Others An error occurred installing and instance of REPUBLISH_SEC_PPI_PPI.
+
+**/
+EFI_STATUS
+EFIAPI
+SecMigrationPeiInitialize (
+ IN EFI_PEI_FILE_HANDLE FileHandle,
+ IN CONST EFI_PEI_SERVICES **PeiServices
+ )
+{
+ EFI_STATUS Status;
+
+ Status = EFI_ABORTED;
+
+ if (PcdGetBool (PcdMigrateTemporaryRamFirmwareVolumes)) {
+ Status = PeiServicesInstallPpi (&mEdkiiRepublishSecPpiDescriptor);
+ ASSERT_EFI_ERROR (Status);
+ }
+
+ return Status;
+}
diff --git a/UefiCpuPkg/SecMigrationPei/SecMigrationPei.h b/UefiCpuPkg/SecMigrationPei/SecMigrationPei.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..2d28490d9e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/UefiCpuPkg/SecMigrationPei/SecMigrationPei.h
@@ -0,0 +1,158 @@
+/** @file
+ Migrates SEC structures after permanent memory is installed.
+
+ Copyright (c) 2020, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.<BR>
+ SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause-Patent
+
+**/
+
+#ifndef __SEC_MIGRATION_H__
+#define __SEC_MIGRATION_H__
+
+#include <Base.h>
+
+#include <Pi/PiPeiCis.h>
+#include <Ppi/RepublishSecPpi.h>
+#include <Ppi/SecPerformance.h>
+#include <Ppi/SecPlatformInformation.h>
+#include <Ppi/SecPlatformInformation2.h>
+#include <Ppi/TemporaryRamDone.h>
+#include <Ppi/TemporaryRamSupport.h>
+
+/**
+ This interface conveys state information out of the Security (SEC) phase into PEI.
+
+ @param[in] PeiServices Pointer to the PEI Services Table.
+ @param[in,out] StructureSize Pointer to the variable describing size of the input buffer.
+ @param[out] PlatformInformationRecord Pointer to the EFI_SEC_PLATFORM_INFORMATION_RECORD.
+
+ @retval EFI_SUCCESS The data was successfully returned.
+ @retval EFI_NOT_FOUND Can't found the HOB created by SecMigrationPei component.
+ @retval EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL The size of buffer pointed by StructureSize is too small and will return
+ the minimal required size in the buffer pointed by StructureSize.
+ @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER The StructureSize is NULL or PlatformInformationRecord is NULL.
+
+**/
+EFI_STATUS
+EFIAPI
+SecPlatformInformationPostMemory (
+ IN CONST EFI_PEI_SERVICES **PeiServices,
+ IN OUT UINT64 *StructureSize,
+ OUT EFI_SEC_PLATFORM_INFORMATION_RECORD *PlatformInformationRecord
+ );
+
+/**
+ Re-installs the SEC Platform Information PPIs to implementation in this module to support post-memory.
+
+ @param[in] PeiServices An indirect pointer to the EFI_PEI_SERVICES table published by the PEI Foundation.
+ @param[in] NotifyDescriptor Address of the notification descriptor data structure.
+ @param[in] Ppi Address of the PPI that was installed.
+
+ @retval EFI_SUCCESS The SEC Platform Information PPI could not be re-installed.
+ @return Others An error occurred during PPI re-install.
+
+**/
+EFI_STATUS
+EFIAPI
+SecPlatformInformationPpiNotifyCallback (
+ IN EFI_PEI_SERVICES **PeiServices,
+ IN EFI_PEI_NOTIFY_DESCRIPTOR *NotifyDescriptor,
+ IN VOID *Ppi
+ );
+
+/**
+ This interface re-installs PPIs installed in SecCore from a post-memory PEIM.
+
+ This is to allow a platform that may not support relocation of SecCore to update the PPI instance to a post-memory
+ copy from a PEIM that has been shadowed to permanent memory.
+
+ @retval EFI_SUCCESS The SecCore PPIs were re-installed successfully.
+ @retval Others An error occurred re-installing the SecCore PPIs.
+
+**/
+EFI_STATUS
+EFIAPI
+RepublishSecPpis (
+ VOID
+ );
+
+/**
+ Disables the use of Temporary RAM.
+
+ If present, this service is invoked by the PEI Foundation after
+ the EFI_PEI_PERMANANT_MEMORY_INSTALLED_PPI is installed.
+
+ @retval EFI_SUCCESS Dummy function, alway return this value.
+
+**/
+EFI_STATUS
+EFIAPI
+SecTemporaryRamDonePostMemory (
+ VOID
+ );
+
+/**
+ This service of the EFI_PEI_TEMPORARY_RAM_SUPPORT_PPI that migrates temporary RAM into
+ permanent memory.
+
+ @param PeiServices Pointer to the PEI Services Table.
+ @param TemporaryMemoryBase Source Address in temporary memory from which the SEC or PEIM will copy the
+ Temporary RAM contents.
+ @param PermanentMemoryBase Destination Address in permanent memory into which the SEC or PEIM will copy the
+ Temporary RAM contents.
+ @param CopySize Amount of memory to migrate from temporary to permanent memory.
+
+ @retval EFI_SUCCESS The data was successfully returned.
+ @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER PermanentMemoryBase + CopySize > TemporaryMemoryBase when
+ TemporaryMemoryBase > PermanentMemoryBase.
+
+**/
+EFI_STATUS
+EFIAPI
+SecTemporaryRamSupportPostMemory (
+ IN CONST EFI_PEI_SERVICES **PeiServices,
+ IN EFI_PHYSICAL_ADDRESS TemporaryMemoryBase,
+ IN EFI_PHYSICAL_ADDRESS PermanentMemoryBase,
+ IN UINTN CopySize
+ );
+
+/**
+ This interface conveys performance information out of the Security (SEC) phase into PEI.
+
+ This service is published by the SEC phase. The SEC phase handoff has an optional
+ EFI_PEI_PPI_DESCRIPTOR list as its final argument when control is passed from SEC into the
+ PEI Foundation. As such, if the platform supports collecting performance data in SEC,
+ this information is encapsulated into the data structure abstracted by this service.
+ This information is collected for the boot-strap processor (BSP) on IA-32.
+
+ @param[in] PeiServices The pointer to the PEI Services Table.
+ @param[in] This The pointer to this instance of the PEI_SEC_PERFORMANCE_PPI.
+ @param[out] Performance The pointer to performance data collected in SEC phase.
+
+ @retval EFI_SUCCESS The performance data was successfully returned.
+ @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER The This or Performance is NULL.
+ @retval EFI_NOT_FOUND Can't found the HOB created by the SecMigrationPei component.
+
+**/
+EFI_STATUS
+EFIAPI
+GetPerformancePostMemory (
+ IN CONST EFI_PEI_SERVICES **PeiServices,
+ IN PEI_SEC_PERFORMANCE_PPI *This,
+ OUT FIRMWARE_SEC_PERFORMANCE *Performance
+ );
+
+typedef struct {
+ UINT64 StructureSize;
+ EFI_SEC_PLATFORM_INFORMATION_RECORD *PlatformInformationRecord;
+} SEC_PLATFORM_INFORMATION_CONTEXT;
+
+typedef struct {
+ EFI_HOB_GUID_TYPE Header;
+ UINT8 Revision;
+ UINT8 Reserved[3];
+ FIRMWARE_SEC_PERFORMANCE FirmwareSecPerformance;
+ SEC_PLATFORM_INFORMATION_CONTEXT Context;
+} SEC_PLATFORM_INFORMATION_CONTEXT_HOB;
+
+#endif
diff --git a/UefiCpuPkg/SecMigrationPei/SecMigrationPei.inf b/UefiCpuPkg/SecMigrationPei/SecMigrationPei.inf
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..384d6a96f6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/UefiCpuPkg/SecMigrationPei/SecMigrationPei.inf
@@ -0,0 +1,68 @@
+## @file
+# Migrates SEC structures after permanent memory is installed.
