!37 [sync] PR-35: add CC0-1.0 license

From: @openeuler-sync-bot 
Reviewed-by: @liuzhiqiang26 
Signed-off-by: @liuzhiqiang26

0001-cryptsetup-add-system-library-paths.patch

@@ -1,7 +1,17 @@
-diff -rupN cryptsetup-2.0.4.old/configure cryptsetup-2.0.4/configure
---- cryptsetup-2.0.4.old/configure	2018-08-03 12:31:52.000000000 +0200
-+++ cryptsetup-2.0.4/configure	2018-08-03 13:42:50.605275535 +0200
-@@ -12300,6 +12300,9 @@ fi
+From b4d26d1500682dc375759c0ed16677197a433c64 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: geruijun <geruijun@huawei.com>
+Date: Sat, 18 Jul 2020 10:29:43 +0800
+Subject: [PATCH 1/2] cryptsetup add system library paths
+
+---
+ configure | 5 ++++-
+ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/configure b/configure
+index 145be42..7643af8 100755
+--- a/configure
++++ b/configure
+@@ -12294,6 +12294,9 @@ fi
    # before this can be enabled.
    hardcode_into_libs=yes
  
@@ -11,7 +21,7 @@ diff -rupN cryptsetup-2.0.4.old/configure cryptsetup-2.0.4/configure
    # Ideally, we could use ldconfig to report *all* directores which are
    # searched for libraries, however this is still not possible.  Aside from not
    # being certain /sbin/ldconfig is available, command
-@@ -12308,7 +12311,7 @@ fi
+@@ -12302,7 +12305,7 @@ fi
    # appending ld.so.conf contents (and includes) to the search path.
    if test -f /etc/ld.so.conf; then
      lt_ld_extra=`awk '/^include / { system(sprintf("cd /etc; cat %s 2>/dev/null", \$2)); skip = 1; } { if (!skip) print \$0; skip = 0; }' < /etc/ld.so.conf | $SED -e 's/#.*//;/^[	 ]*hwcap[	 ]/d;s/[:,	]/ /g;s/=[^=]*$//;s/=[^= ]* / /g;s/"//g;/^$/d' | tr '\n' ' '`
@@ -20,3 +30,6 @@ diff -rupN cryptsetup-2.0.4.old/configure cryptsetup-2.0.4/configure
    fi
  
    # We used to test for /lib/ld.so.1 and disable shared libraries on
+-- 
+1.8.3.1
+

0002-fix-compat-test.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,66 @@
+From f73c9760f43897fce0d6aa32042f751a2e7d0de0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: hanzhijun <hanzhijun1@huawei.com>
+Date: Sat, 18 Jul 2020 10:30:03 +0800
+Subject: [PATCH 2/2] fix compat test
+
+---
+ tests/compat-test | 15 ++++++++-------
+ 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/tests/compat-test b/tests/compat-test
+index a61453e..7ee946e 100755
+--- a/tests/compat-test
++++ b/tests/compat-test
+@@ -22,6 +22,7 @@ PWD0="compatkey"
+ PWD1="93R4P4pIqAH8"
+ PWD2="mymJeD8ivEhE"
+ PWD3="ocMakf3fAcQO"
++PWD4="hkj123HJGS12"
+ PWDW="rUkL4RUryBom"
+ VK_FILE="compattest_vkfile"
+ 
+@@ -225,17 +226,17 @@ echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP luksAddKey $IMG $FAST_PBKDF_OPT 2>/dev/null && fail
+ echo -e "$PWD1\n$PWD2" | $CRYPTSETUP luksAddKey $IMG $FAST_PBKDF_OPT || fail
+ echo -e "$PWD0\n$PWD1" | $CRYPTSETUP luksAddKey $IMG $FAST_PBKDF_OPT 2>/dev/null && fail
+ echo "[4] change key"
+-echo -e "$PWD1\n$PWD0\n" | $CRYPTSETUP luksChangeKey $FAST_PBKDF_OPT $IMG || fail
++echo -e "$PWD1\n$PWD4\n" | $CRYPTSETUP luksChangeKey $FAST_PBKDF_OPT $IMG || fail
+ echo -e "$PWD1\n$PWD2\n" | $CRYPTSETUP luksChangeKey $FAST_PBKDF_OPT $IMG 2>/dev/null && fail
+ [ $? -ne 2 ] && fail "luksChangeKey should return EPERM exit code"
+ echo "[5] remove key"
+-# delete active keys PWD0, PWD2
++# delete active keys PWD2, PWD4
+ echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP luksRemoveKey $IMG 2>/dev/null && fail
+ [ $? -ne 2 ] && fail "luksRemove should return EPERM exit code"
+-echo $PWD0 | $CRYPTSETUP luksRemoveKey $IMG || fail
+ echo $PWD2 | $CRYPTSETUP luksRemoveKey $IMG || fail
++echo $PWD4 | $CRYPTSETUP luksRemoveKey $IMG || fail
+ # check if keys were deleted
+-echo $PWD0 | $CRYPTSETUP luksOpen $IMG --test-passphrase 2>/dev/null && fail
++echo $PWD4 | $CRYPTSETUP luksOpen $IMG --test-passphrase 2>/dev/null && fail
+ [ $? -ne 1 ] && fail "luksOpen should return ENOENT exit code"
+ echo $PWD2 | $CRYPTSETUP luksOpen $IMG --test-passphrase 2>/dev/null && fail
+ [ $? -ne 1 ] && fail "luksOpen should return ENOENT exit code"
+@@ -867,16 +868,16 @@ expect timeout abort "Are you sure? (Type 'yes' in capital letters):"
+ send "YES\n"
+ expect timeout abort "Enter passphrase for $EXPECT_DEV:"
+ sleep 0.1
+-send "$PWD0\n"
++send "$PWD4\n"
+ expect timeout abort "Verify passphrase:"
+ sleep 0.1
+-send "$PWD0\n"
++send "$PWD4\n"
+ expect timeout abort "Command successful."
+ expect timeout abort eof
+ eval spawn $CRYPTSETUP luksOpen -v $LOOPDEV --test-passphrase
+ expect timeout abort "Enter passphrase for $EXPECT_DEV:"
+ sleep 0.1
+-send "$PWD0\n"
++send "$PWD4\n"
+ expect timeout abort "Command successful."
+ expect timeout abort eof
+ exit
+-- 
+1.8.3.1
+