+#
+# Copyright (c) 2019, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.<BR>
+# SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause-Patent
+#
+##
+
+[Defines]
+ INF_VERSION = 0x00010005
+ BASE_NAME = SecMigrationPei
+ MODULE_UNI_FILE = SecMigrationPei.uni
+ FILE_GUID = 58B35361-8922-41BC-B313-EF7ED9ADFDF7
+ MODULE_TYPE = PEIM
+ VERSION_STRING = 1.0
+ ENTRY_POINT = SecMigrationPeiInitialize
+
+#
+# The following information is for reference only and not required by the build tools.
+#
+# VALID_ARCHITECTURES = IA32 X64 EBC
+#
+
+[Sources]
+ SecMigrationPei.c
+ SecMigrationPei.h
+
+[Packages]
+ MdePkg/MdePkg.dec
+ MdeModulePkg/MdeModulePkg.dec
+ UefiCpuPkg/UefiCpuPkg.dec
+
+[LibraryClasses]
+ BaseLib
+ BaseMemoryLib
+ DebugLib
+ HobLib
+ MemoryAllocationLib
+ PeimEntryPoint
+ PeiServicesLib
+ PeiServicesTablePointerLib
+
+[Ppis]
+ ## PRODUCES
+ gRepublishSecPpiPpiGuid
+
+ ## SOMETIMES_PRODUCES
+ gEfiTemporaryRamDonePpiGuid
+
+ ## SOMETIME_PRODUCES
+ gEfiTemporaryRamSupportPpiGuid
+
+ ## SOMETIMES_PRODUCES
+ gPeiSecPerformancePpiGuid
+
+ ## SOMETIMES_CONSUMES
+ ## PRODUCES
+ gEfiSecPlatformInformationPpiGuid
+
+ ## SOMETIMES_CONSUMES
+ ## SOMETIMES_PRODUCES
+ gEfiSecPlatformInformation2PpiGuid
+
+[Pcd]
+ gEfiMdeModulePkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdMigrateTemporaryRamFirmwareVolumes ## CONSUMES
+
+[Depex]
+ TRUE
diff --git a/UefiCpuPkg/SecMigrationPei/SecMigrationPei.uni b/UefiCpuPkg/SecMigrationPei/SecMigrationPei.uni
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..62c2064ba2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/UefiCpuPkg/SecMigrationPei/SecMigrationPei.uni
@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
+// /** @file
+// Migrates SEC structures after permanent memory is installed.
+//
+// Copyright (c) 2019, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.<BR>
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause-Patent
+//
+// **/
+
+
+#string STR_MODULE_ABSTRACT #language en-US "Migrates SEC structures after permanent memory is installed"
+
+#string STR_MODULE_DESCRIPTION #language en-US "Migrates SEC structures after permanent memory is installed."
+
diff --git a/UefiCpuPkg/UefiCpuPkg.dec b/UefiCpuPkg/UefiCpuPkg.dec
index 762badf5d2..8b2e03d49d 100644
--- a/UefiCpuPkg/UefiCpuPkg.dec
+++ b/UefiCpuPkg/UefiCpuPkg.dec
@@ -84,6 +84,9 @@
## Include/Ppi/ShadowMicrocode.h
gEdkiiPeiShadowMicrocodePpiGuid = { 0x430f6965, 0x9a69, 0x41c5, { 0x93, 0xed, 0x8b, 0xf0, 0x64, 0x35, 0xc1, 0xc6 }}
+ ## Include/Ppi/RepublishSecPpi.h
+ gRepublishSecPpiPpiGuid = { 0x27a71b1e, 0x73ee, 0x43d6, { 0xac, 0xe3, 0x52, 0x1a, 0x2d, 0xc5, 0xd0, 0x92 }}
+
[PcdsFeatureFlag]
## Indicates if SMM Profile will be enabled.
# If enabled, instruction executions in and data accesses to memory outside of SMRAM will be logged.
diff --git a/UefiCpuPkg/UefiCpuPkg.dsc b/UefiCpuPkg/UefiCpuPkg.dsc
index afa3041282..964720048d 100644
--- a/UefiCpuPkg/UefiCpuPkg.dsc
+++ b/UefiCpuPkg/UefiCpuPkg.dsc
@@ -146,6 +146,7 @@
UefiCpuPkg/PiSmmCommunication/PiSmmCommunicationPei.inf
UefiCpuPkg/PiSmmCommunication/PiSmmCommunicationSmm.inf
UefiCpuPkg/SecCore/SecCore.inf
+ UefiCpuPkg/SecMigrationPei/SecMigrationPei.inf
UefiCpuPkg/PiSmmCpuDxeSmm/PiSmmCpuDxeSmm.inf
UefiCpuPkg/PiSmmCpuDxeSmm/PiSmmCpuDxeSmm.inf {
<Defines>
--
2.27.0

1339
0029-MdeModulePkg-PeiCore-Enable-T-RAM-evacuation-in-PeiC.patch Normal file
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117
0030-SecurityPkg-Tcg2Pei-Use-Migrated-FV-Info-Hob-for-cal.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,117 @@
From 012809cdca4b876e675cbd181fee213133858a5e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Guomin Jiang <guomin.jiang@intel.com>
Date: Mon, 29 Jun 2020 14:50:21 +0800
Subject: [PATCH] SecurityPkg/Tcg2Pei: Use Migrated FV Info Hob for calculating
hash (CVE-2019-11098)
REF:https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1614
When we allocate pool to save rebased the PEIMs, the address will change
randomly, therefore the hash will change and result PCR0 change as well.
To avoid this, we save the raw PEIMs and use it to calculate hash.
The Tcg2Pei calculate the hash and it use the Migrated FV Info.