0003-Check-segment-gaps-regardless-of-heap-space.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,61 @@
+From e8e71e43c3ff2dca951d30af48708bcb411e47d2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Tobias Stoeckmann <tobias@stoeckmann.org>
+Date: Mon, 24 Aug 2020 19:21:43 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 3/5] Check segment gaps regardless of heap space.
+
+Segments are validated in hdr_validate_segments. Gaps in segment keys
+are detected when collecting offsets. But if an invalid segment is very
+large, larger than count, it could happen that cryptsetup is unable to
+allocate enough memory, not giving a clue about what actually is the
+problem.
+
+Therefore check for gaps even if not enough memory is available. This
+gives much more information with debug output enabled.
+
+Obviously cryptsetup still fails if segments are perfectly fine but not
+enough RAM available. But at that stage, the user knows that it's the
+fault of the system, not of an invalid segment.
+---
+ lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c | 19 ++++++++++++-------
+ 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c b/lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c
+index e346067..e4e1424 100644
+--- a/lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c
++++ b/lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c
+@@ -679,11 +679,10 @@ static int hdr_validate_segments(struct crypt_device *cd, json_object *hdr_jobj)
+ 	if (first_backup < 0)
+ 		first_backup = count;
+ 
+-	intervals = malloc(first_backup * sizeof(*intervals));
+-	if (!intervals) {
+-		log_dbg(cd, "Not enough memory.");
+-		return 1;
+-	}
++	if (first_backup <= count && (size_t)first_backup < SIZE_MAX / sizeof(*intervals))
++		intervals = malloc(first_backup * sizeof(*intervals));
++	else
++		intervals = NULL;
+ 
+ 	for (i = 0; i < first_backup; i++) {
+ 		jobj = json_segments_get_segment(jobj_segments, i);
+@@ -692,8 +691,14 @@ static int hdr_validate_segments(struct crypt_device *cd, json_object *hdr_jobj)
+ 			free(intervals);
+ 			return 1;
+ 		}
+-		intervals[i].offset = json_segment_get_offset(jobj, 0);
+-		intervals[i].length = json_segment_get_size(jobj, 0) ?: UINT64_MAX;
++		if (intervals != NULL) {
++			intervals[i].offset = json_segment_get_offset(jobj, 0);
++			intervals[i].length = json_segment_get_size(jobj, 0) ?: UINT64_MAX;
++		}
++	}
++	if (intervals == NULL) {
++		log_dbg(cd, "Not enough memory.");
++		return 1;
+ 	}
+ 
+ 	r = !validate_segment_intervals(cd, first_backup, intervals);
+-- 
+1.8.3.1
+

0004-Fix-posible-buffer-overflows-in-LUKS-conversion.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,31 @@
+From 88b2d1af10922e0defb3eeacac6bb03aab9cbd60 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Ondrej Kozina <okozina@redhat.com>
+Date: Thu, 27 Aug 2020 12:12:13 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 4/5] Fix posible buffer overflows in LUKS conversion.
+
+cipher[31] and cipher_mode[31] buffers were passed to
+crypt_parse_name_and_mode() routine where sscanf(s, "%31[^-]-%31s",
+cipher, cipher_mode) was called.
+
+In corner case it could cause terminating 0 byte written beyond
+respective arrays.
+---
+ lib/luks2/luks2_luks1_convert.c | 2 +-
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/lib/luks2/luks2_luks1_convert.c b/lib/luks2/luks2_luks1_convert.c
+index 603c44d..9b70df1 100644
+--- a/lib/luks2/luks2_luks1_convert.c
++++ b/lib/luks2/luks2_luks1_convert.c
+@@ -675,7 +675,7 @@ static int keyslot_LUKS1_compatible(struct crypt_device *cd, struct luks2_hdr *h
+ int LUKS2_luks2_to_luks1(struct crypt_device *cd, struct luks2_hdr *hdr2, struct luks_phdr *hdr1)
+ {
+ 	size_t buf_size, buf_offset;
+-	char cipher[LUKS_CIPHERNAME_L-1], cipher_mode[LUKS_CIPHERMODE_L-1];
++	char cipher[LUKS_CIPHERNAME_L], cipher_mode[LUKS_CIPHERMODE_L];
+ 	char digest[LUKS_DIGESTSIZE], digest_salt[LUKS_SALTSIZE];
+ 	const char *hash;
+ 	size_t len;
+-- 
+1.8.3.1
+

0005-Fix-a-memleak-in-blockwise-test.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
+From fa57d76de233e22afd79e81c98a741c23dae3498 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Milan Broz <gmazyland@gmail.com>
+Date: Sat, 29 Aug 2020 12:21:32 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 5/5] Fix a memleak in blockwise test.
+
+---
+ tests/unit-utils-io.c | 2 +-
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/tests/unit-utils-io.c b/tests/unit-utils-io.c
+index ff5be52..9e59234 100644
+--- a/tests/unit-utils-io.c
++++ b/tests/unit-utils-io.c
+@@ -99,7 +99,7 @@ static int test_write_buffer(void)
+ 	if (ret < 0)
+ 		goto out;
+ 
+-	return (size_t) ret == test_length ? 0 : -EIO;
++	ret = (size_t) ret == test_length ? 0 : -EIO;
+ out:
+ 	if (fd >= 0)
+ 		close(fd);
+-- 
+1.8.3.1
+

0006-CVE-2021-4122.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,855 @@
+From 60addcffa6794c29dccf33d8db5347f24b75f2fc Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Ondrej Kozina <okozina@redhat.com>
+Date: Sun, 2 Jan 2022 16:57:31 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] Fix CVE-2021-4122 - LUKS2 reencryption crash recovery attack
+
+Fix possible attacks against data confidentiality through LUKS2 online
+reencryption extension crash recovery.
+
+An attacker can modify on-disk metadata to simulate decryption in
+progress with crashed (unfinished) reencryption step and persistently
+decrypt part of the LUKS device.
+
+This attack requires repeated physical access to the LUKS device but
+no knowledge of user passphrases.
+
+The decryption step is performed after a valid user activates
+the device with a correct passphrase and modified metadata.
+There are no visible warnings for the user that such recovery happened
+(except using the luksDump command). The attack can also be reversed
+afterward (simulating crashed encryption from a plaintext) with
+possible modification of revealed plaintext.
+
+The problem was caused by reusing a mechanism designed for actual
+reencryption operation without reassessing the security impact for new
+encryption and decryption operations. While the reencryption requires
+calculating and verifying both key digests, no digest was needed to
+initiate decryption recovery if the destination is plaintext (no
+encryption key). Also, some metadata (like encryption cipher) is not
+protected, and an attacker could change it. Note that LUKS2 protects
+visible metadata only when a random change occurs. It does not protect
+against intentional modification but such modification must not cause
+a violation of data confidentiality.
+
+The fix introduces additional digest protection of reencryption
+metadata. The digest is calculated from known keys and critical
+reencryption metadata. Now an attacker cannot create correct metadata
+digest without knowledge of a passphrase for used keyslots.
+For more details, see LUKS2 On-Disk Format Specification version 1.1.0.
+
+Conflict: move LUKS2_keyslot_reencrypt_digest_create to lib/luks2/luks2.h
+	move LUKS2_keyslot_jobj_area to lib/luks2/luks2.h 
+	reencrypt_keyslot_update -> reenc_keyslot_update
+
+Signed-off-by: yanglongkang <yanglongkang@huawei.com>
+---
+ lib/Makemodule.am                  |   1 +
+ lib/luks2/luks2.h                  |  10 +
+ lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c    |  73 +++++-
+ lib/luks2/luks2_keyslot.c          |  31 ++-
+ lib/luks2/luks2_keyslot_reenc.c    |  18 +-
+ lib/luks2/luks2_reencrypt.c        |  40 ++-
+ lib/luks2/luks2_reencrypt_digest.c | 381 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
+ lib/setup.c                        |  21 +-
+ po/POTFILES.in                     |   1 +
+ 9 files changed, 533 insertions(+), 43 deletions(-)
+ create mode 100644 lib/luks2/luks2_reencrypt_digest.c
+
+diff --git a/lib/Makemodule.am b/lib/Makemodule.am
+index bf4230b..69159fa 100644
+--- a/lib/Makemodule.am
++++ b/lib/Makemodule.am
+@@ -104,6 +104,7 @@ libcryptsetup_la_SOURCES = \
+ 	lib/luks2/luks2_keyslot_luks2.c	\
+ 	lib/luks2/luks2_keyslot_reenc.c	\
+ 	lib/luks2/luks2_reencrypt.c	\
++	lib/luks2/luks2_reencrypt_digest.c	\
+ 	lib/luks2/luks2_segment.c	\
+ 	lib/luks2/luks2_token_keyring.c	\
+ 	lib/luks2/luks2_token.c		\
+diff --git a/lib/luks2/luks2.h b/lib/luks2/luks2.h
+index 6ab753a..610917b 100644
+--- a/lib/luks2/luks2.h
++++ b/lib/luks2/luks2.h
+@@ -297,9 +297,15 @@ int LUKS2_keyslot_wipe(struct crypt_device *cd,
+ 	int keyslot,
+ 	int wipe_area_only);
+ 
++int LUKS2_keyslot_reencrypt_digest_create(struct crypt_device *cd,
++	struct luks2_hdr *hdr,
++	struct volume_key *vks);
++
+ int LUKS2_keyslot_dump(struct crypt_device *cd,
+ 	int keyslot);
+ 
++int LUKS2_keyslot_jobj_area(json_object *jobj_keyslot, uint64_t *offset, uint64_t *length);
++
+ crypt_keyslot_priority LUKS2_keyslot_priority_get(struct crypt_device *cd,
+ 	struct luks2_hdr *hdr,
+ 	int keyslot);
+@@ -606,4 +612,8 @@ void crypt_reencrypt_unlock(struct crypt_device *cd, struct crypt_lock_handle *r
+ 
+ int luks2_check_device_size(struct crypt_device *cd, struct luks2_hdr *hdr, uint64_t check_size, uint64_t *dev_size, bool activation, bool dynamic);
+ 
++int LUKS2_reencrypt_digest_verify(struct crypt_device *cd,
++	struct luks2_hdr *hdr,
++	struct volume_key *vks);
++
+ #endif
+diff --git a/lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c b/lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c
+index e4e1424..fb6cef5 100644
+--- a/lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c
++++ b/lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c
+@@ -1368,24 +1368,63 @@ int LUKS2_config_set_flags(struct crypt_device *cd, struct luks2_hdr *hdr, uint3
+  */
+ 
+ /* LUKS2 library requirements */
+-static const struct  {
++struct requirement_flag {
+ 	uint32_t flag;
++	uint32_t version;
+ 	const char *description;
+-} requirements_flags[] = {
+-	{ CRYPT_REQUIREMENT_OFFLINE_REENCRYPT, "offline-reencrypt" },
+-	{ CRYPT_REQUIREMENT_ONLINE_REENCRYPT, "online-reencrypt" },
+-	{ 0, NULL }
+ };
+ 
+-static uint32_t get_requirement_by_name(const char *requirement)
++static const struct requirement_flag unknown_requirement_flag = { CRYPT_REQUIREMENT_UNKNOWN, 0, NULL };