Cc: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Cc: Jian J Wang <jian.j.wang@intel.com>
Cc: Chao Zhang <chao.b.zhang@intel.com>
Cc: Qi Zhang <qi1.zhang@intel.com>
Cc: Rahul Kumar <rahul1.kumar@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Guomin Jiang <guomin.jiang@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Jian J Wang <jian.j.wang@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Qi Zhang <qi1.zhang@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Liming Gao <liming.gao@intel.com>
---
SecurityPkg/Tcg/Tcg2Pei/Tcg2Pei.c | 31 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++---
SecurityPkg/Tcg/Tcg2Pei/Tcg2Pei.inf | 1 +
2 files changed, 29 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/SecurityPkg/Tcg/Tcg2Pei/Tcg2Pei.c b/SecurityPkg/Tcg/Tcg2Pei/Tcg2Pei.c
index 4852d86..651a60c 100644
--- a/SecurityPkg/Tcg/Tcg2Pei/Tcg2Pei.c
+++ b/SecurityPkg/Tcg/Tcg2Pei/Tcg2Pei.c
@@ -21,6 +21,7 @@ SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause-Patent
#include <Guid/TcgEventHob.h>
#include <Guid/MeasuredFvHob.h>
#include <Guid/TpmInstance.h>
+#include <Guid/MigratedFvInfo.h>
#include <Library/DebugLib.h>
#include <Library/BaseMemoryLib.h>
@@ -536,6 +537,10 @@ MeasureFvImage (
EDKII_PEI_FIRMWARE_VOLUME_INFO_PREHASHED_FV_PPI *PrehashedFvPpi;
HASH_INFO *PreHashInfo;
UINT32 HashAlgoMask;
+ EFI_PHYSICAL_ADDRESS FvOrgBase;
+ EFI_PHYSICAL_ADDRESS FvDataBase;
+ EFI_PEI_HOB_POINTERS Hob;
+ EDKII_MIGRATED_FV_INFO *MigratedFvInfo;
//
// Check Excluded FV list
@@ -621,6 +626,26 @@ MeasureFvImage (
Instance++;
} while (!EFI_ERROR(Status));
+ //
+ // Search the matched migration FV info
+ //
+ FvOrgBase = FvBase;
+ FvDataBase = FvBase;
+ Hob.Raw = GetFirstGuidHob (&gEdkiiMigratedFvInfoGuid);
+ while (Hob.Raw != NULL) {
+ MigratedFvInfo = GET_GUID_HOB_DATA (Hob);
+ if ((MigratedFvInfo->FvNewBase == (UINT32) FvBase) && (MigratedFvInfo->FvLength == (UINT32) FvLength)) {
+ //
+ // Found the migrated FV info
+ //
+ FvOrgBase = (EFI_PHYSICAL_ADDRESS) (UINTN) MigratedFvInfo->FvOrgBase;
+ FvDataBase = (EFI_PHYSICAL_ADDRESS) (UINTN) MigratedFvInfo->FvDataBase;
+ break;
+ }
+ Hob.Raw = GET_NEXT_HOB (Hob);
+ Hob.Raw = GetNextGuidHob (&gEdkiiMigratedFvInfoGuid, Hob.Raw);
+ }
+
//
// Init the log event for FV measurement
//
@@ -631,13 +656,13 @@ MeasureFvImage (
if (FvName != NULL) {
AsciiSPrint ((CHAR8 *)FvBlob2.BlobDescription, sizeof(FvBlob2.BlobDescription), "Fv(%g)", FvName);
}
- FvBlob2.BlobBase = FvBase;
+ FvBlob2.BlobBase = FvOrgBase;
FvBlob2.BlobLength = FvLength;
TcgEventHdr.EventType = EV_EFI_PLATFORM_FIRMWARE_BLOB2;
TcgEventHdr.EventSize = sizeof (FvBlob2);
EventData = &FvBlob2;
} else {
- FvBlob.BlobBase = FvBase;
+ FvBlob.BlobBase = FvOrgBase;
FvBlob.BlobLength = FvLength;
TcgEventHdr.PCRIndex = 0;
TcgEventHdr.EventType = EV_EFI_PLATFORM_FIRMWARE_BLOB;
@@ -672,7 +697,7 @@ MeasureFvImage (
//
Status = HashLogExtendEvent (
0,
- (UINT8*) (UINTN) FvBase, // HashData
+ (UINT8*) (UINTN) FvDataBase, // HashData
(UINTN) FvLength, // HashDataLen
&TcgEventHdr, // EventHdr
EventData // EventData
diff --git a/SecurityPkg/Tcg/Tcg2Pei/Tcg2Pei.inf b/SecurityPkg/Tcg/Tcg2Pei/Tcg2Pei.inf
index 3d361e8..367df21 100644
--- a/SecurityPkg/Tcg/Tcg2Pei/Tcg2Pei.inf
+++ b/SecurityPkg/Tcg/Tcg2Pei/Tcg2Pei.inf
@@ -63,6 +63,7 @@
gTcgEvent2EntryHobGuid ## PRODUCES ## HOB
gEfiTpmDeviceInstanceNoneGuid ## SOMETIMES_PRODUCES ## GUID # TPM device identifier
gEfiTpmDeviceInstanceTpm12Guid ## SOMETIMES_PRODUCES ## GUID # TPM device identifier
+ gEdkiiMigratedFvInfoGuid ## SOMETIMES_CONSUMES ## HOB
[Ppis]
gEfiPeiFirmwareVolumeInfoPpiGuid ## SOMETIMES_CONSUMES ## NOTIFY
--
2.27.0

74
0031-MdeModulePkg-Add-new-PCD-to-control-the-evacuate-tem.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,74 @@
From 1facb8fdef6389f390b66da6d8304f54cc93104a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Guomin Jiang <guomin.jiang@intel.com>
Date: Wed, 8 Jul 2020 09:33:46 +0800
Subject: [PATCH] MdeModulePkg: Add new PCD to control the evacuate temporary
memory feature (CVE-2019-11098)
REF:https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1614
The security researcher found that we can get control after NEM disable.
The reason is that the flash content reside in NEM at startup and the
code will get the content from flash directly after disable NEM.
To avoid this vulnerability, the feature will copy the PEIMs from
temporary memory to permanent memory and only execute the code in
permanent memory.
The vulnerability is exist in physical platform and haven't report in
virtual platform, so the virtual can disable the feature currently.
When enable the PcdMigrateTemporaryRamFirmwareVolumes, always shadow
all PEIMs no matter the condition of PcdShadowPeimOnBoot or
PcdShadowPeimOnS3Boot.
Cc: Jian J Wang <jian.j.wang@intel.com>
Cc: Hao A Wu <hao.a.wu@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Guomin Jiang <guomin.jiang@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Liming Gao <liming.gao@intel.com>
Acked-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
---
MdeModulePkg/MdeModulePkg.dec | 9 +++++++++
MdeModulePkg/MdeModulePkg.uni | 6 ++++++
2 files changed, 15 insertions(+)
diff --git a/MdeModulePkg/MdeModulePkg.dec b/MdeModulePkg/MdeModulePkg.dec
index 843e963ad3..45874e9c82 100644
--- a/MdeModulePkg/MdeModulePkg.dec
+++ b/MdeModulePkg/MdeModulePkg.dec
@@ -1220,6 +1220,15 @@
# @Prompt Shadow Peim and PeiCore on boot
gEfiMdeModulePkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdShadowPeimOnBoot|TRUE|BOOLEAN|0x30001029
+ ## Enable the feature that evacuate temporary memory to permanent memory or not<BR><BR>
+ # Set FALSE as default, if the developer need this feature to avoid this vulnerability, please
+ # enable it to shadow all PEIMs no matter the behavior controled by PcdShadowPeimOnBoot or
+ # PcdShadowPeimOnS3Boot<BR>
+ # TRUE - Evacuate temporary memory, the actions include copy memory, convert PPI pointers and so on.<BR>
+ # FALSE - Do nothing, for example, no copy memory, no convert PPI pointers and so on.<BR>
+ # @Prompt Evacuate temporary memory to permanent memory
+ gEfiMdeModulePkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdMigrateTemporaryRamFirmwareVolumes|FALSE|BOOLEAN|0x3000102A
+
## The mask is used to control memory profile behavior.<BR><BR>
# BIT0 - Enable UEFI memory profile.<BR>
# BIT1 - Enable SMRAM profile.<BR>
diff --git a/MdeModulePkg/MdeModulePkg.uni b/MdeModulePkg/MdeModulePkg.uni
index 2007e0596c..5235dee561 100644
--- a/MdeModulePkg/MdeModulePkg.uni
+++ b/MdeModulePkg/MdeModulePkg.uni
@@ -214,6 +214,12 @@
"TRUE - Shadow PEIM on S3 boot path after memory is ready.<BR>\n"
"FALSE - Not shadow PEIM on S3 boot path after memory is ready.<BR>"
+#string STR_gEfiMdeModulePkgTokenSpaceGuid_PcdMigrateTemporaryRamFirmwareVolumes_HELP #language en-US "Enable the feature that evacuate temporary memory to permanent memory or not.<BR><BR>\n"
+ "It will allocate page to save the temporary PEIMs resided in NEM(or CAR) to the permanent memory and change all pointers pointed to the NEM(or CAR) to permanent memory.<BR><BR>\n"
+ "After then, there are no pointer pointed to NEM(or CAR) and TOCTOU volnerability can be avoid.<BR><BR>\n"
+
+#string STR_gEfiMdeModulePkgTokenSpaceGuid_PcdMigrateTemporaryRamFirmwareVolumes_PROMPT #language en-US "Enable the feature that evacuate temporary memory to permanent memory or not"
+
#string STR_gEfiMdeModulePkgTokenSpaceGuid_PcdAcpiDefaultOemId_PROMPT #language en-US "Default OEM ID for ACPI table creation"
#string STR_gEfiMdeModulePkgTokenSpaceGuid_PcdAcpiDefaultOemId_HELP #language en-US "Default OEM ID for ACPI table creation, its length must be 0x6 bytes to follow ACPI specification."
--
2.27.0

170
0032-MdeModulePkg-Core-Create-Migrated-FV-Info-Hob-for-ca.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,170 @@
From 4b68cef04c70d8fd8a9bf745fc649c84d67531e8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Guomin Jiang <guomin.jiang@intel.com>
Date: Mon, 29 Jun 2020 13:52:02 +0800
Subject: [PATCH] MdeModulePkg/Core: Create Migrated FV Info Hob for
calculating hash (CVE-2019-11098)
REF:https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1614
When we allocate pool to save the rebased PEIMs, the address will change
randomly, therefore the hash will change and result PCR0 change as well.
To avoid this, we save the raw PEIMs and use it to calculate hash.
The MigratedFvInfo HOB will never produce when
PcdMigrateTemporaryRamFirmwareVolumes is FALSE, because the PCD control
the total feature.
Cc: Jian J Wang <jian.j.wang@intel.com>
Cc: Hao A Wu <hao.a.wu@intel.com>
Cc: Dandan Bi <dandan.bi@intel.com>
Cc: Liming Gao <liming.gao@intel.com>
Cc: Debkumar De <debkumar.de@intel.com>
Cc: Harry Han <harry.han@intel.com>
Cc: Catharine West <catharine.west@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Guomin Jiang <guomin.jiang@intel.com>
Acked-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Jian J Wang <jian.j.wang@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Liming Gao <liming.gao@intel.com>
---
MdeModulePkg/Core/Pei/Dispatcher/Dispatcher.c | 28 +++++++++++++++++++
MdeModulePkg/Core/Pei/PeiMain.h | 1 +
MdeModulePkg/Core/Pei/PeiMain.inf | 1 +
MdeModulePkg/Include/Guid/MigratedFvInfo.h | 22 +++++++++++++++
MdeModulePkg/MdeModulePkg.dec | 3 ++
5 files changed, 55 insertions(+)
create mode 100644 MdeModulePkg/Include/Guid/MigratedFvInfo.h
diff --git a/MdeModulePkg/Core/Pei/Dispatcher/Dispatcher.c b/MdeModulePkg/Core/Pei/Dispatcher/Dispatcher.c
index 5bc0f8674d..b9a279ec73 100644
--- a/MdeModulePkg/Core/Pei/Dispatcher/Dispatcher.c
+++ b/MdeModulePkg/Core/Pei/Dispatcher/Dispatcher.c
@@ -1234,10 +1234,12 @@ EvacuateTempRam (
EFI_FIRMWARE_VOLUME_HEADER *FvHeader;
EFI_FIRMWARE_VOLUME_HEADER *ChildFvHeader;
EFI_FIRMWARE_VOLUME_HEADER *MigratedFvHeader;
+ EFI_FIRMWARE_VOLUME_HEADER *RawDataFvHeader;
EFI_FIRMWARE_VOLUME_HEADER *MigratedChildFvHeader;
PEI_CORE_FV_HANDLE PeiCoreFvHandle;
EFI_PEI_CORE_FV_LOCATION_PPI *PeiCoreFvLocationPpi;
+ EDKII_MIGRATED_FV_INFO MigratedFvInfo;
ASSERT (Private->PeiMemoryInstalled);
@@ -1274,6 +1276,9 @@ EvacuateTempRam (
(((EFI_PHYSICAL_ADDRESS)(UINTN) FvHeader + (FvHeader->FvLength - 1)) < Private->FreePhysicalMemoryTop)
)
) {
+ //
+ // Allocate page to save the rebased PEIMs, the PEIMs will get dispatched later.
+ //
Status = PeiServicesAllocatePages (
EfiBootServicesCode,
EFI_SIZE_TO_PAGES ((UINTN) FvHeader->FvLength),
@@ -1281,6 +1286,17 @@ EvacuateTempRam (
);
ASSERT_EFI_ERROR (Status);
+ //
+ // Allocate pool to save the raw PEIMs, which is used to keep consistent context across
+ // multiple boot and PCR0 will keep the same no matter if the address of allocated page is changed.
+ //
+ Status = PeiServicesAllocatePages (
+ EfiBootServicesCode,
+ EFI_SIZE_TO_PAGES ((UINTN) FvHeader->FvLength),
+ (EFI_PHYSICAL_ADDRESS *) &RawDataFvHeader
+ );
+ ASSERT_EFI_ERROR (Status);
+
DEBUG ((
DEBUG_VERBOSE,
" Migrating FV[%d] from 0x%08X to 0x%08X\n",
@@ -1289,7 +1305,19 @@ EvacuateTempRam (
(UINTN) MigratedFvHeader
));
+ //
+ // Copy the context to the rebased pages and raw pages, and create hob to save the
+ // information. The MigratedFvInfo HOB will never be produced when
+ // PcdMigrateTemporaryRamFirmwareVolumes is FALSE, because the PCD control the
+ // feature.