++
++static const struct requirement_flag requirements_flags[] = {
++	{ CRYPT_REQUIREMENT_OFFLINE_REENCRYPT,1, "offline-reencrypt" },
++	{ CRYPT_REQUIREMENT_ONLINE_REENCRYPT, 2, "online-reencrypt-v2" },
++	{ CRYPT_REQUIREMENT_ONLINE_REENCRYPT, 1, "online-reencrypt" },
++	{ 0, 0, NULL }
++};
++
++static const struct requirement_flag *get_requirement_by_name(const char *requirement)
+ {
+ 	int i;
+ 
+ 	for (i = 0; requirements_flags[i].description; i++)
+ 		if (!strcmp(requirement, requirements_flags[i].description))
+-			return requirements_flags[i].flag;
++			return requirements_flags + i;
+ 
+-	return CRYPT_REQUIREMENT_UNKNOWN;
++	return &unknown_requirement_flag;
++}
++
++static const struct requirement_flag *stored_requirement_name_by_id(struct crypt_device *cd, struct luks2_hdr *hdr, uint32_t req_id)
++{
++	json_object *jobj_config, *jobj_requirements, *jobj_mandatory, *jobj;
++	int i, len;
++	const struct requirement_flag *req;
++
++	assert(hdr);
++	if (!hdr)
++		return NULL;
++
++	if (!json_object_object_get_ex(hdr->jobj, "config", &jobj_config))
++		return NULL;
++
++	if (!json_object_object_get_ex(jobj_config, "requirements", &jobj_requirements))
++		return NULL;
++
++	if (!json_object_object_get_ex(jobj_requirements, "mandatory", &jobj_mandatory))
++		return NULL;
++
++	len = (int) json_object_array_length(jobj_mandatory);
++	if (len <= 0)
++		return 0;
++
++	for (i = 0; i < len; i++) {
++		jobj = json_object_array_get_idx(jobj_mandatory, i);
++		req = get_requirement_by_name(json_object_get_string(jobj));
++		if (req->flag == req_id)
++			return req;
++	}
++
++	return NULL;
+ }
+ 
+ /*
+@@ -1395,7 +1434,7 @@ int LUKS2_config_get_requirements(struct crypt_device *cd, struct luks2_hdr *hdr
+ {
+ 	json_object *jobj_config, *jobj_requirements, *jobj_mandatory, *jobj;
+ 	int i, len;
+-	uint32_t req;
++	const struct requirement_flag *req;
+ 
+ 	assert(hdr);
+ 	if (!hdr || !reqs)
+@@ -1422,8 +1461,8 @@ int LUKS2_config_get_requirements(struct crypt_device *cd, struct luks2_hdr *hdr
+ 		jobj = json_object_array_get_idx(jobj_mandatory, i);
+ 		req = get_requirement_by_name(json_object_get_string(jobj));
+ 		log_dbg(cd, "%s - %sknown", json_object_get_string(jobj),
+-				        reqs_unknown(req) ? "un" : "");
+-		*reqs |= req;
++				        reqs_unknown(req->flag) ? "un" : "");
++		*reqs |= req->flag;
+ 	}
+ 
+ 	return 0;
+@@ -1433,6 +1472,8 @@ int LUKS2_config_set_requirements(struct crypt_device *cd, struct luks2_hdr *hdr
+ {
+ 	json_object *jobj_config, *jobj_requirements, *jobj_mandatory, *jobj;
+ 	int i, r = -EINVAL;
++	const struct requirement_flag *req;
++	uint32_t req_id;
+ 
+ 	if (!hdr)
+ 		return -EINVAL;
+@@ -1442,8 +1483,14 @@ int LUKS2_config_set_requirements(struct crypt_device *cd, struct luks2_hdr *hdr
+ 		return -ENOMEM;
+ 
+ 	for (i = 0; requirements_flags[i].description; i++) {
+-		if (reqs & requirements_flags[i].flag) {
+-			jobj = json_object_new_string(requirements_flags[i].description);
++		req_id = reqs & requirements_flags[i].flag;
++		if (req_id) {
++			/* retain already stored version of requirement flag */
++			req = stored_requirement_name_by_id(cd, hdr, req_id);
++			if (req)
++				jobj = json_object_new_string(req->description);
++			else
++				jobj = json_object_new_string(requirements_flags[i].description);
+ 			if (!jobj) {
+ 				r = -ENOMEM;
+ 				goto err;
+diff --git a/lib/luks2/luks2_keyslot.c b/lib/luks2/luks2_keyslot.c
+index 3b8c889..2435a1f 100644
+--- a/lib/luks2/luks2_keyslot.c
++++ b/lib/luks2/luks2_keyslot.c
+@@ -281,19 +281,9 @@ crypt_keyslot_info LUKS2_keyslot_info(struct luks2_hdr *hdr, int keyslot)
+ 	return CRYPT_SLOT_ACTIVE;
+ }
+ 
+-int LUKS2_keyslot_area(struct luks2_hdr *hdr,
+-	int keyslot,
+-	uint64_t *offset,
+-	uint64_t *length)
++int LUKS2_keyslot_jobj_area(json_object *jobj_keyslot, uint64_t *offset, uint64_t *length)
+ {
+-	json_object *jobj_keyslot, *jobj_area, *jobj;
+-
+-	if(LUKS2_keyslot_info(hdr, keyslot) == CRYPT_SLOT_INVALID)
+-		return -EINVAL;
+-
+-	jobj_keyslot = LUKS2_get_keyslot_jobj(hdr, keyslot);
+-	if (!jobj_keyslot)
+-		return -ENOENT;
++	json_object *jobj_area, *jobj;
+ 
+ 	if (!json_object_object_get_ex(jobj_keyslot, "area", &jobj_area))
+ 		return -EINVAL;
+@@ -309,6 +299,23 @@ int LUKS2_keyslot_area(struct luks2_hdr *hdr,
+ 	return 0;
+ }
+ 
++int LUKS2_keyslot_area(struct luks2_hdr *hdr,
++	int keyslot,
++	uint64_t *offset,
++	uint64_t *length)
++{
++	json_object *jobj_keyslot;
++
++	if (LUKS2_keyslot_info(hdr, keyslot) == CRYPT_SLOT_INVALID)
++		return -EINVAL;
++
++	jobj_keyslot = LUKS2_get_keyslot_jobj(hdr, keyslot);
++	if (!jobj_keyslot)
++		return -ENOENT;
++
++	return LUKS2_keyslot_jobj_area(jobj_keyslot, offset, length);
++}
++
+ static int _open_and_verify(struct crypt_device *cd,
+ 	struct luks2_hdr *hdr,
+ 	const keyslot_handler *h,
+diff --git a/lib/luks2/luks2_keyslot_reenc.c b/lib/luks2/luks2_keyslot_reenc.c
+index b939467..854c926 100644
+--- a/lib/luks2/luks2_keyslot_reenc.c
++++ b/lib/luks2/luks2_keyslot_reenc.c
+@@ -179,6 +179,7 @@ static int reenc_keyslot_store(struct crypt_device *cd,
+ int reenc_keyslot_update(struct crypt_device *cd,
+ 	const struct luks2_reenc_context *rh)
+ {
++	int r;
+ 	json_object *jobj_keyslot, *jobj_area, *jobj_area_type;
+ 	struct luks2_hdr *hdr;
+ 
+@@ -208,11 +209,24 @@ int reenc_keyslot_update(struct crypt_device *cd,
+ 	} else
+ 		log_dbg(cd, "No update of reencrypt keyslot needed.");
+ 
+-	return 0;
++	r = LUKS2_keyslot_reencrypt_digest_create(cd, hdr, rh->vks);
++	if (r < 0)
++		log_err(cd, "Failed to refresh reencryption verification digest.");
++
++	return r;
+ }
+ 
+-static int reenc_keyslot_wipe(struct crypt_device *cd, int keyslot)
++static int reenc_keyslot_wipe(struct crypt_device *cd,
++	int keyslot)
+ {
++	struct luks2_hdr *hdr;
++
++	if (!(hdr = crypt_get_hdr(cd, CRYPT_LUKS2)))
++		return -EINVAL;
++
++	/* remove reencryption verification data */
++	LUKS2_digest_assign(cd, hdr, keyslot, CRYPT_ANY_DIGEST, 0, 0);
++
+ 	return 0;
+ }
+ 
+diff --git a/lib/luks2/luks2_reencrypt.c b/lib/luks2/luks2_reencrypt.c
+index 68d3194..d170f09 100644
+--- a/lib/luks2/luks2_reencrypt.c
++++ b/lib/luks2/luks2_reencrypt.c
+@@ -2390,6 +2390,10 @@ static int reencrypt_init(struct crypt_device *cd,
+ 	if (r < 0)
+ 		goto err;
+ 
++	r = LUKS2_keyslot_reencrypt_digest_create(cd, hdr, *vks);
++	if (r < 0)
++		goto err;
++
+ 	if (name && params->mode != CRYPT_REENCRYPT_ENCRYPT) {
+ 		r = reencrypt_verify_and_upload_keys(cd, hdr, LUKS2_reencrypt_digest_old(hdr), LUKS2_reencrypt_digest_new(hdr), *vks);
+ 		if (r)
+@@ -2520,20 +2524,28 @@ static int reencrypt_context_update(struct crypt_device *cd,
+ static int reencrypt_load(struct crypt_device *cd, struct luks2_hdr *hdr,
+ 		uint64_t device_size,
+ 		const struct crypt_params_reencrypt *params,
++		struct volume_key *vks,
+ 		struct luks2_reenc_context **rh)
+ {
+ 	int r;
+ 	struct luks2_reenc_context *tmp = NULL;
+ 	crypt_reencrypt_info ri = LUKS2_reenc_status(hdr);
+ 
++	if (ri == CRYPT_REENCRYPT_NONE) {
++		log_err(cd, _("Device not marked for LUKS2 reencryption."));
++		return -EINVAL;
++	} else if (ri == CRYPT_REENCRYPT_INVALID)
++		return -EINVAL;
++
++	r = LUKS2_reencrypt_digest_verify(cd, hdr, vks);
++	if (r < 0)
++		return r;
++
+ 	if (ri == CRYPT_REENCRYPT_CLEAN)
+ 		r = reencrypt_load_clean(cd, hdr, device_size, &tmp, params);
+ 	else if (ri == CRYPT_REENCRYPT_CRASH)
+ 		r = reencrypt_load_crashed(cd, hdr, device_size, &tmp);
+-	else if (ri == CRYPT_REENCRYPT_NONE) {
+-		log_err(cd, _("Device not marked for LUKS2 reencryption."));
+-		return -EINVAL;
+-	} else
++	else
+ 		r = -EINVAL;
+ 
+ 	if (r < 0 || !tmp) {
+@@ -2767,7 +2779,7 @@ static int reencrypt_load_by_passphrase(struct crypt_device *cd,
+ 		rparams.device_size = required_size;
+ 	}
+ 
+-	r = reencrypt_load(cd, hdr, device_size, &rparams, &rh);
++	r = reencrypt_load(cd, hdr, device_size, &rparams, *vks, &rh);
+ 	if (r < 0 || !rh)
+ 		goto err;
+ 
+@@ -2987,13 +2999,6 @@ static reenc_status_t reencrypt_step(struct crypt_device *cd,
+ {
+ 	int r;
+ 
+-	/* update reencrypt keyslot protection parameters in memory only */
+-	r = reenc_keyslot_update(cd, rh);
+-	if (r < 0) {
+-		log_dbg(cd, "Keyslot update failed.");
+-		return REENC_ERR;
+-	}
+-
+ 	/* in memory only */
+ 	r = reencrypt_make_segments(cd, hdr, rh, device_size);
+ 	if (r)
+@@ -3258,6 +3263,15 @@ int crypt_reencrypt(struct crypt_device *cd,
+ 
+ 	rs = REENC_OK;
+ 
++	/* update reencrypt keyslot protection parameters in memory only */
++	if (!quit && (rh->device_size > rh->progress)) {
++		r = reenc_keyslot_update(cd, rh);
++		if (r < 0) {
++			log_dbg(cd, "Keyslot update failed.");
++			return reencrypt_teardown(cd, hdr, rh, REENC_ERR, quit, progress);
++		}
++	}
++
+ 	while (!quit && (rh->device_size > rh->progress)) {
+ 		rs = reencrypt_step(cd, hdr, rh, rh->device_size, rh->online);
+ 		if (rs != REENC_OK)
+@@ -3290,7 +3304,7 @@ static int reencrypt_recovery(struct crypt_device *cd,
+ 	int r;
+ 	struct luks2_reenc_context *rh = NULL;
+ 
+-	r = reencrypt_load(cd, hdr, device_size, NULL, &rh);
++	r = reencrypt_load(cd, hdr, device_size, NULL, vks, &rh);
+ 	if (r < 0) {
+ 		log_err(cd, _("Failed to load LUKS2 reencryption context."));
+ 		return r;
+diff --git a/lib/luks2/luks2_reencrypt_digest.c b/lib/luks2/luks2_reencrypt_digest.c
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..7ee277c
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/lib/luks2/luks2_reencrypt_digest.c
+@@ -0,0 +1,381 @@
++/*
++ * LUKS - Linux Unified Key Setup v2, reencryption digest helpers
++ *
++ * Copyright (C) 2022, Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
++ * Copyright (C) 2022, Ondrej Kozina
++ * Copyright (C) 2022, Milan Broz
++ *
++ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
++ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License
++ * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version 2
++ * of the License, or (at your option) any later version.
++ *
++ * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
++ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
++ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
++ * GNU General Public License for more details.
++ *
++ * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
++ * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
++ * Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301 USA.
++ */
++
++#include "luks2_internal.h"
++#include <assert.h>
++
++#define MAX_STR 64
++
++struct jtype {
++	enum { JNONE = 0, JSTR, JU64, JX64, JU32 } type;
++	json_object *jobj;
++	const char *id;
++};
++
++static size_t sr(struct jtype *j, uint8_t *ptr)
++{
++	json_object *jobj;
++	size_t len = 0;