+ //
CopyMem (MigratedFvHeader, FvHeader, (UINTN) FvHeader->FvLength);
+ CopyMem (RawDataFvHeader, MigratedFvHeader, (UINTN) FvHeader->FvLength);
+ MigratedFvInfo.FvOrgBase = (UINT32) (UINTN) FvHeader;
+ MigratedFvInfo.FvNewBase = (UINT32) (UINTN) MigratedFvHeader;
+ MigratedFvInfo.FvDataBase = (UINT32) (UINTN) RawDataFvHeader;
+ MigratedFvInfo.FvLength = (UINT32) (UINTN) FvHeader->FvLength;
+ BuildGuidDataHob (&gEdkiiMigratedFvInfoGuid, &MigratedFvInfo, sizeof (MigratedFvInfo));
//
// Migrate any children for this FV now
diff --git a/MdeModulePkg/Core/Pei/PeiMain.h b/MdeModulePkg/Core/Pei/PeiMain.h
index 6d95a5d32c..c27e8fc33b 100644
--- a/MdeModulePkg/Core/Pei/PeiMain.h
+++ b/MdeModulePkg/Core/Pei/PeiMain.h
@@ -44,6 +44,7 @@ SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause-Patent
#include <Guid/FirmwareFileSystem2.h>
#include <Guid/FirmwareFileSystem3.h>
#include <Guid/AprioriFileName.h>
+#include <Guid/MigratedFvInfo.h>
///
/// It is an FFS type extension used for PeiFindFileEx. It indicates current
diff --git a/MdeModulePkg/Core/Pei/PeiMain.inf b/MdeModulePkg/Core/Pei/PeiMain.inf
index 5b36d516b3..0cf357371a 100644
--- a/MdeModulePkg/Core/Pei/PeiMain.inf
+++ b/MdeModulePkg/Core/Pei/PeiMain.inf
@@ -77,6 +77,7 @@
## CONSUMES ## GUID # Used to compare with FV's file system GUID and get the FV's file system format
gEfiFirmwareFileSystem3Guid
gStatusCodeCallbackGuid
+ gEdkiiMigratedFvInfoGuid ## SOMETIMES_PRODUCES ## HOB
[Ppis]
gEfiPeiStatusCodePpiGuid ## SOMETIMES_CONSUMES # PeiReportStatusService is not ready if this PPI doesn't exist
diff --git a/MdeModulePkg/Include/Guid/MigratedFvInfo.h b/MdeModulePkg/Include/Guid/MigratedFvInfo.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..061c17ed0e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/MdeModulePkg/Include/Guid/MigratedFvInfo.h
@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
+/** @file
+ Migrated FV information
+
+Copyright (c) 2020, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.<BR>
+SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause-Patent
+
+**/
+
+#ifndef __EDKII_MIGRATED_FV_INFO_GUID_H__
+#define __EDKII_MIGRATED_FV_INFO_GUID_H__
+
+typedef struct {
+ UINT32 FvOrgBase; // original FV address
+ UINT32 FvNewBase; // new FV address
+ UINT32 FvDataBase; // original FV data
+ UINT32 FvLength; // Fv Length
+} EDKII_MIGRATED_FV_INFO;
+
+extern EFI_GUID gEdkiiMigratedFvInfoGuid;
+
+#endif // #ifndef __EDKII_MIGRATED_FV_INFO_GUID_H__
+
diff --git a/MdeModulePkg/MdeModulePkg.dec b/MdeModulePkg/MdeModulePkg.dec
index 45874e9c82..d7572eedd1 100644
--- a/MdeModulePkg/MdeModulePkg.dec
+++ b/MdeModulePkg/MdeModulePkg.dec
@@ -389,6 +389,9 @@
## GUID indicates the capsule is to store Capsule On Disk file names.
gEdkiiCapsuleOnDiskNameGuid = { 0x98c80a4f, 0xe16b, 0x4d11, { 0x93, 0x9a, 0xab, 0xe5, 0x61, 0x26, 0x3, 0x30 } }
+ ## Include/Guid/MigratedFvInfo.h
+ gEdkiiMigratedFvInfoGuid = { 0xc1ab12f7, 0x74aa, 0x408d, { 0xa2, 0xf4, 0xc6, 0xce, 0xfd, 0x17, 0x98, 0x71 } }
+
[Ppis]
## Include/Ppi/AtaController.h
gPeiAtaControllerPpiGuid = { 0xa45e60d1, 0xc719, 0x44aa, { 0xb0, 0x7a, 0xaa, 0x77, 0x7f, 0x85, 0x90, 0x6d }}
--
2.27.0

137
0033-UefiCpuPkg-CpuMpPei-Add-GDT-migration-support-CVE-20.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,137 @@
From 60b12e69fb1c8c7180fdda92f008248b9ec83db1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Michael Kubacki <michael.a.kubacki@intel.com>
Date: Sun, 14 Apr 2019 11:48:07 +0800
Subject: [PATCH] UefiCpuPkg/CpuMpPei: Add GDT migration support
(CVE-2019-11098)
REF:https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1614
Moves the GDT to permanent memory in a memory discovered
callback. This is done to ensure the GDT authenticated in
pre-memory is not fetched from outside a verified location
after the permanent memory transition.
Cc: Eric Dong <eric.dong@intel.com>
Cc: Ray Ni <ray.ni@intel.com>
Cc: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Cc: Rahul Kumar <rahul1.kumar@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Kubacki <michael.a.kubacki@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Jian J Wang <jian.j.wang@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Liming Gao <liming.gao@intel.com>
---
UefiCpuPkg/CpuMpPei/CpuMpPei.c | 37 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
UefiCpuPkg/CpuMpPei/CpuMpPei.h | 12 +++++++++++
UefiCpuPkg/CpuMpPei/CpuMpPei.inf | 1 +
UefiCpuPkg/CpuMpPei/CpuPaging.c | 12 +++++++++--
4 files changed, 60 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/UefiCpuPkg/CpuMpPei/CpuMpPei.c b/UefiCpuPkg/CpuMpPei/CpuMpPei.c
index 07ccbe7c6a..d07540cf74 100644
--- a/UefiCpuPkg/CpuMpPei/CpuMpPei.c
+++ b/UefiCpuPkg/CpuMpPei/CpuMpPei.c
@@ -429,6 +429,43 @@ GetGdtr (
AsmReadGdtr ((IA32_DESCRIPTOR *)Buffer);
}
+/**
+ Migrates the Global Descriptor Table (GDT) to permanent memory.
+
+ @retval EFI_SUCCESS The GDT was migrated successfully.
+ @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES The GDT could not be migrated due to lack of available memory.
+
+**/
+EFI_STATUS
+MigrateGdt (
+ VOID
+ )
+{
+ EFI_STATUS Status;
+ UINTN GdtBufferSize;
+ IA32_DESCRIPTOR Gdtr;
+ VOID *GdtBuffer;
+
+ AsmReadGdtr ((IA32_DESCRIPTOR *) &Gdtr);
+ GdtBufferSize = sizeof (IA32_SEGMENT_DESCRIPTOR) -1 + Gdtr.Limit + 1;
+
+ Status = PeiServicesAllocatePool (
+ GdtBufferSize,
+ &GdtBuffer
+ );
+ ASSERT (GdtBuffer != NULL);
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
+ return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;
+ }
+
+ GdtBuffer = ALIGN_POINTER (GdtBuffer, sizeof (IA32_SEGMENT_DESCRIPTOR));
+ CopyMem (GdtBuffer, (VOID *) Gdtr.Base, Gdtr.Limit + 1);
+ Gdtr.Base = (UINTN) GdtBuffer;
+ AsmWriteGdtr (&Gdtr);
+
+ return EFI_SUCCESS;
+}
+
/**
Initializes CPU exceptions handlers for the sake of stack switch requirement.
diff --git a/UefiCpuPkg/CpuMpPei/CpuMpPei.h b/UefiCpuPkg/CpuMpPei/CpuMpPei.h
index 7d5c527d60..309478cbe1 100644
--- a/UefiCpuPkg/CpuMpPei/CpuMpPei.h
+++ b/UefiCpuPkg/CpuMpPei/CpuMpPei.h
@@ -397,6 +397,18 @@ SecPlatformInformation2 (
OUT EFI_SEC_PLATFORM_INFORMATION_RECORD2 *PlatformInformationRecord2
);
+/**
+ Migrates the Global Descriptor Table (GDT) to permanent memory.
+
+ @retval EFI_SUCCESS The GDT was migrated successfully.
+ @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES The GDT could not be migrated due to lack of available memory.