++	uint64_t u64;
++	uint32_t u32;
++
++	if (!json_object_is_type(j->jobj, json_type_object))
++		return 0;
++
++	if (!json_object_object_get_ex(j->jobj, j->id, &jobj))
++		return 0;
++
++	switch(j->type) {
++	case JSTR: /* JSON string */
++		if (!json_object_is_type(jobj, json_type_string))
++			return 0;
++		len = strlen(json_object_get_string(jobj));
++		if (len > MAX_STR)
++			return 0;
++		if (ptr)
++			memcpy(ptr, json_object_get_string(jobj), len);
++		break;
++	case JU64: /* Unsigned 64bit integer stored as string */
++		if (!json_object_is_type(jobj, json_type_string))
++			break;
++		len = sizeof(u64);
++		if (ptr) {
++			u64 = cpu_to_be64(crypt_jobj_get_uint64(jobj));
++			memcpy(ptr, &u64, len);
++		}
++		break;
++	case JX64: /* Unsigned 64bit segment size (allows "dynamic") */
++		if (!json_object_is_type(jobj, json_type_string))
++			break;
++		if (!strcmp(json_object_get_string(jobj), "dynamic")) {
++			len = strlen("dynamic");
++			if (ptr)
++				memcpy(ptr, json_object_get_string(jobj), len);
++		} else {
++			len = sizeof(u64);
++			u64 = cpu_to_be64(crypt_jobj_get_uint64(jobj));
++			if (ptr)
++				memcpy(ptr, &u64, len);
++		}
++		break;
++	case JU32: /* Unsigned 32bit integer, stored as JSON int */
++		if (!json_object_is_type(jobj, json_type_int))
++			return 0;
++		len =  sizeof(u32);
++		if (ptr) {
++			u32 = cpu_to_be32(crypt_jobj_get_uint32(jobj));
++			memcpy(ptr, &u32, len);
++		}
++		break;
++	case JNONE:
++		return 0;
++	};
++
++	return len;
++}
++
++static size_t srs(struct jtype j[], uint8_t *ptr)
++{
++	size_t l, len = 0;
++
++	while(j->jobj) {
++		l = sr(j, ptr);
++		if (!l)
++			return 0;
++		len += l;
++		if (ptr)
++			ptr += l;
++		j++;
++	}
++	return len;
++}
++
++static size_t segment_linear_serialize(json_object *jobj_segment, uint8_t *buffer)
++{
++	struct jtype j[] = {
++		{ JSTR, jobj_segment, "type" },
++		{ JU64, jobj_segment, "offset" },
++		{ JX64, jobj_segment, "size" },
++		{}
++	};
++	return srs(j, buffer);
++}
++
++static size_t segment_crypt_serialize(json_object *jobj_segment, uint8_t *buffer)
++{
++	struct jtype j[] = {
++		{ JSTR, jobj_segment, "type" },
++		{ JU64, jobj_segment, "offset" },
++		{ JX64, jobj_segment, "size" },
++		{ JU64, jobj_segment, "iv_tweak" },
++		{ JSTR, jobj_segment, "encryption" },
++		{ JU32, jobj_segment, "sector_size" },
++		{}
++	};
++	return srs(j, buffer);
++}
++
++static size_t segment_serialize(json_object *jobj_segment, uint8_t *buffer)
++{
++	json_object *jobj_type;
++	const char *segment_type;
++
++	if (!json_object_object_get_ex(jobj_segment, "type", &jobj_type))
++		return 0;
++
++	if (!(segment_type = json_object_get_string(jobj_type)))
++		return 0;
++
++	if (!strcmp(segment_type, "crypt"))
++		return segment_crypt_serialize(jobj_segment, buffer);
++	else if (!strcmp(segment_type, "linear"))
++		return segment_linear_serialize(jobj_segment, buffer);
++
++	return 0;
++}
++
++static size_t backup_segments_serialize(struct luks2_hdr *hdr, uint8_t *buffer)
++{
++	json_object *jobj_segment;
++	size_t l, len = 0;
++
++	jobj_segment = LUKS2_get_segment_by_flag(hdr, "backup-previous");
++	if (!jobj_segment || !(l = segment_serialize(jobj_segment, buffer)))
++		return 0;
++	len += l;
++	if (buffer)
++		buffer += l;
++
++	jobj_segment = LUKS2_get_segment_by_flag(hdr, "backup-final");
++	if (!jobj_segment || !(l = segment_serialize(jobj_segment, buffer)))
++		return 0;
++	len += l;
++	if (buffer)
++		buffer += l;
++
++	jobj_segment = LUKS2_get_segment_by_flag(hdr, "backup-moved-segment");
++	if (jobj_segment) {
++		if (!(l = segment_serialize(jobj_segment, buffer)))
++			return 0;
++		len += l;
++	}
++
++	return len;
++}
++
++static size_t reenc_keyslot_serialize(struct luks2_hdr *hdr, uint8_t *buffer)
++{
++	json_object *jobj_keyslot, *jobj_area, *jobj_type;
++	const char *area_type;
++	int keyslot_reencrypt;
++
++	keyslot_reencrypt = LUKS2_find_keyslot(hdr, "reencrypt");
++	if (keyslot_reencrypt < 0)
++		return 0;
++
++	if (!(jobj_keyslot = LUKS2_get_keyslot_jobj(hdr, keyslot_reencrypt)))
++		return 0;
++
++	if (!json_object_object_get_ex(jobj_keyslot, "area", &jobj_area))
++		return 0;
++
++	if (!json_object_object_get_ex(jobj_area, "type", &jobj_type))
++		return 0;
++
++	if (!(area_type = json_object_get_string(jobj_type)))
++		return 0;
++
++	struct jtype j[] = {
++		{ JSTR, jobj_keyslot, "mode" },
++		{ JSTR, jobj_keyslot, "direction" },
++		{ JSTR, jobj_area,    "type" },
++		{ JU64, jobj_area,    "offset" },
++		{ JU64, jobj_area,    "size" },
++		{}
++	};
++	struct jtype j_datashift[] = {
++		{ JSTR, jobj_keyslot, "mode" },
++		{ JSTR, jobj_keyslot, "direction" },
++		{ JSTR, jobj_area,    "type" },
++		{ JU64, jobj_area,    "offset" },
++		{ JU64, jobj_area,    "size" },
++		{ JU64, jobj_area,    "shift_size" },
++		{}
++	};
++	struct jtype j_checksum[] = {
++		{ JSTR, jobj_keyslot, "mode" },
++		{ JSTR, jobj_keyslot, "direction" },
++		{ JSTR, jobj_area,    "type" },
++		{ JU64, jobj_area,    "offset" },
++		{ JU64, jobj_area,    "size" },
++		{ JSTR, jobj_area,    "hash" },
++		{ JU32, jobj_area,    "sector_size" },
++		{}
++	};
++
++	if (!strcmp(area_type, "datashift"))
++		return srs(j_datashift, buffer);
++	else if (!strcmp(area_type, "checksum"))
++		return srs(j_checksum, buffer);
++
++	return srs(j, buffer);
++}
++
++static size_t blob_serialize(void *blob, size_t length, uint8_t *buffer)
++{
++	if (buffer)
++		memcpy(buffer, blob, length);
++
++	return length;
++}
++
++static int reencrypt_assembly_verification_data(struct crypt_device *cd,
++	struct luks2_hdr *hdr,
++	struct volume_key *vks,
++	struct volume_key **verification_data)
++{
++	uint8_t *ptr;
++	int digest_new, digest_old;
++	struct volume_key *data = NULL, *vk_old = NULL, *vk_new = NULL;
++	size_t keyslot_data_len, segments_data_len, data_len = 2;
++
++	/* Keys - calculate length */
++	digest_new = LUKS2_reencrypt_digest_new(hdr);
++	digest_old = LUKS2_reencrypt_digest_old(hdr);
++
++	if (digest_old >= 0) {
++		vk_old = crypt_volume_key_by_id(vks, digest_old);
++		if (!vk_old)
++			return -EINVAL;
++		data_len += blob_serialize(vk_old->key, vk_old->keylength, NULL);
++	}
++
++	if (digest_new >= 0 && digest_old != digest_new) {
++		vk_new = crypt_volume_key_by_id(vks, digest_new);
++		if (!vk_new)
++			return -EINVAL;
++		data_len += blob_serialize(vk_new->key, vk_new->keylength, NULL);
++	}
++
++	if (data_len == 2)
++		return -EINVAL;
++
++	/* Metadata - calculate length */
++	if (!(keyslot_data_len = reenc_keyslot_serialize(hdr, NULL)))
++		return -EINVAL;
++	data_len += keyslot_data_len;
++
++	if (!(segments_data_len = backup_segments_serialize(hdr, NULL)))
++		return -EINVAL;
++	data_len += segments_data_len;
++
++	/* Alloc and fill serialization data */
++	data = crypt_alloc_volume_key(data_len, NULL);
++	if (!data)
++		return -ENOMEM;
++
++	ptr = (uint8_t*)data->key;
++
++	/* v2 */
++	*ptr++ = 0x76;
++	*ptr++ = 0x32;
++
++	if (vk_old)
++		ptr += blob_serialize(vk_old->key, vk_old->keylength, ptr);
++
++	if (vk_new)
++		ptr += blob_serialize(vk_new->key, vk_new->keylength, ptr);
++
++	if (!reenc_keyslot_serialize(hdr, ptr))
++		goto bad;
++	ptr += keyslot_data_len;
++
++	if (!backup_segments_serialize(hdr, ptr))
++		goto bad;
++	ptr += segments_data_len;
++
++	assert((size_t)(ptr - (uint8_t*)data->key) == data_len);
++
++	*verification_data = data;
++
++	return 0;
++bad:
++	crypt_free_volume_key(data);
++	return -EINVAL;
++}
++
++int LUKS2_keyslot_reencrypt_digest_create(struct crypt_device *cd,
++	struct luks2_hdr *hdr,
++	struct volume_key *vks)
++{
++	int digest_reencrypt, keyslot_reencrypt, r;
++	struct volume_key *data;
++
++	keyslot_reencrypt = LUKS2_find_keyslot(hdr, "reencrypt");
++	if (keyslot_reencrypt < 0)
++		return keyslot_reencrypt;
++
++	r = reencrypt_assembly_verification_data(cd, hdr, vks, &data);
++	if (r < 0)
++		return r;
++
++	r = LUKS2_digest_create(cd, "pbkdf2", hdr, data);
++	crypt_free_volume_key(data);
++	if (r < 0)
++		return r;
++
++	digest_reencrypt = r;
++
++	r = LUKS2_digest_assign(cd, hdr, keyslot_reencrypt, CRYPT_ANY_DIGEST, 0, 0);
++	if (r < 0)
++		return r;
++
++	return LUKS2_digest_assign(cd, hdr, keyslot_reencrypt, digest_reencrypt, 1, 0);
++}
++
++int LUKS2_reencrypt_digest_verify(struct crypt_device *cd,
++	struct luks2_hdr *hdr,
++	struct volume_key *vks)
++{
++	int r, keyslot_reencrypt;
++	struct volume_key *data;
++
++	keyslot_reencrypt = LUKS2_find_keyslot(hdr, "reencrypt");
++	if (keyslot_reencrypt < 0)
++		return keyslot_reencrypt;
++
++	r = reencrypt_assembly_verification_data(cd, hdr, vks, &data);
++	if (r < 0)
++		return r;
++
++	r = LUKS2_digest_verify(cd, hdr, data, keyslot_reencrypt);
++	crypt_free_volume_key(data);
++
++	if (r < 0) {
++		if (r == -ENOENT)
++			log_dbg(cd, "Reencryption digest is missing.");
++		log_err(cd, _("Reencryption metadata is invalid."));
++	} else
++		log_dbg(cd, "Reencryption metadata verified.");
++
++	return r;
++}
+diff --git a/lib/setup.c b/lib/setup.c
+index 567f262..21a41a3 100644
+--- a/lib/setup.c
++++ b/lib/setup.c
+@@ -4023,6 +4023,12 @@ static int _open_and_activate_reencrypt_device(struct crypt_device *cd,
+ 			keyslot = r;
+ 	}
+ 
++	if (r >= 0) {
++		r = LUKS2_reencrypt_digest_verify(cd, hdr, vks);
++		if (r < 0)
++			goto err;
++	}
++
+ 	log_dbg(cd, "Entering clean reencryption state mode.");
+ 
+ 	if (r >= 0)
+@@ -4050,8 +4056,9 @@ static int _open_and_activate_luks2(struct crypt_device *cd,
+ 	uint32_t flags)
+ {
+ 	crypt_reencrypt_info ri;
+-	int r;
++	int r, rv;
+ 	struct luks2_hdr *hdr = &cd->u.luks2.hdr;
++	struct volume_key *vks = NULL;
+ 
+ 	ri = LUKS2_reenc_status(hdr);
+ 	if (ri == CRYPT_REENCRYPT_INVALID)
+@@ -4061,9 +4068,17 @@ static int _open_and_activate_luks2(struct crypt_device *cd,
+ 		if (name)
+ 			r = _open_and_activate_reencrypt_device(cd, hdr, keyslot, name, passphrase,
+ 					passphrase_size, flags);
+-		else
++		else {
+ 			r = _open_all_keys(cd, hdr, keyslot, passphrase,
+-					   passphrase_size, flags, NULL);
++					   passphrase_size, flags, &vks);
++			if (r < 0)
++				return r;
++
++			rv = LUKS2_reencrypt_digest_verify(cd, hdr, vks);
++			crypt_free_volume_key(vks);
++			if (rv < 0)
++				return rv;
++		}
+ 	} else
+ 		r = _open_and_activate(cd, keyslot, name, passphrase,
+ 				passphrase_size, flags);
+diff --git a/po/POTFILES.in b/po/POTFILES.in
+index 8c1f2b7..9d4958b 100644
+--- a/po/POTFILES.in
++++ b/po/POTFILES.in
+@@ -37,6 +37,7 @@ lib/luks2/luks2_keyslot_luks2.c
+ lib/luks2/luks2_keyslot_reenc.c
+ lib/luks2/luks2_luks1_convert.c
+ lib/luks2/luks2_reencrypt.c
++lib/luks2/luks2_reencrypt_digest.c
+ lib/luks2/luks2_segment.c
+ lib/luks2/luks2_token.c
+ lib/luks2/luks2_token_keyring.c
+-- 
+2.23.0
+