+
+**/
+EFI_STATUS
+MigrateGdt (
+ VOID
+ );
+
/**
Initializes MP and exceptions handlers.
diff --git a/UefiCpuPkg/CpuMpPei/CpuMpPei.inf b/UefiCpuPkg/CpuMpPei/CpuMpPei.inf
index caead3ce34..f4d11b861f 100644
--- a/UefiCpuPkg/CpuMpPei/CpuMpPei.inf
+++ b/UefiCpuPkg/CpuMpPei/CpuMpPei.inf
@@ -63,6 +63,7 @@
gUefiCpuPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdCpuStackSwitchExceptionList ## SOMETIMES_CONSUMES
gUefiCpuPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdCpuKnownGoodStackSize ## SOMETIMES_CONSUMES
gUefiCpuPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdCpuApStackSize ## SOMETIMES_CONSUMES
+ gEfiMdeModulePkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdMigrateTemporaryRamFirmwareVolumes ## CONSUMES
[Depex]
TRUE
diff --git a/UefiCpuPkg/CpuMpPei/CpuPaging.c b/UefiCpuPkg/CpuMpPei/CpuPaging.c
index a462e7ee1e..3bf0574b34 100644
--- a/UefiCpuPkg/CpuMpPei/CpuPaging.c
+++ b/UefiCpuPkg/CpuMpPei/CpuPaging.c
@@ -602,8 +602,16 @@ MemoryDiscoveredPpiNotifyCallback (
IN VOID *Ppi
)
{
- EFI_STATUS Status;
- BOOLEAN InitStackGuard;
+ EFI_STATUS Status;
+ BOOLEAN InitStackGuard;
+ BOOLEAN InterruptState;
+
+ if (PcdGetBool (PcdMigrateTemporaryRamFirmwareVolumes)) {
+ InterruptState = SaveAndDisableInterrupts ();
+ Status = MigrateGdt ();
+ ASSERT_EFI_ERROR (Status);
+ SetInterruptState (InterruptState);
+ }
//
// Paging must be setup first. Otherwise the exception TSS setup during MP
--
2.27.0

106
0034-UefiCpuPkg-CpuMpPei-Enable-paging-and-set-NP-flag-to.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,106 @@
From d7c9de51d249ee101b4d90357a4272b36c831047 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Guomin Jiang <guomin.jiang@intel.com>
Date: Thu, 2 Jul 2020 13:03:34 +0800
Subject: [PATCH] UefiCpuPkg/CpuMpPei: Enable paging and set NP flag to avoid
TOCTOU (CVE-2019-11098)
REF:https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1614
To avoid the TOCTOU, enable paging and set Not Present flag so when
access any code in the flash range, it will trigger #PF exception.
Cc: Eric Dong <eric.dong@intel.com>
Cc: Ray Ni <ray.ni@intel.com>
Cc: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Cc: Rahul Kumar <rahul1.kumar@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Guomin Jiang <guomin.jiang@intel.com>
Acked-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Jian J Wang <jian.j.wang@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Liming Gao <liming.gao@intel.com>
---
UefiCpuPkg/CpuMpPei/CpuMpPei.inf | 3 +++
UefiCpuPkg/CpuMpPei/CpuPaging.c | 32 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----
2 files changed, 30 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
diff --git a/UefiCpuPkg/CpuMpPei/CpuMpPei.inf b/UefiCpuPkg/CpuMpPei/CpuMpPei.inf
index f4d11b861f..7e511325d8 100644
--- a/UefiCpuPkg/CpuMpPei/CpuMpPei.inf
+++ b/UefiCpuPkg/CpuMpPei/CpuMpPei.inf
@@ -46,6 +46,9 @@
BaseMemoryLib
CpuLib
+[Guids]
+ gEdkiiMigratedFvInfoGuid ## SOMETIMES_CONSUMES ## HOB
+
[Ppis]
gEfiPeiMpServicesPpiGuid ## PRODUCES
gEfiSecPlatformInformationPpiGuid ## SOMETIMES_CONSUMES
diff --git a/UefiCpuPkg/CpuMpPei/CpuPaging.c b/UefiCpuPkg/CpuMpPei/CpuPaging.c
index 3bf0574b34..8ab7dfcce3 100644
--- a/UefiCpuPkg/CpuMpPei/CpuPaging.c
+++ b/UefiCpuPkg/CpuMpPei/CpuPaging.c
@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@ SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause-Patent
#include <Library/MemoryAllocationLib.h>
#include <Library/CpuLib.h>
#include <Library/BaseLib.h>
+#include <Guid/MigratedFvInfo.h>
#include "CpuMpPei.h"
@@ -602,9 +603,11 @@ MemoryDiscoveredPpiNotifyCallback (
IN VOID *Ppi
)
{
- EFI_STATUS Status;
- BOOLEAN InitStackGuard;
- BOOLEAN InterruptState;
+ EFI_STATUS Status;
+ BOOLEAN InitStackGuard;
+ BOOLEAN InterruptState;
+ EDKII_MIGRATED_FV_INFO *MigratedFvInfo;
+ EFI_PEI_HOB_POINTERS Hob;
if (PcdGetBool (PcdMigrateTemporaryRamFirmwareVolumes)) {
InterruptState = SaveAndDisableInterrupts ();
@@ -619,9 +622,14 @@ MemoryDiscoveredPpiNotifyCallback (
// the task switch (for the sake of stack switch).
//
InitStackGuard = FALSE;
- if (IsIa32PaeSupported () && PcdGetBool (PcdCpuStackGuard)) {
+ Hob.Raw = NULL;
+ if (IsIa32PaeSupported ()) {
+ Hob.Raw = GetFirstGuidHob (&gEdkiiMigratedFvInfoGuid);
+ InitStackGuard = PcdGetBool (PcdCpuStackGuard);
+ }
+
+ if (InitStackGuard || Hob.Raw != NULL) {
EnablePaging ();
- InitStackGuard = TRUE;
}
Status = InitializeCpuMpWorker ((CONST EFI_PEI_SERVICES **)PeiServices);
@@ -631,6 +639,20 @@ MemoryDiscoveredPpiNotifyCallback (
SetupStackGuardPage ();
}
+ while (Hob.Raw != NULL) {
+ MigratedFvInfo = GET_GUID_HOB_DATA (Hob);
+
+ //
+ // Enable #PF exception, so if the code access SPI after disable NEM, it will generate
+ // the exception to avoid potential vulnerability.
+ //
+ ConvertMemoryPageAttributes (MigratedFvInfo->FvOrgBase, MigratedFvInfo->FvLength, 0);
+
+ Hob.Raw = GET_NEXT_HOB (Hob);
+ Hob.Raw = GetNextGuidHob (&gEdkiiMigratedFvInfoGuid, Hob.Raw);
+ }
+ CpuFlushTlb ();
+
return Status;
}
--
2.27.0

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From ffde22468e2f0e93b51f97b801e6c7a181088c61 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Guomin Jiang <guomin.jiang@intel.com>
Date: Wed, 8 Jul 2020 16:01:14 +0800
Subject: [PATCH] SecurityPkg/TcgPei: Use Migrated FV Info Hob for calculating
hash (CVE-2019-11098)
REF:https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1614
When we allocate pool to save rebased the PEIMs, the address will change
randomly, therefore the hash will change and result PCR0 change as well.
To avoid this, we save the raw PEIMs and use it to calculate hash.
The TcgPei calculate the hash and it use the Migrated FV Info.