cryptsetup.spec

@@ -1,26 +1,28 @@
 Name:     cryptsetup
-Version:  2.3.1
-Release:  1
+Version:  2.3.3
+Release:  7
 Summary:  Utility used to conveniently set up disk encryption
-License:  GPLv2+ and LGPLv2+
+License:  GPLv2+ and CC0-1.0 and LGPLv2+
 URL:      https://gitlab.com/cryptsetup/cryptsetup
-Source0:  https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/utils/cryptsetup/v2.0/cryptsetup-%{version}.tar.xz
+Source0:  https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/utils/cryptsetup/v2.3/cryptsetup-%{version}.tar.xz
 
+Patch1:  0001-cryptsetup-add-system-library-paths.patch
+Patch2:  0002-fix-compat-test.patch
+Patch3:  0003-Check-segment-gaps-regardless-of-heap-space.patch
+Patch4:  0004-Fix-posible-buffer-overflows-in-LUKS-conversion.patch
+Patch5:  0005-Fix-a-memleak-in-blockwise-test.patch
+Patch6:  0006-CVE-2021-4122.patch
 
-Patch0:   0001-cryptsetup-add-system-library-paths.patch
-
-BuildRequires: openssl-devel, popt-devel, device-mapper-devel git
-BuildRequires: libuuid-devel, json-c-devel, libargon2-devel, libpwquality-devel libblkid-devel
-BuildRequires: python2-devel python3-devel
+BuildRequires: openssl-devel, popt-devel, device-mapper-devel,  gcc
+BuildRequires: libuuid-devel, json-c-devel, libargon2-devel, libpwquality-devel, libblkid-devel
 Requires:      libpwquality >= 1.2.0
 
 Provides:      %{name}-luks = %{version}-%{release}
 Obsoletes:     %{name}-luks < 1.4.0
 Provides:      %{name}-libs %{name}-libs%{?_isa}
 Obsoletes:     %{name}-libs
-
-%{!?python_sitearch: %global python_sitearch %(%{__python} -c \
-"from distutils.sysconfig import get_python_lib; print get_python_lib(1)")}
+Obsoletes:     python2-%{name} < 2.1.0
+Obsoletes:     %{name}-python3 < 2.1.0
 
 %description
 cryptsetup is a utility used to conveniently set up disk encryption based
@@ -66,15 +68,17 @@ Requires:   man
 This contains man files for the using of cryptsetup.
 
 %prep
-%autosetup -n %{name}-%{version}  -p1 -S git
+%autosetup -n %{name}-%{version} -p1
 
 %build
 %configure --enable-fips --enable-pwquality --enable-libargon2 --with-crypto_backend=openssl
 %make_build
 
+%check
+make check
+
 %install
 %make_install
-
 %find_lang cryptsetup
 
 %post -n cryptsetup -p /sbin/ldconfig
@@ -96,7 +100,6 @@ This contains man files for the using of cryptsetup.
 %{_includedir}/libcryptsetup.h
 %{_libdir}/pkgconfig/libcryptsetup.pc
 
-
 %files -n veritysetup
 %{_sbindir}/veritysetup
 
@@ -111,6 +114,23 @@ This contains man files for the using of cryptsetup.
 %{_mandir}/man8/*
 
 %changelog
+* Mon Oct 17 2022 wuguanghao <wuguanghao3@huawei.com> - 2.3.3-7
+- add CC0-1.0 license
+
+* Mon Jan 24 2022 yanglongakang <yanglongkang@huawei.com> - 2.3.3-6
+- Fix CVE-2021-4122
+
+* Fri Jul 30 2021 chenyanpanHW <chenyanpan@huawei.com> - 2.3.3-5
+- DESC: delete -S git from %autosetup, and delete BuildRequires git
+
+* Thu Jul 1 2021 yanglongkang <yanglongkang@huawei.com> - 2.3.3-4
+- add buildrequire gcc
+  add make check
+  backport upstream patches to solve several problems -epoch2
+
+* Sat Jul 18 2020 Ruijun Ge <geruijun@huawei.com> - 2.3.3-1
+- update to 2.3.3 version
+
 * Mon Apr 13 2020 wangjufeng <wangjufeng@huawei.com> - 2.3.1-1
 - Type:enhancemnet
 - ID:NA