Cc: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Cc: Jian J Wang <jian.j.wang@intel.com>
Cc: Chao Zhang <chao.b.zhang@intel.com>
Cc: Qi Zhang <qi1.zhang@intel.com>
Cc: Rahul Kumar <rahul1.kumar@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Guomin Jiang <guomin.jiang@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Jian J Wang <jian.j.wang@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Qi Zhang <qi1.zhang@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Liming Gao <liming.gao@intel.com>
---
SecurityPkg/Tcg/TcgPei/TcgPei.c | 29 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
SecurityPkg/Tcg/TcgPei/TcgPei.inf | 1 +
2 files changed, 28 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/SecurityPkg/Tcg/TcgPei/TcgPei.c b/SecurityPkg/Tcg/TcgPei/TcgPei.c
index a9a808c..9701bfe 100644
--- a/SecurityPkg/Tcg/TcgPei/TcgPei.c
+++ b/SecurityPkg/Tcg/TcgPei/TcgPei.c
@@ -21,6 +21,7 @@ SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause-Patent
#include <Guid/TcgEventHob.h>
#include <Guid/MeasuredFvHob.h>
#include <Guid/TpmInstance.h>
+#include <Guid/MigratedFvInfo.h>
#include <Library/DebugLib.h>
#include <Library/BaseMemoryLib.h>
@@ -378,6 +379,10 @@ MeasureFvImage (
EFI_STATUS Status;
EFI_PLATFORM_FIRMWARE_BLOB FvBlob;
TCG_PCR_EVENT_HDR TcgEventHdr;
+ EFI_PHYSICAL_ADDRESS FvOrgBase;
+ EFI_PHYSICAL_ADDRESS FvDataBase;
+ EFI_PEI_HOB_POINTERS Hob;
+ EDKII_MIGRATED_FV_INFO *MigratedFvInfo;
//
// Check if it is in Excluded FV list
@@ -401,10 +406,30 @@ MeasureFvImage (
}
}
+ //
+ // Search the matched migration FV info
+ //
+ FvOrgBase = FvBase;
+ FvDataBase = FvBase;
+ Hob.Raw = GetFirstGuidHob (&gEdkiiMigratedFvInfoGuid);
+ while (Hob.Raw != NULL) {
+ MigratedFvInfo = GET_GUID_HOB_DATA (Hob);
+ if ((MigratedFvInfo->FvNewBase == (UINT32) FvBase) && (MigratedFvInfo->FvLength == (UINT32) FvLength)) {
+ //
+ // Found the migrated FV info
+ //
+ FvOrgBase = (EFI_PHYSICAL_ADDRESS) (UINTN) MigratedFvInfo->FvOrgBase;
+ FvDataBase = (EFI_PHYSICAL_ADDRESS) (UINTN) MigratedFvInfo->FvDataBase;
+ break;
+ }
+ Hob.Raw = GET_NEXT_HOB (Hob);
+ Hob.Raw = GetNextGuidHob (&gEdkiiMigratedFvInfoGuid, Hob.Raw);
+ }
+
//
// Measure and record the FV to the TPM
//
- FvBlob.BlobBase = FvBase;
+ FvBlob.BlobBase = FvOrgBase;
FvBlob.BlobLength = FvLength;
DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, "The FV which is measured by TcgPei starts at: 0x%x\n", FvBlob.BlobBase));
@@ -416,7 +441,7 @@ MeasureFvImage (
Status = HashLogExtendEvent (
(EFI_PEI_SERVICES **) GetPeiServicesTablePointer(),
- (UINT8*) (UINTN) FvBlob.BlobBase,
+ (UINT8*) (UINTN) FvDataBase,
(UINTN) FvBlob.BlobLength,
&TcgEventHdr,
(UINT8*) &FvBlob
diff --git a/SecurityPkg/Tcg/TcgPei/TcgPei.inf b/SecurityPkg/Tcg/TcgPei/TcgPei.inf
index c0bff6e..6d1951f 100644
--- a/SecurityPkg/Tcg/TcgPei/TcgPei.inf
+++ b/SecurityPkg/Tcg/TcgPei/TcgPei.inf
@@ -58,6 +58,7 @@
gTpmErrorHobGuid ## SOMETIMES_PRODUCES ## HOB
gMeasuredFvHobGuid ## PRODUCES ## HOB
gEfiTpmDeviceInstanceTpm12Guid ## PRODUCES ## GUID # TPM device identifier
+ gEdkiiMigratedFvInfoGuid ## SOMETIMES_CONSUMES ## HOB
[Ppis]
gPeiLockPhysicalPresencePpiGuid ## SOMETIMES_CONSUMES ## NOTIFY
--
2.27.0

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0036-UefiCpuPkg-Move-MigrateGdt-from-DiscoverMemory-to-Te.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,191 @@
From f6ec1dd34fb6b9757b5ead465ee2ea20c182b0ac Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Guomin Jiang <guomin.jiang@intel.com>
Date: Wed, 13 Jan 2021 18:08:09 +0800
Subject: [PATCH] UefiCpuPkg: Move MigrateGdt from DiscoverMemory to
TempRamDone. (CVE-2019-11098)
REF: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1614
REF: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=3160
The GDT still in flash with commit 60b12e69fb1c8c7180fdda92f008248b9ec83db1
after TempRamDone
So move the action to TempRamDone event to avoid reading GDT from flash.
Signed-off-by: Guomin Jiang <guomin.jiang@intel.com>
Cc: Eric Dong <eric.dong@intel.com>
Cc: Ray Ni <ray.ni@intel.com>
Cc: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Cc: Rahul Kumar <rahul1.kumar@intel.com>
Cc: Debkumar De <debkumar.de@intel.com>
Cc: Harry Han <harry.han@intel.com>
Cc: Catharine West <catharine.west@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Ray Ni <ray.ni@intel.com>
---
UefiCpuPkg/CpuMpPei/CpuMpPei.c | 37 --------------------------
UefiCpuPkg/CpuMpPei/CpuMpPei.inf | 1 -
UefiCpuPkg/CpuMpPei/CpuPaging.c | 8 ------
UefiCpuPkg/SecCore/SecCore.inf | 1 +
UefiCpuPkg/SecCore/SecMain.c | 45 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
5 files changed, 46 insertions(+), 46 deletions(-)
diff --git a/UefiCpuPkg/CpuMpPei/CpuMpPei.c b/UefiCpuPkg/CpuMpPei/CpuMpPei.c
index 40729a09b9..3c1bad6470 100644
--- a/UefiCpuPkg/CpuMpPei/CpuMpPei.c
+++ b/UefiCpuPkg/CpuMpPei/CpuMpPei.c
@@ -429,43 +429,6 @@ GetGdtr (
AsmReadGdtr ((IA32_DESCRIPTOR *)Buffer);
}
-/**
- Migrates the Global Descriptor Table (GDT) to permanent memory.
-
- @retval EFI_SUCCESS The GDT was migrated successfully.
- @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES The GDT could not be migrated due to lack of available memory.
-
-**/
-EFI_STATUS
-MigrateGdt (
- VOID
- )
-{
- EFI_STATUS Status;
- UINTN GdtBufferSize;
- IA32_DESCRIPTOR Gdtr;
- VOID *GdtBuffer;
-
- AsmReadGdtr ((IA32_DESCRIPTOR *) &Gdtr);
- GdtBufferSize = sizeof (IA32_SEGMENT_DESCRIPTOR) -1 + Gdtr.Limit + 1;
-
- Status = PeiServicesAllocatePool (
- GdtBufferSize,
- &GdtBuffer
- );
- ASSERT (GdtBuffer != NULL);
- if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
- return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;
- }
-
- GdtBuffer = ALIGN_POINTER (GdtBuffer, sizeof (IA32_SEGMENT_DESCRIPTOR));
- CopyMem (GdtBuffer, (VOID *) Gdtr.Base, Gdtr.Limit + 1);
- Gdtr.Base = (UINTN) GdtBuffer;
- AsmWriteGdtr (&Gdtr);
-
- return EFI_SUCCESS;
-}
-
/**
Initializes CPU exceptions handlers for the sake of stack switch requirement.
diff --git a/UefiCpuPkg/CpuMpPei/CpuMpPei.inf b/UefiCpuPkg/CpuMpPei/CpuMpPei.inf
index ba829d816e..7444bdb968 100644
--- a/UefiCpuPkg/CpuMpPei/CpuMpPei.inf
+++ b/UefiCpuPkg/CpuMpPei/CpuMpPei.inf
@@ -67,7 +67,6 @@
gUefiCpuPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdCpuStackSwitchExceptionList ## SOMETIMES_CONSUMES
gUefiCpuPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdCpuKnownGoodStackSize ## SOMETIMES_CONSUMES
gUefiCpuPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdCpuApStackSize ## SOMETIMES_CONSUMES
- gEfiMdeModulePkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdMigrateTemporaryRamFirmwareVolumes ## CONSUMES
[Depex]
TRUE
diff --git a/UefiCpuPkg/CpuMpPei/CpuPaging.c b/UefiCpuPkg/CpuMpPei/CpuPaging.c
index 50ad4277af..3e261d6657 100644
--- a/UefiCpuPkg/CpuMpPei/CpuPaging.c
+++ b/UefiCpuPkg/CpuMpPei/CpuPaging.c
@@ -605,17 +605,9 @@ MemoryDiscoveredPpiNotifyCallback (
{
EFI_STATUS Status;
BOOLEAN InitStackGuard;
- BOOLEAN InterruptState;
EDKII_MIGRATED_FV_INFO *MigratedFvInfo;
EFI_PEI_HOB_POINTERS Hob;
- if (PcdGetBool (PcdMigrateTemporaryRamFirmwareVolumes)) {
- InterruptState = SaveAndDisableInterrupts ();
- Status = MigrateGdt ();
- ASSERT_EFI_ERROR (Status);
- SetInterruptState (InterruptState);
- }
-
//
// Paging must be setup first. Otherwise the exception TSS setup during MP
// initialization later will not contain paging information and then fail
diff --git a/UefiCpuPkg/SecCore/SecCore.inf b/UefiCpuPkg/SecCore/SecCore.inf
index 545781d6b4..ded83beb52 100644
--- a/UefiCpuPkg/SecCore/SecCore.inf
+++ b/UefiCpuPkg/SecCore/SecCore.inf
@@ -77,6 +77,7 @@
[Pcd]
gUefiCpuPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdPeiTemporaryRamStackSize ## CONSUMES
+ gEfiMdeModulePkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdMigrateTemporaryRamFirmwareVolumes ## CONSUMES
[UserExtensions.TianoCore."ExtraFiles"]
SecCoreExtra.uni
diff --git a/UefiCpuPkg/SecCore/SecMain.c b/UefiCpuPkg/SecCore/SecMain.c
index 155be49a60..2416c4ce56 100644
--- a/UefiCpuPkg/SecCore/SecMain.c
+++ b/UefiCpuPkg/SecCore/SecMain.c
@@ -35,6 +35,43 @@ EFI_PEI_PPI_DESCRIPTOR mPeiSecPlatformInformationPpi[] = {
}
};
+/**
+ Migrates the Global Descriptor Table (GDT) to permanent memory.
+
+ @retval EFI_SUCCESS The GDT was migrated successfully.
+ @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES The GDT could not be migrated due to lack of available memory.
+
+**/
+EFI_STATUS
+MigrateGdt (
+ VOID
+ )
+{
+ EFI_STATUS Status;
+ UINTN GdtBufferSize;
+ IA32_DESCRIPTOR Gdtr;
+ VOID *GdtBuffer;
+
+ AsmReadGdtr ((IA32_DESCRIPTOR *) &Gdtr);
+ GdtBufferSize = sizeof (IA32_SEGMENT_DESCRIPTOR) -1 + Gdtr.Limit + 1;
+
+ Status = PeiServicesAllocatePool (
+ GdtBufferSize,
+ &GdtBuffer
+ );
+ ASSERT (GdtBuffer != NULL);
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
+ return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;
+ }
+
+ GdtBuffer = ALIGN_POINTER (GdtBuffer, sizeof (IA32_SEGMENT_DESCRIPTOR));
+ CopyMem (GdtBuffer, (VOID *) Gdtr.Base, Gdtr.Limit + 1);
+ Gdtr.Base = (UINTN) GdtBuffer;
+ AsmWriteGdtr (&Gdtr);
+
+ return EFI_SUCCESS;
+}
+
//
// These are IDT entries pointing to 10:FFFFFFE4h.
//
@@ -409,6 +446,14 @@ SecTemporaryRamDone (
//
State = SaveAndDisableInterrupts ();
+ //
+ // Migrate GDT before NEM near down
+ //
+ if (PcdGetBool (PcdMigrateTemporaryRamFirmwareVolumes)) {
+ Status = MigrateGdt ();
+ ASSERT_EFI_ERROR (Status);
+ }
+
//
// Disable Temporary RAM after Stack and Heap have been migrated at this point.
//
--
2.27.0

17
edk2.spec
View File

@ -5,7 +5,7 @@
Name: edk2
Version: %{stable_date}
Release: 9
Release: 10
Summary: EFI Development Kit II
License: BSD-2-Clause-Patent
URL: https://github.com/tianocore/edk2
@ -40,6 +40,16 @@ Patch0025: 0023-SecurityPkg-Tcg-Import-Tcg2PlatformPei-from-edk2-pla.patch
Patch0026: 0024-SecurityPkg-Tcg-Make-Tcg2PlatformPei-buildable-and-f.patch
Patch0027: 0025-SecurityPkg-Add-references-to-header-and-inf-files-t.patch
Patch0028: 0026-CryptoPkg-BaseCryptLib-fix-NULL-dereference-CVE-2019.patch
Patch0029: 0027-UefiCpuPkg-Correct-some-typos.patch
Patch0030: 0028-UefiCpuPkg-SecMigrationPei-Add-initial-PEIM-CVE-2019.patch
Patch0031: 0029-MdeModulePkg-PeiCore-Enable-T-RAM-evacuation-in-PeiC.patch
Patch0032: 0030-SecurityPkg-Tcg2Pei-Use-Migrated-FV-Info-Hob-for-cal.patch
Patch0033: 0031-MdeModulePkg-Add-new-PCD-to-control-the-evacuate-tem.patch
Patch0034: 0032-MdeModulePkg-Core-Create-Migrated-FV-Info-Hob-for-ca.patch
Patch0035: 0033-UefiCpuPkg-CpuMpPei-Add-GDT-migration-support-CVE-20.patch
Patch0036: 0034-UefiCpuPkg-CpuMpPei-Enable-paging-and-set-NP-flag-to.patch
Patch0037: 0035-SecurityPkg-TcgPei-Use-Migrated-FV-Info-Hob-for-calc.patch
Patch0038: 0036-UefiCpuPkg-Move-MigrateGdt-from-DiscoverMemory-to-Te.patch
BuildRequires: acpica-tools gcc gcc-c++ libuuid-devel python3 bc nasm python2
@ -235,8 +245,11 @@ chmod +x %{buildroot}%{_bindir}/Rsa2048Sha256GenerateKeys
%endif
%changelog
* Thu Sep 29 2022 chenhuiying<chenhuiying4@huawei.com> - 202002-10
- fix CVE-2019-11098
* Thu Sep 29 2022 chenhuiying<chenhuiying4@huawei.com> - 202002-9
* fix CVE-2019-14584
- fix CVE-2019-14584
* Fri Jan 28 2022 Jinhua Cao<caojinhua1@huawei.com> - 202002-8
- fix CVE-2021-38576